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Introduction 
INCENTIVES 
“People are people, and they respond to incentives. They can nearly always be 
manipulated -for good or ill - if only you find the right levers.” (Levitt and Dubner, 
2009). Incentives play a central role in our lives. Even if we do not always notice them 
immediately, we are all guided by them in everyday life. For example, we are offered 
coupons for a certain store which encourage us to buy our groceries there, we donate 
blood because afterwards we feel good about ourselves, and we work long hours at a 
consultancy to meet the ideal of a corporate culture.  
These examples indicate that the types and mechanisms of incentives are manifold 
and that they work by reference to different underlying human motivations. According 
to Bénabou and Tirole (2006), human motivations can be categorized as intrinsic, 
extrinsic, and reputational. While individuals are intrinsically motivated by a task itself, 
e.g. in the case of altruism, extrinsic motivation can be derived from a monetary or 
material reward.1 Reputational motivation is based on the assumption that people are 
motivated by signaling behavior that is perceived as good by society, thus conforming 
to social pressure or norms. Good behavior can either be signaled to oneself in order 
to uphold a certain self-image and self-esteem (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002, Dana et al., 
2007), or to others in order to be perceived as good by others and receive a positive 
social reputation (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, Rege and Telle, 2004, Ariely et al., 2009). 
In practice, extrinsic and reputational incentives are frequently implemented in order 
to change a person’s behavior, and all of the incentives above mentioned imply either 
monetary rewards or reputational concerns. Coupons are an extrinsic monetary 
incentive, donating blood involves reputational motivation in the sense of signaling 
good behavior to oneself, and working long hours at a consultancy brings reputational 
motivation in the sense signaling good behavior to others.  
Economists use incentives widely to change the behavior of economic agents towards 
more desirable outcomes. In the last decades, incentives have played an important 
                                                                
1
 Regarding the interplay between these two motivations, both theoretical models (Bénabou 
and Tirole, 2003) and experimental evidence (see e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, Gneezy and 
Rutichini, 2000) show that extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation. 
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role especially for labor relationships, where the interests of the firm and of the 
employee are often not aligned. In order to motivate people to act in their interest, 
firms typically embed incentives within compensation schemes. In recent years, 
incentives that reward performance have become especially popular in business 
practice. Just recently, the new Yahoo chief executive Marissa Mayer was awarded a 
highly performance-dependent payment package. It includes a base salary of $1 
million and various performance-based payments such as a bonus of up to $4 million if 
predetermined performance measures are met.2 
When individual performance is easily observable, i.e. when the executed task is 
simple, empirical evidence finds that performance incentives matter. Lazear (2000) 
shows that output increased by 44 % when compensation for workers of a glass 
manufacturer was changed from salary to piece rate. Paarsch and Shearer (2000) 
indicate that productivity in a tree-planting firm was higher by 22.6% for workers who 
received piece rate compensation than for those who received a fixed payment. 
Bandiera et al. (2007) show that productivity increased by 21% when the 
compensation of managers for a soft fruit producer in the UK was changed from a 
fixed wage to piece rate.   
However, for most workers performance is not easily measureable due the complexity 
of the task to be executed (Pendergast, 1999).  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this dissertation is to empirically and theoretically investigate the effects of 
different performance incentives on individual distribution and provision behavior in 
such complex production situations. Chapter 1, Fischbacher et al. (2013), analyzes 
whether the salience of performance measures in complex team production situations 
plays an important role for perceptions of distributive fairness by means of a 
laboratory experiment. Chapters 2-5, i.e. Brosig-Koch et al. (2013a, b), Kairies and 
Krieger (2013), and Kairies (2012), investigate whether and how different monetary 
and non-monetary incentives affect provision behavior of professionals whose 
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 See New York Times: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/adding-up-marissa-mayers-
pay-at-yahoo/ (retrieved:04.02.2013) 
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performance is multidimensional and difficult to measure – in this case physicians – by 
using laboratory experiments and a theoretical model.  
TEAM PRODUCTION: WHO CONTRIBUTES? 
First, complexity of a job may arise when many workers execute tasks for which the 
outcome is not solely the result of individual inputs, but also of joint inputs by multiple 
workers. Examples of joint production where individual contributions are not easily 
measurable include joint ventures, government agencies, law firms, teaching, and 
medical practice. As individual contributions in work teams are often difficult to 
observe, employees are frequently paid a fixed share of the total outcome. However, 
compensation schemes which do not account for individual performance may lead to 
shirking and inefficient effort levels due to free-riding (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, 
Holmstrom, 1982).  
When performance is not fully observable firms sometimes make use of subjective 
performance measures (Rajan and Reichelstein, 2006). Subjective performance 
measures, however, often lead to rent-seeking activities by supervisors (Holmstrom 
1982, Milgrom and Roberts, 1988), which in turn may cause disputes among 
employees and even, e.g., costly strikes. In order to forgo such disputes and design 
adequate subjective performance measures for team production, it is hence important 
to understand people’s perceptions of distributive fairness in joint production 
situations.  
MULTIPLE ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE: WHAT CAN BE OBSERVED?  
Second, performance is often difficult to measure when tasks or jobs are more 
complex in the sense that they have more than one outcome dimension, e.g. not only 
quantity but also quality. For hairdressers, for instance, it might not only be important 
how many haircuts they give per day, but also how nice and well cut they are.  When 
only few dimensions are actually measureable and included in performance metrics, 
employees may substitute incentivized aspects for non-incentivized aspects as a result 
of multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, Baker 1992, Courty and Marschke, 
2004). Typical professional groups in which it is difficult to measure all dimensions of 
performance include lawyers, teachers, and physicians. 
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Especially the compensation of the latter has drawn much media attention in Germany 
in recent months. In the city of Goettingen, e.g., a physician at a hospital forged 
patient data in order to receive donor organs, as performance incentives were based 
on the quantity of organ transplants conducted.3 Performance payment dependent on 
the quantity of medical services is common in health care, as outcomes in terms of 
patient well-being are difficult to observe. Typically, physicians have been 
remunerated by compensation schemes such as fee-for-service or capitation. Under 
fee-for-service, a physician receives a fee for each quantity of medical treatment 
provided, and under capitation he receives a lump-sum payment per capita 
irrespective of the quantity of medical treatment provided. From a theoretical point of 
view these incentives are thus contrary to each other. While a fee-for service 
compensation leads to the overprovision of medical treatment, capitation leads to 
underprovision (Ellis and McGuire, 1986).  Payment reforms targeting under- and 
overprovision include mixed payment systems which are usually a combination of 
these basic payment schemes (Krasnik et al., 1990, Iversen and Lurås, 2000, Dumont et 
al., 2008). 
Neither the classic payment schemes nor mixed models, however, usually target what 
ought to be most important: the patient outcome. As President Barack Obama of the 
United States of America put it in his speech to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
in 2009: “You did not enter this profession to be bean counters and paper pushers. You 
entered this profession to be healers”.4 Relating this notion to physician payment 
suggests that future compensation schemes should take this most fundamental aspect 
of the medical profession, the quality of care, into account. Reforms targeted at 
improving the quality of care include pay-for-performance incentives, or paying 
physicians to fulfill certain predetermined performance measures of which some are 
outcome related (Doran et al., 2006, Rosenthal, 2008). Non-monetary incentives are 
even more frequently used in attempts to improve the quality of care. Non-monetary 
performance incentives are based on the theoretical assumption that people are not 
solely motivated by money but also care about their self-esteem (Bénabou and Tirole, 
                                                                
3
 See e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: http://www.faz.net/-gqe-721ce (retrieved: 
12.08.2012) 
4
 See e.g. in the New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/health/policy/16obama.html?ref=politics&pagewanted=
print&_r=0 (retrieved: 21.01.2012) 
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2002), i.e. they like being a good physician, or their social reputation (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006), i.e. they like being perceived as being a good physician by others.  In 
practice, policy makers have started to implement private and public feedback systems 
in several countries. While private feedback speaks to self-esteem, public feedback 
also addresses the desire to be perceived as a good physician.5  
THE METHOD OF ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS 
Using experiments in the economic sciences is a rather new development. In contrast 
to other sciences such as biology, physics or chemistry, economic science was purely 
observational and theoretical for a long time (Cronson and Gächter, 2010).  While 
economic theories offer a good framework to analyze and describe economic 
situations, they are limited as they are an abstraction and are based on behavioral 
assumptions. Generally speaking, behavioral assumptions include economic agents’ 
evaluation of outcomes implied in their preferences, their cognitive abilities such as 
decisions under uncertainty, and their behavior usually described in equilibrium 
solution concepts. Despite the fact that economic theories are only an abstraction, 
they are useful as they provide testable and thus falsifiable (see e.g., Popper 1934, 
1963) predictions. To test the predictions of theories one needs to collect data. 
However, natural experiments which guarantee control of the environment are very 
rare. Control means that only the parameters of interest (the treatments) are varied 
and hence changes in behavior can be attributed only to the changes in these 
parameters. A further problem is that in order to truly test a theory, an experiment 
must test not only the predictions of the model but also its assumptions – a 
predicament known as the Duhem-Quine problem. In the case that the predictions of 
an experiment are not verified, one cannot say whether this is due to a violation of the 
assumptions made, or to a wrong prediction of the theory. In this case, laboratory 
experiments have an advantage over using field data, as assumptions and predictions 
can be tested separately.6  
                                                                
5
 In the long-term, public feedback can also have financial consequences for physicians. 
6
 However, laboratory experiments often cannot entirely avoid this problem, as they rely on 
certain assumptions as well, e.g. that the subjects’ utilities depend primarily on their payoff. 
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According to Smith (2002), the ideal method for conducting laboratory experiments is 
to first derive a testable prediction from a well-specified theory and then implement 
an experimental design that implicitly includes auxiliary assumptions which have been 
tested in previous experiments. The latter include using relevant and clear instructions 
about what the subjects in an experiment can do, what they know, how their decisions 
are transformed into monetary payoffs guaranteeing that subjects take their decisions 
seriously, and randomly assigning the subject pool, usually consisting of students. In 
short, laboratory experiments are an abstraction of real world economic decisions, just 
like theories. Compared to data collection in the field, however, they have the 
advantages of control over parameters and auxiliary assumptions and a less biased 
subject pool. Following Roth (1995), economic experiments are conducted for roughly 
three purposes: to test theories (“Speaking to Theorists”), to observe new regularities 
of human behavior (“Searching for Facts”), and as test beds for policy instruments 
(“Whispering in the Ears of Princes”). 
The aim of experiments of the first type is to analyze existing theories and give 
feedback, hopefully engendering a fruitful dialogue between experimenters and 
theorists. Economists started to conduct formal economic experiments to test theories 
in the first half of the 20th century. Early experiments included the analysis of individual 
choice behavior, such as testing the indifference curve (Thurstone, 1931). Another 
substantial impulse for experimental economics was given by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” (1944). Their expected 
utility theory provided a basis for new experiments which tested game theoretic 
predictions (Mosteller and Nogee, 1951, Allais, 1953, Flood, 1952). In a third 
experimental wave in the 1960s economists then began testing theories of industrial 
organization, e.g. on bargaining in oligopolies (Sauermann and Selten, 1960), 
duopolies, and bilateral monopolies (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960).  
The second category of economic experiments evolved through ongoing 
experimentation. Experimenters often observe robust regularities of behavior which 
have not yet been explained by theory. Ideally, these observations then lead to the 
development of new theories. Observations from experiments led, e.g., to the 
development of prospect theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979), or theories of 
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Theories of 
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inequity aversion are a prime example, as they themselves provided new predictions 
which were tested (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). As a consequence of observed 
inconsistencies, new theories of other-regarding preferences were developed 
(Charness and Rabin, 2002, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Thus, experimentation leads 
to a continuous dialogue between theorists and experimenters with the aim of 
improving theories. 
The latest category of the three comprehends experiments which provide a test bed 
for policy makers. Such experiments are usually motivated by the intention of decision 
makers to change institutions. Beyond control and random subject pools, laboratory 
experiments also offer the advantage of being a relatively cost-efficient means of 
testing new institutions. Policy changes usually concern market designs, including for 
instance a kidney exchange system (Roth et al. 2004, 2005), school and university 
admissions (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2005, Dwenger et al., 2010), spectrum auctions 
(Grimm et al., 2003), or online auctions (Bolton et al., 2004, Ariely et al., 2005). 
According to Roth (1988) economic experimentation has started its “steady and 
sustained transformation from an occasional curiosity into a regular means for 
investigating many kinds of economic phenomena”. The success of this method can be 
underlined by the fact that the share of experimental papers published in the top three 
economics journals has risen from 0.84% -1.58% in the 1980s to 3.80-4.15% between 
2000 and 2008 (Falk and Heckmann, 2009).7  However, experiments still face 
resistance. One point of criticism is that laboratory experiments lack realism and thus 
many economists argue that field experiments are of greater relevance to policy (Levitt 
and List, 2007, 2009). In particular, they criticize that in laboratory experiments 
subjects are scrutinized, there is a deficiency of anonymity between experimenter and 
subject, decision situations often lack context dependency, stakes are not realistic, and 
only certain types of subjects select into experiments. However, Falk and Heckman 
(2009) argue that realism is not the real issue in the debate over “laboratory vs. field”, 
but rather the possibility of isolating causal effects – which in turn calls for more 
laboratory experimentation. Examples for laboratory experiments trying to isolate 
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 The three top journals include The American Economic Review, Econometrica, and The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
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causal effects include research analyzing games with high stakes, or using subjects who 
are not students and, e.g., CEOs (Fehr and List, 2004).  
The method of experimental economics is thus ideal for analyzing complex production 
situations. While theoretical models on performance incentives in the workplace are 
abundant, testing them in the field is often difficult when production processes or job 
tasks are more complex. This holds especially in team production and for tasks for 
which not all dimensions of performance are measurable and environmental 
influences are difficult to control for. In the context of team production where 
individual contributions are often difficult to observe, we use a laboratory experiment 
to control for the complexity of the production process. In the field of health 
economics laboratory experiments are relatively new and few studies exist so far (an 
early example is Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). Using the method of laboratory 
experiments to analyze physician compensation schemes has several advantages. In a 
laboratory experiment we can investigate individual decision behavior before and after 
a payment reform by varying the performance incentives and keeping everything else 
constant. In addition, we are able to assume that quality is fully observable and hence 
exclude the problem of multitasking. To control for external validity, we also conduct 
laboratory experiments with medical students.8 Experimental economics may thus 
offer health policy makers a cost efficient way to analyze the effects of planned 
reforms before they are implemented and thus help to avoid costly policy failures.  
 In the following I summarize Chapters 1-5 of my dissertation. 
CHAPTER 1  
In Chapter 1, we address the problem of performance measurement in complex team 
production. In team production processes, mutually agreed-upon distribution rules for 
the ex post allocation of the joint product are vital to providing team members with 
adequate monetary incentives ex ante. However, if team members regard the 
distribution of income as unfair their motivation might be negatively affected. The 
degree to which individual performance is observable determines the availability of 
performance measures as a basis for monetary incentives, but it also affects team 
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 We also began conducting laboratory experiments with actual physicians, though not enough 
observations are available yet to perform meaningful analyses. 
9 
 
member’s norms of distributive fairness.  The degree to which performance measures 
are obvious occurs especially in complex team production situations in which 
individual contributions to the joint output are often difficult to observe, for instance 
in work teams, co-authored publications, joint ventures, or mergers or acquisitions. 
For the latter, Cronson et al. (2004) for example find that they may result in both 
synergies and negative externalities, thus making it difficult to observe individual 
contributions. Recent experimental evidence shows that team members allocate their 
effort according to distributive norms which account for individual contributions 
(Konow, 2000, Gantner et al., 2001, Cappelen et al., 2007, Cappelen, et al., 2008, 
Konow et al., 2009).  The most prominent distribution norms include equal sharing 
based on the fairness ideal of strict egalitarianism (Nielsen, 1985), accountability in the 
sense of holding people responsible only for factors in their control (Konow, 1996, 
2000), and marginal productivities based on the libertarian fairness ideal (Nozick, 
1974). However, only few studies can accommodate the complexity of a production 
process. While Gächter and Riedl (2005) account for negative externalities and 
Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2011) for uncertainty in the production process – they show 
that entitlements play a role under these circumstances – they are not able to 
investigate the prevalence of distributive norms.  
However, as it is crucial from a motivational point of view to anticipate perceptions of 
distributive fairness for the design of performance measures, we use a laboratory 
experiment to analyze what people consider a fair distribution when individual 
contributions are not readily apparent. The experimental design is as follows: Joint 
production for a team of two takes place by a neutral third party. Team members can 
increase joint output by answering a knowledge question. Thus, effort costs are not 
observable. Varying the increase in the joint output resulting from each team member 
giving the correct answer allows us to investigate whether individual inputs (i.e. giving 
the right answer per se) or marginal productivities (i.e. the increase in points realized 
by giving the correct answer) affect the distribution chosen. In each of the nine 
production situations we showed our participants a payoff matrix in which three 
situations were additive, three allowed for synergies, and three for negative 
externalities. Hence, individual marginal productivities were noticeable, but not always 
apparent. 
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Our results indicate that people hold others responsible for their inputs, i.e. they 
distribute according to the accountability principle. In particular in the asymmetric 
cases, third parties allocate more points to the subject who knew the correct answer 
to the knowledge question. In the symmetric cases, in which both subjects either know 
or do not know the correct answer, they distribute equally. The predominance of the 
accountability principle is robust to the role of the person distributing the joint 
production payoff, i.e. whether it is the neutral third party or the proposers and 
responders in an Ultimatum Game, and to the framing of the production process, i.e. 
whether it is simultaneous or sequential. Although both our framings are economically 
equivalent, marginal productivities are only considered if they are made apparent. 
Hence, the results offer an explanation for why subjective performance measures are 
frequently regarded as unfair. 
CHAPTER 2 
In chapters 2-5, performance incentives for the medical profession are analyzed. As 
mentioned earlier, the treatment quality provided by physicians is difficult to measure 
and thus difficult to control. Abstracting from measurement difficulties, the effects of 
different monetary and non-monetary performance incentives for physicians are 
analyzed by means of laboratory experiments in Chapters 2-4 and by a theoretical 
model in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 2, we derive an experimental design of performance incentives for 
physicians and analyze provision behavior under the basic incentive schemes of 
capitation and fee-for-service as well as various mixtures of the two.  
Concerning the basic incentives, theory suggests the effects of underprovison given 
capitation and overprovision given fee-for-service are mitigated in mixed 
remuneration systems (Ellis and McGuire, 1986). Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) provide 
empirical evidence which supports this. However, their experimental design involves a 
rather complicated parameterization of payment incentives and patient health benefit. 
As a consequence, it lacks comparability across payment incentives and different 
patient types. Moreover, they use an across-subject design which does not allow for 
within-subject analysis. Our study models a much more general framework for the 
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classic payment schemes of capitation and fee-for-service, with patient benefits that 
allow for a clear characterization of illness and severity of illness.  
In order to mitigate the effects of under- and overprovision, several countries have 
introduced mixed payment systems. Empirical evidence confirm that mixed payment 
incentives can have this effect, see e.g. Krasnik et al. (1990) for Denmark, Iversen und 
Lurås (2000) for Norway or Dumont et al. (2008) for Canada. These field studies, 
however, lack control over some aspects such as the variation of multiple parameters 
of the payment systems, self-selection of physicians into new payment systems, and 
missing acknowledgement of institutional characteristics or the health status of 
patients treated. Hence, they are not controlled analyses of the effect of mixed 
payment incentives on physician provision behavior.  
To complement the existing field studies, we conduct a controlled laboratory 
experiment. In this experiment subjects take on the role of a physician and decide on 
the quantity of medical treatment for nine different patient types which result from 
the combination of three different illnesses (A,B,C) and three different severities of 
these illnesses (x,y,z). Patients are not present in the laboratory. However, subjects are 
informed that the monetary value of the patient benefit arising from their treatment 
decision goes to real patients who are treated for eye cataract. Thus, their decisions 
enable surgery for real patients. To account for the character of a payment reform we 
use a within-subject design. In part 1 of the laboratory experiment, subjects decide on 
the quantity of medical treatment for the nine patients under either capitation or fee-
for-service remuneration. In part 2, they are then faced with different mixtures of 
these two basic payment systems, which diverge from the basic remuneration scheme 
in part 1 to varying degrees. 
We find that mixed payment incentives significantly dampen the effects of over- and 
underprovision observed under fee-for-service and capitation. Hence, patients are 
better off under mixed payment than under the basic payment systems. However, 
considering efficiency, i.e. cost-benefit analysis, we find no significant improvement. 
Hence, the increase in money put into the system cannot be outweighed by the 
increased patient benefits. Concerning the patient types, we find that severities play a 
significant role, whereas illnesses do not.  
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CHAPTER 3 
In Chapter 3 we analyze whether pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives improve 
patient care compared to the pure payment systems of capitation and fee-for service. 
P4P incentives explicitly target the quality of care and not simply the quantity of 
treatment provided. They have been implemented in several countries such as the UK 
(Doran et al., 2006, Campbell et al., 2009), the USA (Rosenthal et al., 2004, and 
Rosenthal, 2008), Australia (Duckett et al. 2008, Scott, 2008, Scott et al., 2009), Korea 
(Kim, 2012), New Zealand (Perkins and Seddon, 2006, and Buetow, 2008), and Spain 
(Gené-Badia et al., 2007). Despite the popularity of P4P incentives, good data for 
evaluation is limited and it is yet an unanswered question, whether P4P incentives 
actually lead to an increase in the quality of care (Maynard, 2012). Existing evidence on 
early implementations generally shows that the effects on the overall quality of 
medical care were rather moderate; see e.g. Mullen et al. (2010) for the California P4P 
scheme or Campbell et al. (2009) and Gravelle et al. (2010) for the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework in the UK. A possible reason for the ambiguous effects may be 
negative side-effects due to design problems arising from the complexity of measuring 
quality. These include substitution away from non-incentivized to incentivized quality 
aspects of care (Mullen et al., 2010), improving quality to the performance target 
(Campbell et al., 2009), or gaming quality indicators by exception reporting (Gravelle et 
al., 2010). This raises the question whether the implemented quality metrics were not 
reliable, or whether perhaps P4P incentives fail to work at all.   
Our experiment serves as a first step towards understanding the effects of P4P 
incentives within a medical context in a controlled environment. We build on the 
experimental design on the basis of capitation and fee-for-service remuneration 
outlined in Chapter 2. The design is again sequential, i.e. subjects in the role of a 
physician decide on the quantity of medical treatment for nine different patients, 
under a basic payment scheme in the first part of the experiment and under pay-for-
performance payment in the second part. We attempt to capture the predominant 
characteristics of pay-for-performance incentives in the field in our design of the 
incentive mechanism.  The performance incentive is thus modeled as an additional 
bonus given on top of the existing basic payment. Physicians can receive a bonus when 
they provide good performance. The performance measure is based on treatment 
13 
 
quality, i.e. patient outcomes, which is perfectly observable in our experiment. The 
bonus is paid when the physician provides a quantity of medical treatment within a 
predefined interval around the around the patient-optimal level. We conduct our 
experiments with non-medical and medical students as subjects and can therefore 
control for any differences in behavior which may result from professional norms.  
We find that physician provision behavior under pay-for-performance incentives 
differs significantly from that under basic capitation and fee-for-service remuneration. 
Given additional performance incentives, physicians treat patients at levels much 
closer to their optimum, hence improving the quality of care. We also consider the 
benefit/cost ratio for P4P as compared to the basic payment schemes and find that the 
increase in the additional costs cannot be overcompensated by the increase in patient 
benefits. This result supports the findings of previous field studies (see e.g. Mullen et 
al. 2010). Provision behavior is robust for medical and non-medical students. 
Moreover, an analysis of individual behavior reveals that given financial P4P incentives 
the majority of physicians can be classified as profit maximizers. Thus, this supports or 
finding that physicians respond to financial P4P incentives by increasing the quality of 
care. Hence, our results lead us to conclude that financial P4P incentives are able to 
increase patient benefits, but do not improve cost-effectiveness. 
CHAPTER 4 
In Chapter 4, we experimentally investigate whether and how non-financial 
performance incentives affect physician provision behavior. Non-monetary incentives 
have become another interesting approach for policy makers, as they might lead to 
improvements in patient care at a much lower cost than monetary incentives (Dranove 
and Jin, 2010). Non-monetary performance incentives are typically introduced in the 
form of public quality reporting, and evidence shows that they lead physicians to 
change their provision behavior. Although some evidence suggests an improvement in 
quality for the reported aspects (Hannan et al. 1994, Rosenthal et al., 1997) public 
reporting also leads to unintended problems, leaving the effect on the overall quality 
of care ambiguous (Marshall, 2000). Such problems include substitution away from 
unreported aspects of care (Werner et al., 2009) or patient selection (Dranove et al., 
2003, Cutler et al., 2004, Werner and Asch, 2005). Also, this type of incentive is 
sensitive to regional heterogeneity in the degree of market competition (Grabowski 
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and Town, 2011) and simultaneous introduction with monetary incentives (Maynard, 
2012).  Consequently, Cutler et al. (2004) postulate the need for more research on 
non-monetary performance incentives in order to better understand the underlying 
mechanisms that drive changes in physician provision behavior.  
We therefore investigate how non-monetary performance incentives for physicians 
affect the quality of medical services provided in a controlled laboratory experiment. 
This design, too, builds on the framework described in Chapter 2. Physicians decide on 
the quantity of medical treatment for nine different patients. In part 1 of the 
experiment subjects decide under fee-for-service incentives, while in part 2 they are 
informed that in addition to this they will receive either private or public feedback on 
their performance at the end of the experiment. We distinguish between private and 
public performance feedback as it is necessary from a theoretical point of view. While 
private feedback provides competitive incentives addressing self-esteem (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2002), making relative performance known to others adds a reputational 
motivation (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). We measure performance in terms of outcome 
quality for all patients and give feedback in the form of competitive rankings. At the 
end of the experiment subjects receive private feedback by being shown their 
individual position in the ranking of all attendees on their computer screen. For public 
feedback subjects stand up at the end of the experiment while the ranking is read out 
loud by the experimenter; this procedure is similar to those used by Rege and Telle 
(2004) and Ariely et al. (2009). We conduct this experiment with non-medical and 
medical students. 
Our results show that public feedback incentives have an effect on the quality of 
medical care.  We find that this effect depends on the feedback mode. While private 
feedback has no impact on the quality of care, public feedback has a significant 
positive impact. Our results are robust to a subject’s degree program (medical studies 
or other), changes in the task order, and other socio-demographic factors.  
CHAPTER 5 
In Chapter 5, I construct a theoretical framework that provides insights into how 
monetary and non-monetary incentives work when they are implemented jointly.  
15 
 
In the last decades, especially monetary-incentives have been used to improve the 
quality of medical treatment in terms of patient outcomes. However, if physician 
payment includes high monetary incentives dependent on the quantity of treatment, 
overprovision is likely (Ellis and McGuire, 1986). This is the case e.g. within Medicare in 
the US, where physicians receive high fee-for-service payments. Overprovision is a 
crucial problem as it is not only costly, but may even harm patients’ health, e.g. when 
excess x-rays or medications are subscribed. In a situation of overprovision, a policy 
maker’s two prevalent goals of improving the quality of care while reducing its costs 
need not be mutually exclusive. In recent years health policy makers have started to 
make use of non-monetary incentives based on reputational motivation (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006). In contrast to monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives may have 
the advantage that they come at relatively low costs and may be an important means 
to improving treatment quality.9 Non-financial incentives addressing social 
reputational concerns are predominantly implemented in the form of public quality 
reporting. Early evidence shows that physicians respond to these incentives (Dranove 
et al., 2003, Cutler et al., 2004, Werner and Asch, 2005). 
In order to analyze monetary and non-monetary incentives and account for the 
scenario of overprovision of medical treatment, I extend the seminal paper by Siciliani 
(2009). In contrast to Siciliani, I focus the analysis on non-monetary incentives 
addressing reputational motivation. Additionally, I conduct an efficiency analysis and 
derive the efficiency maximizing price. The assumptions of the model can be 
summarized as follows. Monetary incentives are given by a fee-for-service for each 
quantity of medical treatment. When abstracting from reputational motivation, a 
higher fee-for-service leads to an increase in medical treatment as it increases 
physicians' marginal revenues. To account for reputational motivation, I introduce a 
patient benefit function which links the quantity of care to the corresponding patient 
benefit. I assume that physicians are altruistic, as in Ellis and McGuire (1986), and that 
they care about their reputation, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006). Like Ellis and 
McGuire (1986), but in contrast to Siciliani (2009), I assume that patients are 
characterized by a peaked patient benefit function allowing for under- and 
overprovision of care. If physicians treat patients close to their benefit maximum, i.e. 
                                                                
9
 When neglecting the implementation costs of public reporting systems. 
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over- or underprovision are low, they receive an extra gain in utility by being perceived 
as “good”. Physicians are heterogeneous in their degree of altruism. Those who are 
more altruistic adjust the quantity of care in order to be perceived as “good”, while 
less altruistic physicians maximize their profits.  
I find that in contrast to monetary incentives, better reputational motivation 
unambiguously reduces the magnitude of overprovision, which in turn increases 
patient benefit and decreases the costs of healthcare provision. Moreover, regarding 
the efficiency of the monetary incentive scheme, which trades-off physicians' demand 
for a high fee-for-service (higher marginal revenues) against the patients' interest in a 
low fee-for-service (less overprovision), I show that an efficiency-maximizing price 
exists and that it decreases in reputational motivation.  
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Equal Sharing, Accountability, and Productivity: An Experiment on 
Distributive Fairness in Complex Team Production Processes 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the importance of different norms of distributive fairness in a team production 
process in which individual contributions to the joint output are not directly apparent. In par-
ticular, we investigate whether people prefer to share a joint output equally (egalitarianism), 
hold others responsible for their inputs (accountability principle), or reward others for their 
additional contributions to the joint output (libertarianism). The results of our experimental 
study indicate that people hold others responsible only for controllable factors, i.e., they re-
ward others for their inputs. The predominance of the accountability principle is robust to the 
role of the person distributing the joint production payoff (neutral third party vs. proposers 
and responders in an Ultimatum Game) and to the framing of the production process (simul-
taneous vs. sequential). Marginal productivities are taken into account only when they are 
made readily apparent. Thus, our findings offer an explanation of why subjective performance 
measures are frequently regarded as unfair. 
  
 2 
I. Introduction 
In practice, situations in which members of a team or group must individually exert some ef-
fort or make relationship-specific investments in order to realize a joint output or profit are 
abundant. Real-world examples include work teams within a firm, business partnerships, cor-
porate networks, joint ventures, strategic alliances of companies, research collaborations, and 
co-authored publications. In these situations, mutually agreed-upon rules determining the ex 
post allocation of the joint output to team members are an important mechanism to provide 
team members with sufficient (monetary) incentives ex ante. However, motivation and thus 
(non-monetary) incentives might be negatively affected if team members regard the resulting 
income distribution as unfair. In this context, the degree to which individual performance is 
observable not only determines the scope of performance measures available to create suffi-
cient pecuniary incentives, but also influences the norms of distributive fairness prevalent 
within the team.  
In situations in which individual performance is observable, one efficient compensation 
scheme is the implementation of an allocation rule that takes into account team members’ 
contributions, effort levels, or inputs (Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). A typical example is a 
piece-rate compensation scheme, e.g., payment per unit of installed car windows (Lazear 
(2000)), payment per planted tree (Paarsch and Shearer (1999)), or payment per unit of har-
vested fruit (Bandiera et al. (2007)). 
Usually, however, team production processes are more complex. For example, for the majori-
ty of workers, individual performance within the work team might be hard to observe 
(Prendergast (1999)), and marginal contributions to the joint output might be even more dif-
ficult to measure. In cases in which individual performance and marginal contributions are not 
verifiable, team members are frequently remunerated by means of a pre-defined fixed share of 
the joint output (i.e., by implementing some kind of “profit sharing”). Thus, the performance 
measure does not directly depend on individual contributions. An example is the joint venture 
(named Caradigm) formed by Microsoft and General Electric as a collaboration in the health 
care sector.1 Combining Microsoft’s IT expertise with the experience of General Electric in 
health care services allows both companies to generate new products, ultimately yielding ad-
ditional profits for both. Microsoft contributes various patented software technologies 
(Amalga, Vergence) to the joint venture, while General Electric provides a huge clinical data-
                                                 
1
  See the press releases that can be found at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2012/feb12/02- 
13HIMSPR.aspx (retrieved: 14.01.2013) and http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/Press/2012/Jun12/06-
06CaradigmPR.aspx (retrieved: 14.01.2013). 
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base (Qualibria). However, the additional contributions of the two companies (e.g., human 
capital, existing customer relationships, or effort exerted) are hard to measure. As the joint 
venture is 50-50 by design, the two companies agree to equally share all future profits, inde-
pendent of their individual contributions. However, one drawback of compensation schemes 
that do not account for individual performance is that they can lead to shirking and to ineffi-
cient effort levels in the sense of free-riding (Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Baker et al. 
(1988)).  
One possible way to mitigate this incentive problem is to reward team members by means of 
subjective performance measures (Rajan and Reichelstein (2006)) that make use of partially 
non-verifiable information, e.g., the “value of the team member for the organization” or other 
proxies for non-observable individual inputs or marginal productivities. However, if team 
members have non-standard preferences, subjective performance evaluations can create new 
incentive problems (Baker et al. (1988)). One example is the evaluation process for junior 
faculty at research universities: Frequently, the evaluation scheme is not explicitly specified 
ex ante, and it probably does not entail a complete measurement of all the components that 
characterize a good scholar. Another recently discussed example that has attracted media at-
tention is the compensation of top executives. In particular, empirical evidence shows that 
CEO pay and the company’s contemporaneous performance are not closely linked (Izan et al. 
(1998), Shiwakoti et al. (2004), Kubo (2005), and Doucouliagos et al. (2007)). Case studies of 
Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, for instance, reveal that between 2000 and 2008, their top 
executives cashed out performance-based compensation of $1.4 billion and $1 billion, respec-
tively. These amounts could not be clawed back when the companies collapsed. The stake-
holders and owners of companies thus frequently question appropriateness – and fairness – of 
top management’s pay. In April 2012, for example, stockholders accounting for 55% of 
Citigroup’s shares did not approve the pay of the company’s chief executive, Vikram Pendit. 
In the previous year, Pendit had earned a total of $15 million, even though the company’s 
stock had halved in value and paid a dividend of only 1 cent per share.2 
These examples vividly illustrate that understanding the norms of distributive fairness in 
complex team production processes is crucial for the design of suitable performance 
measures. Investigation of this problem raises the following question: In cases in which indi-
vidual marginal contributions to the joint output are not directly obvious (e.g., in the presence 
of synergies or negative externalities), what allocation do team members regard as fair? 
                                                 
2
  See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6eddcc0e-8d63-11e1-b8b2-00144feab49a.html (retrieved: 13.01.2013). 
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The literature discusses a variety of fairness norms, which vary in the extent to which differ-
ent factors constituting the production process are considered in allocating the joint output. 
More precisely, the elements of the production process might not be controllable by an indi-
vidual to the same extent. Under the fairness ideal of strict egalitarianism, for example, team 
members should receive equal shares of the joint output (e.g., in cases in which a real-effort 
task is performed and there are no monetary effort costs) or equal incomes (in cases with 
monetary effort or investment costs). The accountability principle recommends that alloca-
tions only depend on (endogenous) factors that are completely under an individual’s control 
(e.g., the effort level, the effort intensity, or the investment level chosen), whereas individual 
characteristics beyond an individual’s control (e.g., talent, ability, or traits) are neglected. Un-
der the fairness ideal of liberal egalitarianism, in contrast, both effort and individual charac-
teristics affect distributional choices. Finally, the fairness ideal of libertarianism proposes that 
individuals’ contributions to the joint output should determine their shares – i.e., in addition to 
effort levels and individual characteristics, exogenous factors such as marginal productivities 
should determine the allocation of the joint output. 
In the present study, we focus on the importance of exogenous factors such as individual mar-
ginal productivities for the allocation of an output generated within a team. In our experiment, 
we investigate a situation in which two group members must answer a knowledge question to 
increase the joint output available for distribution. Varying the increase in the joint output re-
sulting from each team member giving the correct answer allows us to investigate whether in-
dividual inputs (i.e., giving the right answer per se) or marginal productivities (i.e., the in-
crease in Points realized by giving the correct answer) affect distributional choices. For each 
treatment, we observe distributional choices for nine different situations. 
In one series of experiments, a third party outside the team allocated the output to the two 
subjects who jointly generated the output within their team (Third Party Treatments). Since 
the third parties’ payoffs were not affected by their distributional choices, we should be able 
to observe the relative importance of fairness norms in an unbiased fashion. 
In the simultaneous framing condition of the Third Party Treatment (TPT), we showed our 
participants the payoff matrices resulting from the nine different situations. Thus, the individ-
ual marginal productivities realizable within the group were observable. However, since our 
design included cases with synergies and negative externalities, the reference point for the 
distribution of the joint output was not clear. Our results indicate that libertarianism does not 
explain the data, i.e., that the allocation of the joint output did not depend on exogenous mar-
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ginal productivities. Instead, group members rewarded endogenous inputs and allocated more 
Points to the subject who knew the correct answer to the knowledge question. Consequently, 
both team members received an equal share if neither or both subjects gave the correct an-
swer. If only one subject gave the right answer, this participant received a share of approxi-
mately two-thirds of the joint output. 
In the sequential framing condition of the Third Party Treatment (TPTSQM), we explicitly in-
formed our participants about the additional increase in the joint output they could realize by 
giving the correct answer. Although the TPT and the TPTSQM conditions are economically 
completely equivalent, we found that subjects considered marginal productivities only in the 
TPTSQM condition, in which output increases were made overtly apparent. One reason for 
this could be that the information about marginal productivities created personal entitlements 
to claim a share based on the increase in points a subject could realize. 
However, the difference between the TPT and the TPTSQM lies not only in the explicitness 
of the marginal productivities, but also in the sequential framing necessary to inform subjects 
about the output increase that would result from a correct answer to our knowledge question. 
In order to rule out the possibility that it was the sequential framing rather than the obvious-
ness of the incremental increase in the joint output that caused the treatment effect we ob-
served, we implemented a second sequential framing condition of the Third Party Treatment, 
in which we informed our subjects about the possible joint output payoffs (instead of the re-
sulting payoff increases) that team members could realize by giving the correct answer 
(TPTSQNM). Since our results from the TPTSQNM treatment are qualitatively similar to 
those from the TPT, sequential framing does not seem to be the reason for the shift from the 
accountability principle to libertarianism. 
In reality, situations in which a non-involved person outside the team distributes the joint 
payoff occur rather infrequently. Thus, we also investigated the more realistic case in which 
group members allocated an output they had previously generated within their groups, testing 
whether their distributive choices would be different from those of neutral third parties. Using 
the rules of the Ultimatum Game to allocate the joint output (UGT), we found that subjects in 
the UGT, the TPT, and the TPTSQNM in principle operated on the basis of the same fairness 
norms. Subjects in the UGT, however, were somehow “less extreme”, in the sense that they 
did not reward the participant who knew the correct answer to the same extent that subjects in 
the TPT did. Moreover, proposers and responders within the UGT shared the same fairness 
norm. Thus, the prevalence of the accountability principle seems not to be affected by the role 
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of the person allocating the joint output (third party vs. implicated parties), by the connection 
between subjects’ distributive choices and their own payoffs, or by aspects of strategic fair-
ness. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the related literature. Section III presents 
the design of our experiment, and Section IV derives the predictions for the fairness norms we 
consider. Section V presents the results of our experimental study. Section VI summarizes our 
key findings and offers concluding remarks.  
II. Related Literature 
Early experiments investigating norms of distributive fairness assumed the distributable 
amount to be “manna from heaven” (Güth et al. (1982)). In real-life situations, however, fre-
quently the output available for allocation must first be produced. Experimental evidence 
shows that in such cases, the prevalence of norms of distributive fairness is highly context-
dependent. In the following section, we discuss some of the major issues.  
II.1 Type of Input Used to Generate the Joint Output 
First, the relative importance of norms of distributive fairness depends on the type of input 
necessary to produce the output. In particular, some experiments implement a production 
function with monetary investments, while others use a real-effort task.  
Findings from experiments using monetary investments indicate that the majority of subjects 
prefer equal shares. However, a considerable percentage of subjects also acknowledge indi-
vidual contributions, which can be measured in terms of the input contributed or in terms of 
the marginal productivity.  
Gantner et al. (2001) suggest that the joint output itself or the surplus (joint output less in-
vestment costs) could be considered as output measures, whereas the investment costs or the 
individual contribution to the joint output (investment costs times individual marginal produc-
tivities) could be regarded as input measures. Gantner et al. (2001) find that, within an Ulti-
matum Game, 32% of the demand choices were explainable with equal sharing, 12% coincid-
ed with liberal egalitarianism, and 17% corresponded to libertarianism.3  
Cappelen et al. (2007) explicitly differentiate between inputs that a subject can control (e.g., 
the ratio between individual investments and total investments) and factors beyond the partic-
ipant’s control (e.g., individual investments multiplied by the exogenously given productivity 
                                                 
3
  Similar experiments using an Ultimatum Game with additive and asymmetric advance production have been 
conducted by Königstein (2000) and Brandstätter and Königstein (2001).  
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parameter). In their Dictator Game with a preceding phase of joint production, Cappelen et al. 
(2007) find that 43% of the subjects’ allocation choices were in line with strict egalitarianism 
and 40% with liberal egalitarianism, with only 17% following libertarianism. 
Implementing monetary efforts such as those in Gantner et al. (2001) and Cappelen et al. 
(2007), however, complicates the disentanglement of preferences for equal payoffs from pref-
erences for the acknowledgment of individual contributions or performance in a general 
sense. In this regard, Gächter and Riedl (2005) have shown that “moral property rights” can 
significantly shape bargaining behavior. Along similar lines, evidence from experiments with 
joint production in the form of real-effort tasks is less supportive of equal sharing and indi-
cates increased acknowledgement of individual inputs.  
In this context, Konow (2000) describes an experiment in which subjects performed a real-
effort task (folding letters) and distributed the joint output according to the rules of the Dicta-
tor Game. In accordance with the accountability principle, the dictators’ shares varied in di-
rect proportion to their entitlements, which in turn depended on the number of letters folded. 
However, Konow (2000) focuses on a single fairness norm.  
Cappelen et al. (2011) study the relative importance of needs, entitlements, and nationality in 
people’s fairness norms. Joint production was implemented with a real-effort task (typing 
words), and distribution was accomplished using a Dictator Game. The experiment was con-
ducted with participants in two poor (Uganda and Tanzania) and two rich countries (Germany 
and Norway). Cappelen et al. (2011) find that liberal egalitarianism was the most prevalent 
distributive norm among rich participants, at 42%. Libertarians were estimated at 34%, while 
the share of egalitarians was only 23.8%. The focus of Cappelen et al. (2011), however, is on 
explaining how people distribute when different moral motives are at play.  
Cappelen et al. (2010) disentangle liberal egalitarianism by further analyzing the factors for 
which people are held responsible. In their experiment, individual contributions resulted from 
subjects’ inputs (i.e., the performance of a real-effort task) or choices (i.e., time spent work-
ing) and a randomly assigned value-per-input unit. In line with the previous results, Cappelen 
et al. (2010) find that liberal egalitarianism is the most prevalent fairness norm, in particular 
in the form of holding people responsible for their inputs. The percentages of subjects who al-
located according to the accountability principle, libertarians, strict egalitarians, and those 
holding others responsible for their choices were 42%, 28%, 24%, and 7%, respectively.  
In summary, equal sharing tends to be the most prevalent norm when monetary investments 
are necessary to generate an output, whereas fairness based on accountability gains in im-
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portance when real-effort tasks are performed. In our experiment, subjects had to perform a 
real-effort task. Thus, we can differentiate between the preference for taking into account in-
puts per se and the preference for equal income distributions. 
II.2 Role of the Person Allocating the Joint Output 
The prevalence of fairness norms can also be driven by the role of the person allocating the 
joint output. In this context, Konow et al. (2009) compare the distributive choices of stake-
holders allocating a previously produced joint output according to the rules of the Dictator 
Game with those of neutral third parties. Konow et al. (2009) find that third parties use fair-
ness norms that account for individual contributions more often than stakeholders do, and that 
only lifting anonymity shifts the balance towards equality.  
In our experiment, we ran sessions in which subjects distributed an output that they had pre-
viously generated within their group (Ultimatum Game Treatments) as well as sessions in 
which neutral third parties allocated the output produced by a group they did not belong to 
(Third Party Treatments). Thus, we can address the question of whether the prevalence of 
fairness norms depends on the role of the person allocating the output, including issues such 
as potential self-serving biases. 
II.3 Complexity of the Production Process – Additivity and Observability 
Distributive fairness can also be influenced by increased complexity in the production pro-
cess. First, joint production must not necessarily be additive; it can also lead to negative ex-
ternalities or to synergies. Croson et al. (2004), for example, describe a number of mergers 
and acquisitions that resulted in synergies and in negative externalities. 
Gächter and Riedl (2005) experimentally analyze the distribution of a joint output in the pres-
ence of negative externalities. Subjects completed a real-effort task and then received a claim 
that was dependent on their relative performance in a group of two. In some of the cases, 
however, the sum of the proposed claims exceeded the distributable amount. Gächter and 
Riedl (2005) find that also in these cases, claims resulting from relative performance served as 
focal points. 
Second, individual performance, especially in the form of marginal productivities, is often dif-
ficult to observe (Prendergast (1999)). Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2011) address this issue by 
extending the framework presented by Gächter and Riedl (2005) to uncertainty about relative 
performance, demonstrating that receiving information about individual performance influ-
ences entitlements and the bargaining process.  
 9 
Although Gächter and Riedl (2005) and Karagözoğlu and Riedl (2011) show that entitlements 
and uncertainty about relative performance influence the allocation chosen, they do not inves-
tigate the prevalence of distributive fairness norms. Since the subjects in their experiments re-
ceived information only about their relative performance, performance in the form of inputs 
or marginal productivities was completely unobservable. However, this information can sig-
nificantly shape entitlements, distributive fairness, and allocations. 
In our experiment, we take additive marginal payoffs, negative externalities, and synergies in-
to account. This enables us to investigate the importance of fairness norms across a wide 
range of joint production outcomes. Moreover, we implemented a simultaneous framing con-
dition by showing participants the resulting payoff matrices (TPT), as well as sequential fram-
ing conditions, in which we explicitly informed participants about the additional output in-
crease (TPTSQM) and the resulting joint output (TPTSQNM), respectively, that team mem-
bers could realize. We can therefore address the question of whether the prevalence of fair-
ness norms depends on the noticeability of individual marginal productivities. 
III. Experimental Design 
III.1 General Description of Our Experiment 
The focus of our experiment is on the distribution of a joint output that has been produced 
within a group of two subjects. We randomly formed groups of two participants, one in the 
role of subject A and one in the role of subject B, and asked both group members to answer 
the same multiple-choice knowledge question. The output actually realized was determined 
by whether neither, one, or both subjects within a group knew the correct answer to this ques-
tion; the joint production payoff increased when one of the group members answered the 
question correctly, and it was highest when both subjects knew the correct answer. We kept 
the joint output in the symmetric cases (in which neither or both subjects within the group 
knew the correct answer) constant at 20 Points and at 100 Points, respectively, and varied the 
output for the asymmetric cases (in which only one of the participants gave the right answer) 
to 30, 60, and 90 Points. As illustrated in Table 1, there are thus nine different joint produc-
tion payoff matrices, which we denote by 
20
100
w r
m
r w
A B
JP
A B
 
=  
 
 (with 1 9m ,...,= ). w rA B  
( )r wA B  refers to the asymmetric case in which subject A (subject B) gives the wrong answer 
to the question, while subject B (subject A) gives the right answer. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Since our variation of the joint production payoffs allows for a clear differentiation between 
varieties of marginal productivities, we can test whether the (exogenously given) increase in 
the joint output resulting from one of the group members answering the question correctly af-
fects distributional choices. In our experiment, subjects made decisions on all nine payoff ma-
trices, i.e., not only could they clearly observe the respective individual marginal productivi-
ties of the group members, but they could also recognize the differences regarding marginal 
productivities between matrices.  
Note that the marginal production payoffs are additive only in matrices 3
20 90
30 100
JP  =  
 
, 
5
20 60
60 100
JP  =  
 
, and 7
20 30
90 100
JP  =  
 
. In these matrices, the marginal productivities in all 
three cases r wA B , w rA B , and r rA B  are evident: When participants give the correct answer, the 
effects on the size of the distributable output are precisely determinable. Matrices 
1
20 30
30 100
JP  =  
 
, 2
20 60
30 100
JP  =  
 
, and 4
20 30
60 100
JP  =  
 
, in contrast, are super-additive, 
i.e., ( ) ( )100 20 20 20w r r wA B A B> + − + − . Since the group members’ marginal productivities 
add up to less than 80 Points, subjects can realize synergy effects if they both know the right 
answer. It is thus not apparent which of the group members played the greater role in earning 
the joint output of 100 Points. However, when only one group member answers correctly, the 
resulting effects on the joint output are again precisely attributable. Matrices 
6
20 90
60 100
JP  =  
 
, 8
20 60
90 100
JP  =  
 
, and 9
20 90
90 100
JP  =  
 
 are sub-additive, since the sum of 
the individual marginal productivities exceeds 80 Points. Given that one of the subjects knows 
the right answer, the other group member thus creates negative externalities on the joint pro-
duction payoff by also giving the correct answer. We included the non-additive matrices in 
our design to investigate whether (and how) synergy effects and negative externalities in the 
case in which both subjects know the right answer affect distributional choices. In particular, 
we can test whether marginal productivities are more relevant for the additive matrices (in 
which marginal productivities are more apparent) than for the non-additive matrices.  
For the allocation stage of our experiment, we implemented variants of two basic treatment 
conditions (Third Party Treatment and Ultimatum Game Treatment). We conducted only one 
treatment per session.  
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In the Third Party Treatment (TPT), each subject assumed the role of a third party in deciding 
on the allocation of a joint production payoff that two other subjects had created within their 
group by answering their respective knowledge questions. Since subjects in the role of the 
third party made decisions regarding the allocation of an output that an anonymous group had 
realized, and because their distributional choices did not affect their own payoffs, self-interest 
should not have impacted their judgments. Thus, the TPT enables us to observe norms of dis-
tributive fairness that are not distorted by self-serving behavior or self-centered fairness per-
ceptions.  
In addition, we ran a Third Party Treatment framed in a way that made marginal productivi-
ties even more apparent than showing subjects the matrices displayed in Table 1. Specifically, 
we chose a sequential presentation format in which we informed participants about the addi-
tional output increase they could realize by giving the correct answer (TPTSQM). Comparing 
the TPT with the TPTSQM allows us to investigate whether an explicit framing of marginal 
productivities affects the relative importance of the libertarian fairness ideal. We also con-
ducted another Third Party Treatment with sequential framing, but without explicitly inform-
ing participants about the marginal productivities of the team members (TPTSQNM). In the 
TPTSQNM, we showed participants the joint output resulting from neither / one / both sub-
jects knowing the correct answer. Consequently, we can isolate the effects of the sequential 
framing from those resulting from the apparentness of marginal productivities. 
Situations in which an “impartial arbitrator” allocates a distributable amount to the individuals 
involved in the production of the joint output (as in our TPT) are, however, uncommon in ac-
tual practice. Clearly more realistic are situations in which group members must come to an 
agreement on how to apportion a collaboratively generated output. In our Ultimatum Game 
Treatment (UGT), subjects thus had to decide on the allocation of a joint production payoff 
that they had created within their own group according to the rules of the Ultimatum Game 
(Güth et al. (1982)). By comparing data from the TPT with data from the UGT, we can inves-
tigate whether the fairness norms we observe for the TPT also apply in a more realistic situa-
tion in which implicated parties with asymmetric bargaining power distribute a jointly gener-
ated output. Subjects in the UGT might feel entitled to claim a certain share of the output, in 
particular in a situation in which only one participant has answered the knowledge question 
correctly (or when the marginal productivity of one of the participants is comparatively large). 
Moreover, subjects, as implicated parties, might fall prey to a potential self-serving bias in 
making their fairness judgments (Babcock et al. (1995), Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), 
Charness and Haruvy (2000), Konow (2000), Gächter and Riedl (2005), and Konow (2009); 
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for an overview, see Konow (2003)). This suggests that “individuals (might) subconsciously 
alter their fundamental views about what is fair or right in a way that benefits their interests” 
(Dahl and Ransom (1999), p. 703). Comparing third parties’ decisions with those of subjects 
that have a personal stake in the outcome of both the production stage and the allocation stage 
thus enables us to test whether there are differences in fairness perceptions between the two 
methods of allocation.  
In the UGT, we implemented a role reversal (i.e., half of the subjects first made their deci-
sions in the role of the proposer (responder) and then in the role of the responder (proposer)). 
By contrasting proposers’ offers with responders’ acceptance thresholds (within-subject com-
parison), we can test whether individual perceptions of distributive fairness are sensitive to 
the subject’s role. To rule out the possibility that the role reversal could affect distributional 
choices (e.g., that subjects’ offers and minimum claims would convert to 50% due to the role 
reversal), we conducted an additional session in which subjects distributed a joint production 
payoff that they had generated within their own group according to the rules of the Ultimatum 
Game, but only in one role, either as the proposer or the responder (UGT1R). 
Using ORSEE (Greiner (2004)), we recruited students from the University and the University 
of Applied Sciences in the same town for our experiment. We programmed and conducted the 
experiment using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)). Each subject participated in only 
one of our sessions.  
After all of the subjects had entered the laboratory, they were seated at individual computer 
workstations. Participants received instructions for their respective roles, which we asked 
them to read carefully. Subjects then answered some control questions. The experiment began 
after we had orally summarized the instructions. We gave this detailed vocal summary to en-
sure that all participants understood the rules of the game and knew that in the Ultimatum 
Game Treatments (UGT and UGT1R) the instructions for proposers and responders followed 
the same set of rules.  
At the end of the experiment, we converted the Points that subjects had earned into money 
(one Point was equivalent to 0.25 € ($ 0.40)) and paid out this amount anonymously, together 
with the 5 € ($7.90) participation fee. Table 2 shows the number of subjects per treatment, as 
well as the average payments that participants earned for a session of approximately 50 
minutes. The compensation that participants received is well above the hourly rate for student 
jobs.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
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III.2 Detailed Information on the Experimental Design 
For all of our treatments, we implemented the strategy method (Selten (1967)) for the alloca-
tion stage. For each of the nine matrices specified in Table 1, subjects had to announce their 
preferred allocation of the joint production payoffs to group members before the knowledge 
question was asked. 
In the TPT, TPTSQM, and TPTSQNM conditions, all subjects first decided as a third party on 
the distribution of joint production payoffs to an anonymous group of two members in the 
roles of A and B. Third parties had to make their distributional choices before they were ran-
domly matched with the group whose payoff they decided. Note that third parties always allo-
cated an output that they had not themselves created. 
After subjects in the role of the third party had made their decisions, the experimental soft-
ware randomly determined two of the nine matrices as payoff-relevant. For each of these ma-
trices, we randomly built groups of two additional subjects from the subject pool we had re-
cruited for the session, assigning them the roles of A and B, respectively. Thus, we imple-
mented a role reversal, in the sense that every subject was now in the role of A or B, but al-
ways within a group that was different from the one the subject had decided for as a third par-
ty. Subjects A and B then realized joint production as follows. 
All participants saw six multiple-choice questions from a knowledge quiz on their computer 
screens. The experimental software randomly chose one participant, who rolled a die to de-
termine which one of these questions would be relevant for the first matrix. All participants 
had to answer the question that this subject had randomly chosen. Ensuring that questions 
would not be repeated if the same number came up twice the same procedure was carried out 
for the second matrix. The correctness of the answers of the two subjects A and B within a 
group determined the joint output realized (i.e., a specific cell of the randomly chosen matrix). 
When participants were answering the question, they knew which matrix applied, but we had 
not yet informed them with whom they were paired in a group and whether this subject had 
answered the question correctly. Subjects did not have an incentive to answer strategically, 
since their payoffs were always increased by answering correctly.  
After all of the subjects had answered the knowledge question, each group was matched with 
a third party outside the group. One of the selected matrices determined a subject’s payoff in 
role A, the other the payoff in role B. Thus, the distributional choices made by subjects in the 
role of the third party never affected their own compensation earned within the experiment. 
The selection of matrices, assignment of roles, building of groups, and matching were com-
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pletely random. However, the allocation of the joint production payoff was carried out exactly 
as the third party the group was matched with had previously decided.  
For the TPTSQM and the TPTSQNM, we implemented the same procedure as with the TPT, 
except for the framing. To make the increase in the joint production payoff that could be real-
ized by giving the correct answer (i.e., the individual marginal productivities) more apparent 
in the TPTSQM, we presented the decisions in the TPTSQM sequentially. As an example, 
consider the joint production payoff matrix 8
20 60
90 100
JP  =  
 
: We started with 20 Points and 
informed subjects on their computer screens that the joint production payoff would not in-
crease further if A and B both gave the wrong answer. In the next line on the screen, we ex-
plicitly informed subjects that the output would increase by 40 Points if B (but not A) knew 
the correct answer. The following line stated that the joint output, starting from the baseline of 
20 Points, would increase by 70 Points if A (but not B) answered the question correctly. The 
last line told subjects that the output would go up by 70 Points if A was right and by an addi-
tional 10 Points if B was also right. Thus, the framing in the TPTSQM implied that A was the 
first mover in creating the joint production payoff of 100 Points. In the TPTSQNM, we im-
plemented the same sequential framing with A as the first mover. In contrast to the TPTSQM, 
however, we informed subjects in the TPTSQNM about the joint output that could be realized 
if neither A nor B / only B / only A / both A and B answered the question correctly. 
In the UGT and the UGT1R, the two subjects within a group had to agree on how to distribute 
the joint production payoffs realized within their group according to the rules of the Ultima-
tum Game: Applying the strategy method, proposers (subjects A) announced the share of the 
joint payoff they wanted to offer to the responder within their group (subject B), and subjects 
B simultaneously announced the minimum thresholds they set for the acceptance of the offer 
from subject A. Should B’s threshold be lower than A’s offer, the subjects reached an agree-
ment, and A’s offer was carried out. If, however, B’s threshold exceeded A’s offer, neither 
subject received anything. 
For each of the nine matrices specified in Table 1, subjects within a group in the UGT had to 
decide as a proposer as well as a responder. More precisely, in the UGT, we assigned half of 
the subjects to subgroup I and the other half to subgroup II. In subgroup I (II), subjects first 
decided as a proposer (responder) and then as a responder (proposer). Thus, for each of the 
nine matrices, we observed decisions as a proposer and as a responder from each subject. In 
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the UGT1R, subjects did not change their roles, i.e., for each subject in the UGT1R, we only 
observed decisions as a proposer or as a responder.  
After all of the participants in the UGT and the UGT1R had made their decisions, we again 
randomly selected two matrices to determine actual payoffs. Realization of the joint produc-
tion payoff was carried out exactly as described for the Third Party Treatments. In the UGT 
(UGT1R), we randomly built groups of two participants from different subgroups (of subjects 
A and B) for each selected matrix, and the decisions made by the subjects within these groups 
were payoff-relevant. For each subject, one of the selected matrices was relevant for the deci-
sion as a proposer, the other matrix for the decision as a responder. 
IV. Predictions  
In the following section, we derive predictions with regard to the distribution of the joint pro-
duction payoffs as defined in Table 1. Provided that subjects adhere to one of the fairness ide-
als we investigate, we should observe behavior in line with these predictions, in particular for 
subjects in the Third Party Treatments. 
In the Ultimatum Game Treatments, in addition to a subject’s individual fairness preference, 
other considerations could be relevant: First, proposers might care about fairness not only be-
cause they are interested in the responder’s well-being (“intrinsic fairness”), but also because 
they fear the rejection of unfair offers (“strategic fairness”; Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993), 
Hoffman et al. (1994), Pillutla and Murnighan (1995), Straub and Murnighan (1995), Croson 
(1996), Kagel et al. (1996), Rapoport and Sundali (1996), Van Dijk et al. (2004)). Strategic 
fairness implies that even if low offers were consistent with the proposer’s “intrinsic fairness 
norm”, we should not expect to observe comparatively low offers in the Ultimatum Game 
Treatments, since low offers are frequently rejected. Because proposers in the Ultimatum 
Game Treatments have incomplete information regarding the responders’ fairness norms, 
proposers might regard an equal split as an offer that would minimize the risk of rejection. 
Second, since subjects’ decisions in the Ultimatum Game directly affect their own payoffs, we 
should not expect to observe very high offers in the Ultimatum Game Treatments. As a con-
sequence, offers in the UGT and in the UGT1R should be less widely scattered than alloca-
tions in the TPT, TPTSQM, and TPTSQNM. Moreover, minimum acceptance thresholds in 
the UGT and in the UGT1R are predicted to be lower than allocations in the TPT, TPTSQM, 
and TPTSQNM, because higher thresholds correspond with a higher incidence of bargaining 
failures (Oosterbeek et al. (2004)). 
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IV.1 Equal Sharing (Strict Egalitarianism) 
If group members distribute joint payoffs according to the strict egalitarian fairness ideal, A 
and B should each receive a share of 50% of the joint output, irrespective of who has an-
swered the question correctly and has thus increased the distributable endowment. Note that 
strict egalitarian fairness and equal sharing as modeled in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) lead to identical predictions within our experiment, because per-
forming a real-effort task (i.e., giving an answer to our knowledge quiz) does not incur mone-
tary effort costs. 
IV.2 Fairness Based on Accountability  
Fairness based on individual accountability presumes that knowing the answer to our 
knowledge question creates mutually accepted moral property rights to claim a certain share. 
Thus, participants should be rewarded simply for knowing the right answer, irrespective of the 
absolute amount of the output increase they were able to realize. For the symmetric cases in 
which both or neither of the group members knew the right answer, we again predict that sub-
jects will distribute the joint production payoff equally, since both subjects within the group 
created the distributable endowment in equal measure. For the asymmetric cases, however, we 
predict that the subject who knew the correct answer will receive a larger share α  of the joint 
production payoff than the subject who was wrong, i.e., 0 5.α ≥ . If subjects somehow reward 
group members who give the wrong answer for participating in the experiment and for trying 
to answer the knowledge question, we should observe 1α < . If subjects adhere to individual 
accountability, the share α  that the subject who is responsible for increasing the joint payoff 
receives is predicted to be constant across payoff matrices, i.e., independent of the marginal 
productivities realized by knowing the right answer. Since we cannot distinguish talent or 
ability from effort in our design, we refrain from making predictions regarding the distributive 
choices of liberal egalitarians. 
IV.3 Fairness Based on Individual Marginal Productivities (Libertarianism) 
If subjects value the libertarian fairness ideal, their allocation should take into account incre-
mental changes in the distributable output arising from the correctness of their answers. For 
all of our matrices, the incremental output effect resulting from only one group member an-
swering the question correctly (i.e., for cells r wA B  and w rA B ) is apparent. For our additive 
matrices ( 3JP , 5JP , 7JP ), marginal productivities are clearly attributable to subjects A and B, 
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even for cell r rA B . For the non-additive matrices, in contrast, it is not clear which of the sub-
jects had greater “responsibility” for creating the joint payoff in r rA B  (i.e., who the first mov-
er was). Moreover, it is not obvious whether subjects are focused on gains or on losses, i.e., 
whether the joint production payoff of 20 Points or of 100 Points serves as the reference point.  
For both scenarios of reference points, we calculate Shapley Values (Shapley (1953)) to speci-
fy the average marginal contribution (marginal loss) each subject realizes by entering (leav-
ing) the coalition. In our design, we assume a coalition to be the situation in which both sub-
jects answer the question correctly. Since the Shapley Value takes into account the possibility 
that subjects A and B can each join the coalition as either a first player or a second player, it is 
a concept ideally suited for predicting shares when subjects adhere to the libertarian fairness 
ideal. 
If the focus is on gains (i.e., the reference point is that neither of the subjects knows the right 
answer), subjects start from a joint production payoff of 20 Points. We assume that if both 
subjects give the wrong answer, 20 Points will be distributed equally. Consider the payoff ma-
trix 3
20 90
30 100
JP  =  
 
, for which marginal productivities are additive. In the asymmetric case 
w rA B  (90 Points), B’s marginal productivity is 70 Points. Hence, B should receive 70 Points 
more than in the reference situation. Thus, we predict an allocation of 10 Points for A and 80 
Points for B. If, in contrast, A answers the knowledge question correctly and B is wrong (30 
Points), A’s marginal productivity is 10 Points. Hence, we predict an allocation of 20 Points 
for A and 10 Points for B. For the symmetric case r rA B , B’s Shapley Value, GainBS , can be de-
rived by dividing the sum of B’s marginal contributions when B enters the coalition as a first 
player and as a second player by two. In our example, B entering the coalition as the first 
player would be a move from the symmetric case w wA B  (20 Points) to the asymmetric case 
w rA B  (90 Points). Thus, B’s marginal contribution is 70 Points. Entering the coalition as the 
second player would represent a move from the asymmetric case r wA B  (30 Points) to the 
symmetric case r rA B  (100 Points), i.e., B’s marginal contribution is again 70 Points. The 
Shapley Value for B is thus given by 70 70 70
2
Gain
BS
+
= =
 Points; analogously, the Shapley 
Value for A is 10 10 10
2
Gain
AS
+
= =
 Points. An example in which players’ marginal contribu-
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tions are not identical for the two types of move is provided by matrix 2
20 60
30 100
JP  =  
 
. 
Here, the Shapley Values are 10 40 25
2
Gain
AS
+
= =
 Points and 40 70 55
2
Gain
BS
+
= =
 Points. The 
individual Shapley Values (see Table 3) add up to 80 Points in each of the output matrices, 
which is exactly the total contribution realized when both group members answer the question 
correctly (100 Points) rather than incorrectly (20 Points). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 4 shows the corresponding shares that B should receive (1) if the payoff 20w wA B =  is 
split equally, (2) if, in addition, individual marginal productivities in the asymmetric cases 
w rA B  and r wA B  are enforced, and (3) if shares of 
10
100
Gain
A
A
S +
α =
 and 10
100
Gain
B
B
S +
α = , re-
spectively, are realized in the symmetric case 100r rA B = . Note that the share of the subject 
who answers correctly increases with the marginal productivity. We predict shares for B, Bα , 
to increase with the output resulting from situation w rA B  and to decrease with the output re-
sulting from r wA B : The more A (B) contributes to the joint production payoff by knowing the 
right answer, the lower (higher) the share for B will be. In particular, shares should not de-
pend on the fact that one of the subjects knew the right answer per se, but only on the increase 
in the distributable output realized by giving the right answer.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Note that we have framed the TPTSQM and the TPTSQNM as situations in which subjects 
focus on gains and player A is the first mover. In analyzing these treatments, we have there-
fore calculated the variable Shapley_Gain_SQ to take into account the fact that A always en-
ters the coalition as the first player. 
If, however, subjects focus on losses, the reference point is the case in which both subjects 
know the right answer; again, we assume that subjects will share the resulting 100 Points 
equally in this case. For the payoff matrix 3
20 90
30 100
JP  =  
 
, A (B) squanders 10 Points (70 
Points) by not knowing the correct answer. Thus, these losses should be subtracted from the 
50 Points that A and B would receive in the reference situation. Therefore, we predict w rA B  
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(90 Points) to be allocated at 40 Points for A and 50 Points for B. For the case r wA B  (30 
Points), A should receive 30 Points and B 0 Points, since the experimental design precludes 
negative shares. For the symmetric case w wA B  (20 Points), we account for the sequential form 
of destroying Points by not knowing the right answer by again deriving Shapley Values. Since 
the Shapley Values listed in Table 3 do not depend on the reference point, A (B) should re-
ceive a share of 50 1 1
20
Loss
A
A
S
min ;
 −
α = = 
 
 
500 0
20
Loss
B
B
S
max ;
  −
α = =  
  
 in the situation 
w wA B . Table 5 shows the predictions regarding shares for B when subjects adhere to libertari-
an fairness and focus on losses. In the table, we can see that shares for B should increase with 
the output resulting from r wA B  and decrease with w rA B , i.e., the greater the amount of the 
joint production payoff that A (B) destroys by not knowing the right answer, the higher (low-
er) B’s share will be. Again, shares should only depend on the marginal losses realized by not 
knowing the right answer, not on failing to answer the question correctly per se.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Note that the TPTSQM and the TPTSQNM have been framed in terms of additional gains, so 
we do not expect a focus on losses to be behaviorally relevant in this treatment. 
V. Results 
V.1 Descriptive Statistics 
V.1.a Result 1 
In the symmetric case in which both subjects were wrong (AwBw), the joint production payoff 
of 20 Points was divided equally among group members. 
Table 6 displays the shares that subjects in the Third Party Treatments allocated to subjects B, 
as well as the shares that proposers in the Ultimatum Game Treatments offered to the re-
sponders within their groups (averaged across all nine payoff matrices).  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 6 illustrates that in the symmetric case in which neither of the subjects within a group 
knew the correct answer, subjects, on average, shared the joint production payoff of 20 Points 
equally: When both subjects answered the question incorrectly, third parties in the TPT, 
TPTSQM, and TPTSQNM allocated approximately 50%, 50%, and 51% of the joint produc-
 20 
tion payoff to subject B, and proposers in the UGT (UGT1R) offered responders 49% (48%) 
of the 20 Points. 
Figure 1 shows the frequencies of shares allocated to subjects B in percent when both group 
members gave the wrong answer (averaged over all nine matrices). In line with Result 1, al-
most all third parties and the overwhelming majority of proposers distributed half of the joint 
production payoff to subject B.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Table 7 shows the allocations that third parties suggested for subject B, as well as proposers’ 
offers and responders’ minimum thresholds (averaged by payoff matrix). For the symmetric 
case AwBw, a two-sided t-test (a Wilcoxon signed-rank test) comparing allocations / offers to 
subjects B across treatment conditions reveals that only seven (eight) out of 90 situations were 
statistically different from the other situations at conventional levels of significance. Thus, the 
equal distribution of the 20 Points was unaffected by the treatment condition. 
If we take data for the symmetric case w wA B  and regress shares allocated to subjects B on 
dummy variables for the nine different payoff matrices, we do not find evidence of significant 
differences across payoff matrices within any of our five treatment conditions (only the allo-
cation for w wA B  in matrix 2JP  of the TPT was significantly different). Unsurprisingly, the 
payoff matrix did not affect the allocation of the 20 Points resulting from the fact that neither 
A nor B answered the question correctly. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
The equal allocation of 20 Points is in line not only with the predictions of fairness based on 
accountability (or liberal egalitarianism), but also with strict egalitarianism, since both group 
members created the distributable output in equal measure and did not have to incur monetary 
effort costs. If people focus on gains, the libertarian fairness ideal also predicts shares of 0.5 
for all matrices. If people focus on losses, however, libertarian fairness predicts shares of 0.5 
only for matrices 1JP , 5JP , and 9JP . Our data, in contrast, show that in all of our treatments, 
the shares allocated to B in the symmetric case w wA B were approximately 50%, even for the 
matrices in which libertarian fairness predicts shares other than 0.5 (indicated by the variables 
Shapley_Loss defined in Table 5). Thus, subjects did not seem to take marginal productivities 
into account. 
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V.1.b Result 2 
In the asymmetric cases in which only one subject was right (ArBw and AwBr), the subject who 
answered the question correctly received more than half of the joint production payoff.  
Table 6 also confirms that in the asymmetric cases (only one subject within a group knew the 
correct answer), group members, on average, distributed more than half of the joint produc-
tion payoff to the subject who knew the correct answer to the question. 
Third parties in the TPT, TPTSQM, and TPTSQNM, on average, allocated 26.96%, 33.69%, 
and 37.35% of the joint production payoff to subject B when only subject A was right. In the 
corresponding situations r wA B  in the UGT (UGT1R), proposers still offered 39.26% 
(34.53%) of the joint output to the responders in their groups. Interestingly, this rather gener-
ous allocation occurred despite the fact that proposers had superior bargaining power and had 
created the joint production payoff available for distribution. For all treatments, offers in the 
asymmetric cases r wA B  were significantly lower than 50% (t-test, level of significance at 
1%). 
When, in contrast, only subject B was right, third parties in the TPT, TPTSQM, and 
TPTSQNM allocated, on average, 71.07%, 66.43%, and 60.52% to subjects B, and in the 
UGT (UGT1R), proposers offered responders 61.52% (60.99%) of the output. For all treat-
ments, offers in situation w rA B  were significantly larger than 50% (t-test, level of significance 
at 1%). 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate Result 2 graphically. Figure 2 depicts the frequencies of shares 
distributed to subjects B (responders) if only subject A (the proposer) gave the correct answer 
(averaged over all nine matrices). In all treatments, most subjects allocated 50% or less of the 
joint production payoff to subject B.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Figure 3 shows the average frequencies of shares distributed to subjects B when only subject 
B was right. It is clearly evident that in situation w rA B , most third parties and most proposers 
allocated at least half of the output to subject B.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
On the whole, the results for the asymmetric cases are consistent with fairness based on ac-
countability for giving the correct answer. 
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Our findings thus stand in contrast to the results of numerous experiments on Ultimatum 
Game bargaining on exogenously given endowments; earlier studies have shown that the pro-
posers’ modal (mean) offer is typically 50% (averages between 40% and 50%) of the distrib-
utable amount (see Camerer and Thaler (1995), Roth (1995), Oosterbeek et al. (2004)). Thus, 
the fact that the subjects in our design were distributing an endogenous joint output clearly af-
fected their distributional choices. However, allocations to subjects B within a treatment con-
dition were heterogeneous. In the UGT, for example, 26.9% of the proposers generously of-
fered the responder a share of 50% of the joint production payoff, even when only the propos-
er knew the correct answer (see Figure 2). When only the responder was right, the frequency 
of equal offers in the UGT decreased to 20.4% (see Figure 3); most proposers suggested dis-
tributing two-thirds of the joint production payoff to the responder. Thus, in the asymmetric 
cases, we find heterogeneity in the fairness norm applied, either because the accountability 
principle was not equally important for all of the proposers (Brandstätter and Königstein 
(2001)), or because the proposers faced uncertainty about the responders’ fairness norms. 
Equal sharing might thus be seen as a reference point.  
V.1.c Result 3 
In the symmetric case in which both subjects were right (ArBr), the joint production payoff of 
100 was shared equally in each matrix of the treatments with simultaneous framing (TPT, 
UGT, and UGT1R). 
Table 6 shows that in the symmetric case in which both subjects knew the correct answer, 
subjects, on average, again shared the resulting 100 Points equally. When both subjects knew 
the correct answer, third parties in the TPT, TPTSQM, and TPTSQNM distributed approxi-
mately 50%, 51%, and 51% of the 100 Points to subject B, and proposers in the UGT 
(UGT1R) offered responders approximately 49% (48%) of the joint output. 
Figure 4 illustrates the result that almost all third parties and most of the proposers offered 
half of the joint production payoff to subject B.  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
When we compare shares distributed to subjects B for the symmetric case r rA B  across treat-
ment conditions, we find no differences between the UGT, the UGT1R, and the TPT at con-
ventional levels of significance (two-sided t-test or Wilcoxon signed-rank test). When we 
compare the TPTSQM or the TPTSQNM to the other treatments, however, we find significant 
differences for some matrices in the allocation of the joint output of r rA B  between these 
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treatments and the others, and there are significant differences between the TPTSQM and the 
TPTSQNM for matrices 1JP , 2JP , 7JP , 8JP , and 9JP ( two-sided t-test). Using data from the 
symmetric case r rA B , a regression of the shares allocated to subject B on dummy variables 
for the different payoff matrices shows that for the UGT, the UGT1R, and the TPT, the payoff 
matrix did not affect the distribution of the 100 Points resulting from both subjects answering 
the question correctly. For these treatments with simultaneous framing, Result 3 is thus robust 
to the payoff matrix. Similar regressions for the treatments with sequential framing, however, 
show that matrices 2JP  and 3JP  in the TPTSQNM and matrices 4JP  to 9JP  in the TPTSQM 
produced results that were significantly different from those of the other matrices. 
Libertarian fairness also predicts shares of 0.5 for all matrices if participants focus on losses, 
and for matrices 1JP , 5JP , and 9JP  if subjects focus on gains. For the remaining matrices (for 
which libertarian fairness predicts shares other than 0.5, as indicated by the variables Shap-
ley_Gain defined in Table 4 and listed in Table 7), mean offers in the TPT, UGT, and UGT1R 
treatments were also (approximately) at 50%. The participants in these treatments did not 
seem to take different individual productivities into account, but rather shared the joint pro-
duction payoff equally. As a result, for situation r rA B , our data for the TPT, UGT, and 
UGT1R are not in line with the predictions of libertarian fairness, but rather with equal shar-
ing and with the accountability principle.  
V.1.d Result 4 
Libertarian fairness only played a major role in the TPTSQM – not in the UGT, the UGT1R, 
the TPT, or the TPTSQNM. 
Results 1 and 3 for the symmetric cases state that data from the TPT, UGT, and UGT1R are 
consistent with both equal sharing (strict egalitarianism) and the accountability principle (or 
liberal egalitarianism), and Result 2 for the asymmetric cases indicates that the accountability 
principle is more appropriate to explain our data. For the treatments with simultaneous fram-
ing, we do not find evidence that subjects apportioned Points based on individual marginal 
productivities (libertarianism), since participants did not consistently distribute in proportion 
to marginal gains or marginal losses. 
If subjects indeed viewed a distribution according to individual marginal productivities as fair 
and focused on gains, we should observe shares distributed to subject B, Bmα , in the following 
order for our payoff matrices: 
1 4 7 2 5 8 3 6 9, , , , , ,
B B Bα < α < α  for situation w rA B , and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9, , , , , ,
B B Bα > α > α  
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for situation r wA B . If our subjects focused on losses, we should find the opposite ordering of 
shares allocated to subject B, i.e., 
1 4 7 2 5 8 3 6 9, , , , , ,
B B Bα > α > α  for situation w rA B , and 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9, , , , , ,
B B Bα < α < α  for situation r wA B . A comparison of average offers across the respective 
three matrices results in 0.73 > 0.68 < 0.71 (TPT), 0.62 < 0.63 > 0.60 (UGT), and 0.62 > 0.60 
< 0.61 (UGT1R) for w rA B , and in 0.28 < 0.29 > 0.24 (TPT), 0.39 < 0.40 > 0.39 (UGT), and 
0.35 > 0.34 < 0.35 (UGT1R) for r wA B . Evidently, shares are similar across these treatments; 
even if we ignore significance, we do not see a consistent order in our data. We therefore con-
clude that libertarian fairness does not explain our data for the asymmetric cases of the TPT, 
the UGT, and the UGT1R, irrespective of whether subjects focused on gains or on losses.  
In the treatments with simultaneous framing, we presented nine different matrices mJP  to our 
subjects, i.e., 9 x 4 joint production payoffs. This raises the question of whether marginal 
productivities are not relevant because they are exogenously given (i.e., subjects do not have 
an influence on the magnitude of the output increase resulting from knowing the correct an-
swer), or because subjects do not notice differences in marginal productivities across different 
payoff matrices. To shed more light on this issue, we conducted the TPTSQM, which empha-
sized the sequential framing of individual marginal productivities. In situation r rA B , subject A 
appeared to be the first mover in answering questions. In the TPTSQNM, we used the same 
sequential framing; however, in contrast to the TPTSQM, we informed subjects about the re-
sulting joint production payoff (instead of the marginal productivities). 
If we again calculate the average shares allocated to subject B for the respective matrices, we 
find that the ordering predicted for subjects adhering to ideals of libertarian fairness and fo-
cusing on gains (namely, 
1 4 7 2 5 8 3 6 9, , , , , ,
B B Bα < α < α  in situation w rA B  and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9, , , , , ,
B B Bα > α > α  in situa-
tion r wA B ) is indeed present in the data from our TPTSQM (0.63 < 0.67 < 0.68 ( w rA B ) and 
0.35 > 0.33 ≥ 0. 33 ( r wA B )), but not in the data from our TPTSQNM (0.61 > 0.6 < 0.61 (
w rA B ) and 0.38 = 0.38 > 0.37 ( r wA B )). Moreover, using data from the symmetric case r rA B  
for a regression of the shares allocated to subject B on dummy variables for the different pay-
off matrices, we find that in matrices 7JP , 8JP , and 9JP , in which A’s marginal productivity is 
70 Points, the shares allocated to B are significantly lower than 50% in the TPTSQM (but not 
in the TPTSQNM). In matrices 1JP , 2JP , and 3JP , in which A’s marginal productivity at 10 
Points is comparatively low, the shares allocated to B are significantly higher than 50% in the 
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TPTSQM (in the TPTSQNM, shares are significantly higher than 50% only for 3JP , and are 
actually lower for 2JP ). These findings indicate that an emphasis on marginal productivities 
shifts distributional choices to the libertarian fairness ideal, but that the framing as a sequen-
tial production process does not. Marginal productivities thus affect distributional choices on-
ly when they are readily apparent. 
V.2 Regression Analysis 
V.2.a Additional Evidence for Results 1-4 
In the following section, we report the results of regression analyses conducted in order to 
confirm our results from the descriptive statistics and to determine the relative importance of 
the different fairness norms. Table 8 provides the results of separate regressions for each 
treatment, with shares allocated to subjects B as dependent variables and with subjects as 
clusters. To investigate whether group members who had answered their question correctly 
received a larger share than those who were wrong (Result 2), we include the explanatory var-
iables A_right (B_right) as dummy variables. A_right (B_right) takes on the value of 1 when 
subject A (subject B) knew the right answer to the question, and zero otherwise. To test 
whether subjects distributed according to the libertarian fairness ideal (Result 4), we include 
the variables Shapley_Gain_-0.5 (Shapley_Loss_-0.5), which are shares predicted for subjects 
B should participants adhere to the libertarian ideal and focus on gains (on losses), as indicat-
ed in Table 4 (Table 5), minus 0.5.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
In all of the regressions, the coefficient of A_right (B_right) is negative (positive) and highly 
significant. The signs of these coefficients support Result 2, which states that the subject who 
knew the correct answer will be offered a higher share of the joint production payoff than the 
group member who was wrong. When subject A knew the correct answer, subjects allocated a 
lower share to subject B. When, in contrast, subject B was right, third parties and proposers 
rewarded subject B with a higher share. When both group members were right, the coeffi-
cients of A_right and B_right roughly sum up to zero in each of these regressions (Result 3). 
Taking the respective constants into account, the joint production payoff is shared almost 
equally in all of our treatments when both group members were equally responsible for its re-
alization (Result 3) and when both group members were wrong (Result 1). For our treatments 
without an emphasis on marginal productivities (TPT, TPTSQNM, UGT, and UGT1R), Shap-
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ley_Gain_-0.5 is not significant; Shapley_Loss_-0.5 is borderline significant only in the TPT. 
In the regression for the TPTSQM, in contrast, the coefficient of Shapley_Gain_-0.5 is highly 
significant. In line with Result 4, individual marginal productivities as reflected in the Shapley 
Values thus did not affect distributional choices in the treatments in which we did not make 
marginal productivities highly apparent, but considerably shaped the allocation when the real-
ization of marginal productivities was framed as a sequential process. The latter result is con-
trary to the accountability principle stated by Konow (2000) and Konow (2003), since margin-
al productivities were behaviorally relevant in our TPTSQM even though subjects had no in-
fluence on this variable. The behavioral effect of the framing that we implemented in the 
TPTSQM might result in a shift in the individual perception of responsibility, emphasizing 
the amount of additional Points earned by knowing the correct answer rather than the 
knowledge itself. 
Because we framed the situation in the TPTSQM and in the TPTSQNM in such a way that 
subject A appeared to be the first mover, our variable Shaply_Gain_-0.5 might be inappropri-
ate. Consequently, we calculated the variable Shaply_Gain_SQ_-0.5, considering A as the 
first mover. Regressions with Shaply_Gain_SQ_-0.5 rather than Shaply_Gain_-0.5 and 
Shaply_Loss_-0.5 yield results that are similar to those reported in Table 8.4 Thus, the shares 
that third parties in the TPTSQM distributed to subjects B increased with B’s marginal 
productivity, whereas shares in the TPTSQNM were insensitive to marginal productivities.  
To confirm the existence of this shift in the fairness norm, we ran a separate regression for 
each subject, with the shares allocated to subject B as the dependent variable and Shap-
ley_Gain, Shapley_Loss, A_right, and B_right as explanatory variables. Based on the coeffi-
cients from these 152 regressions, we can cluster our subjects into three different fairness 
types: Egalitarians have coefficients of approximately 0. Libertarians are characterized by the 
lowest constants and the highest (positive) coefficients for Shapley_Gain_-0.5. In addition to 
rather high constants, participants who allocated according to the accountability principle 
have large (negative) coefficients for A_right and large (positive) coefficients for B_right. For 
each treatment, Table 9 shows the percentage of subjects that can be classified as one of these 
types. With 42%, the TPTSQM was the treatment with the lowest percentage of subjects dis-
tributing Points according to the accountability principle. In addition, the percentage of Liber-
tarians at 35% was higher in the TPTSQM than in any other treatment; in other treatments, the 
percentage of Libertarians ranged from 7% to 8%. Our results for the remaining treatments 
                                                 
4
 Since the correlation between Shaply_Gain_SQ_-0.5 and A_right is stronger than that between 
Shaply_Gain_-0.5 and A_right, the new regression has an even lower explanatory power. 
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are qualitatively in line with Cappelen et al. (2007), Cappelen et al. (2011), and Cappelen et 
al. (2010).  
Insert Table 9 about here 
In summary, we find that the accountability principle can explain our data for the treatments 
with sequential framing (i.e., TPT, UGT, and UGT1R); libertarianism does not seem to be 
relevant. In these treatments, we showed subjects all nine matrices (i.e., we informed them 
about their marginal productivities), and the differences between the payoff matrices were al-
so observable. Nonetheless, distributional choices in these treatments were insensitive to indi-
vidual marginal productivities. In the TPTSQM, in contrast, we implemented an economically 
completely equivalent situation, but we made marginal productivities more apparent by ac-
centuating the sequential framing of the production process. This framing had significant be-
havioral effects: The prevalent fairness norm shifted to libertarianism. The reason for this 
shift was determined to be the emphasis on marginal productivities rather than the sequential 
framing, since in the TPTSQNM, libertarianism was not the prevalent fairness norm.  
V.2.b Result 5 
Subjects in the UGT and in the UGT1R principally adhered to the same fairness norm as sub-
jects in the TPT, but subjects in the UGT and in the UGT1R were “less extreme” in their dis-
tributional choices than subjects in the TPT. 
A comparison of shares in the asymmetric cases across treatments TPT, UGT, and UGT1R 
reveals that these allocations are qualitatively similar (see Table 7). In addition, the coeffi-
cients in the regressions for the TPT, the UGT, and the UGT1R are similar (see Table 8). 
Thus, proposers in the UGT and in the UGT1R, in principle, seemed to follow the same fair-
ness norm as third parties in the TPT. The predominance of the accountability principle was 
therefore not affected when implicated parties with asymmetric bargaining power distributed 
a joint output.  
In the asymmetric cases, however, subjects in the Ultimatum Game Treatments were less “ex-
treme” than subjects in the TPT, i.e., proposers rewarded the subject who knew the answer 
less than third parties did. If we compare allocations to subjects B between the UGT and 
UGT1R on the one hand and the TPT on the other (see Figure 2 and Figure 3), we see fewer 
large offers and fewer meager offers in the UGT / UGT1R than in the TPT. In Section IV, we 
predicted that any excessively large allocations to subjects B observed in the TPT should dis-
appear in the UGT / UGT1R, because overly generous offers would decrease proposers’ pay-
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offs. Likewise, relatively small allocations to subjects B should be less frequent in the UGT / 
UGT1R than in the TPT, because proposers would fear responders’ rejections. This reasoning 
is confirmed using regressions containing interaction terms: The coefficients of A_right and 
B_right in the UGT and the TPT are statistically different (1% level of significance), as are 
those in the UGT1R and the TPT (5% level of significance).5 
Another explanation for this result could be that fairness norms shift towards being more egal-
itarian when the relationship becomes more personal (Konow et al. (2009)). Result 5, howev-
er, stands in contrast to the findings of Konow (2000), Croson and Konow (2009), and Konow 
et al. (2009), which report that the decisions of quasi-spectators are significantly less widely 
scattered than those of stakeholders.  
To rule out proposers’ self-serving bias (i.e., subjects interpret the relative importance of dif-
ferent fairness norms in their own best interest) as an explanation for Result 5, we compare 
the results of the TPT to those of the UGT / UGT1R. The significant difference between the 
coefficients of B_right in the UGT / UGT1R and the TPT mentioned above is consistent with 
self-serving bias, since biased proposers should place more weight on equal sharing when on-
ly the responder knows the right answer. However, the absolute value of the coefficient of 
A_right is significantly smaller for the UGT / UGT1R than for the TPT at a 1% (5%) level of 
significance, i.e., proposers did not overemphasize the relevance of accountability when only 
they knew the correct answer. In line with Cappelen et al. (2011) and Konow et al. (2009) 
(but in contrast to Cappelen et al. (2007) and Babcock and Loewenstein (1997)), we thus do 
not find consistent evidence for proposers’ self-serving bias.  
A second test addresses the behavioral effects of the role reversal we implemented in the 
UGT as an explanation for the observed difference between the UGT and the TPT. In particu-
lar, the role reversal could have resulted in a less pronounced role perception in the UGT and 
thus in offers centered on 50%. From Table 6 and Table 7, however, we see that there are no 
qualitative differences between the UGT and the UGT1R, and a t-test yields no statistically 
significant differences. Table 8 shows that the coefficients for the UGT1R are similar to those 
for the UGT, and regressions with interaction terms for treatments also show no significant 
differences between the UGT and the UGT1R. Moreover, the coefficients of A_right and 
B_right in the UGT1R regression are smaller than those in the TPT regression and are statisti-
cally significant at the 5%-level. Consequently, we conclude that a less pronounced role per-
                                                 
5
  Regressions on data sets of two treatments including interaction terms of our explanatory variables with 
treatment dummies show that neither the coefficients of A_right and B_right for the UGT and the UGT1R 
nor the constants are statistically different. 
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ception due to the role reversal in the UGT is not the primary reason for the decrease in the 
importance of fairness based on accountability from the TPT to the UGT.  
In principle, the role reversal in the UGT could also have encouraged subjects to justify their 
decisions by hindsight: If participants in subgroup I (first proposer, then responder) subcon-
sciously validated the decisions they made as proposers when setting their acceptance thresh-
olds in the second half of the session, these participants as responders would set lower mini-
mum thresholds than responders in subgroup II (first responder, then proposer) did in the first 
half of the session. Likewise, if participants in subgroup II sought to justify their decisions as 
responders when making offers in the second half of the session, these participants would 
make more generous offers than proposers in subgroup I. However, when we compare offers 
and minimum thresholds between subgroups I and II by conducting a t-test, we find that of-
fers in only 2 out of 36 situations are statistically different at the 5%-level, and that none of 
the minimum claims is statistically different. Thus, we can conclude that this kind of decision 
bias is not present in our data and does not explain Result 5.  
V.2.c Result 6 
In the UGT and in the UGT1R, responders principally adhered to the same fairness norm as 
proposers. 
In the symmetric cases of the UGT (UGT1R), responders claimed, on average, a share of 
35.69% (40.20%) when both subjects gave the wrong answer and 33.25% (37.63%) when 
both group members answered correctly (see Table 6). In the asymmetric cases, however, re-
sponders’ acceptance thresholds were sensitive to the correctness of the group members’ an-
swers: When only the proposer gave the right answer, responders in the UGT (UGT1R) 
claimed, on average, 23.30% (26.96%) of the joint output, i.e., a lower share than in the sym-
metric cases. But when only the responder was right, the average acceptance thresholds in the 
UGT (UGT1R) increased to 40.88% (47.36%), i.e., above the share claimed in the symmetric 
cases of the respective treatment. Thus, we conclude that proposers’ minimum claims are also 
in line with the accountability principle.  
Figure 5 and Figure 6 depict the frequencies of responders’ acceptance thresholds for the 
symmetric and asymmetric cases of the UGT and the UGT1R, respectively.  
Insert Figure 5 about here 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
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We can see that in the symmetric cases, some responders claimed 50% of the joint output. 
However, in the asymmetric cases, and in particular in situation w rA B  (where it is less obvi-
ous what allocations will be viewed as “fair”), we observe a considerable heterogeneity in 
minimum claims. Although some responders adhered to equal sharing, there were also re-
sponders who seemed to adhere to the accountability principle.  
To determine whether responders operated according to the same fairness norm as proposers, 
we ran regressions for the UGT and the UGT1R with the minimum shares that responders 
claimed as the dependent variable and with matching groups as clusters. Table 10 shows that 
the coefficients of the variables Shapley_Gain_-0.5 and Shapley_Loss_-0.5 are again not sig-
nificant. Thus, marginal productivities do not determine minimum claims. The coefficient of 
A_right (B_right) is again negative (positive) and is highly significant. Although the absolute 
values of the coefficients in the regression for responders’ claims are lower than those in the 
regression for proposers’ offers, the difference in A_right is not statistically significant, and 
the difference in B_right is only borderline significant. Since proposers’ offers and respond-
ers’ claims depend similarly on the variables included in the respective regressions, we con-
clude that proposers and responders principally shared the same fairness norm. 
Insert Table 10 about here 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents the results of an experimental study designed to investigate the prevalence 
of different norms of distributive fairness in team production processes in which individual 
contributions are not readily observable. In our experiment, each of two subjects within a 
team had to answer a knowledge question to jointly generate an output. The joint production 
payoff was 20 Points when both subjects gave the wrong answer and 100 Points when both 
subjects answered the question correctly. Payoffs in the asymmetric cases in which only one 
subject was right varied across the nine payoff matrices we used. We included matrices with 
synergies (i.e., the additional payoff increases of both team members were less than 80 Points) 
and negative externalities (i.e., the sum of the marginal productivities exceeded 80 Points). 
Our design allowed us to investigate whether subjects (a) shared the joint production payoff 
equally (egalitarianism), (b) rewarded subjects who knew the correct answer (accountability 
principle), or (c) took into account (exogenously given) individual marginal productivities 
(libertarianism). 
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We find that fairness based on accountability was the most commonly applied norm in a Third 
Party Treatment (TPT) in which a person outside the team distributed the joint production 
payoff. Thus, people are rewarded only for giving the right answer, not for the resulting pay-
off increase. Our results indicate that the predominance of the accountability principle was 
unaffected when subjects allocated an output they had previously generated within their team, 
using the rules of the Ultimatum Game (UGT). This means that membership in the team that 
realizes the joint output does not seem to affect the importance of the accountability principle. 
Moreover, both proposers’ offers and responders’ minimum claims were in line with the ac-
countability principle. Since the payoffs of the subjects in the UGT depended on their distrib-
utive choices, however, they did not reward the team member who knew the correct answer to 
the same extent that subjects in the TPT did.  
In these treatments, we implemented a simultaneous framing, in the sense that we showed 
participants the resulting payoff matrices. One reason for our finding that subjects did not take 
marginal productivities into account might be that the reference point for the distribution of 
the joint output was not clear, since we allowed for synergies and negative externalities. An-
other explanation is that the payoff increase was exogenously given (i.e., not under our sub-
jects’ control), and therefore subjects regarded the consideration of marginal productivities as 
unfair. To shed more light on this issue, we conducted a Third Party Treatment with a sequen-
tial framing and an emphasis on marginal productivities (TPTSQM): Subjects started with 20 
Points, and we explicitly informed them about the payoff increase that would result if one or 
both subjects gave the correct answer. In addition, we conducted another Third Party Treat-
ment with the same sequential framing of the production process, but in which we informed 
participants about the resulting joint production payoff instead of their individual marginal 
productivities (TPTSQNM). Our findings indicate that the framing presented in the TPTSQM 
caused a shift from fairness based on accountability to libertarianism, whereas subjects in the 
TPTSQNM still rewarded endogenous inputs (accountability). Thus, subjects consider mar-
ginal productivities only when they are truly obvious.  
Based on our results, marginal productivities should be integrated into performance measures 
only if they are highly apparent, as is the case in piece-rate compensation schemes. In cases 
with unobservable individual marginal productivities, the subjective performance measures 
that are frequently used as proxies for these marginal productivities are often viewed as un-
fair. Our findings offer an explanation of why management compensation is often regarded as 
unfair: If workers spend the same (or even more) work time in the company as the managers 
do and exert the same effort level, the high levels of compensation paid to managers can be 
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seen as excessive and unfair, in particular when the increase in firm value achieved by the 
management is not readily observable. In such cases, many people would feel that the com-
pensation should only take into account factors that are under an individual’s control (e.g., in-
put, effort levels, investment costs, etc.) or depend on observable output increases (“pay for 
performance”).  
Our experimental design is not without limitations. First, inputs were in the form of answering 
multiple-choice knowledge questions. Thus, individual productivities were not observable, 
and we cannot differentiate between effort, talent, and luck. As a consequence, we are unable 
to disentangle the accountability principle from liberal egalitarianism. Future experiments 
could employ a design that controls for talent and / or intention, for example, by letting sub-
jects determine the level of difficulty of the questions they have to answer. Second, the rela-
tive importance of fairness norms might be different in cases in which people lose rather than 
gain money. Thus, our findings might not extend to decisions on tax payments or donations to 
Third World Countries. Further research thus could address the prevalence of different fair-
ness norms in situations in which people spent part of their wealth. 
  
Table 1:  Joint production payoff matrices (payoffs in 
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Points) 
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 Number of subjects Average payments to participants 
TPT 24 21.70 € / 34.29 $ 
UGT 24 20.00 € / 31.60 $ 
UGT1R 50 14.80 € / 20.78 $ 
TPTSQM 26 17.40 € / 24.36 $ 
TPTSQNM 28 13.63 € / 18,38 $ 
Total 152 --- 
 
Table 2:  Number of subjects and average payments to participants, by treatment condition 
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  AwBr 
  30 Points 60 Points 90 Points 
ArBw 
30 Points 40; 40 25; 55 10; 70 
60 Points 55; 25 40; 40 25; 55 
90 Points 70; 10 55; 25 40; 40 
 
Table 3:  Shapley Values for subjects A and B (in Points), by joint production payoff matrix 
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Table 4:  Predictions regarding shares distributed to B 
(fairness based on marginal productivities with a focus on gains) 
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Table 5:  Predictions regarding shares distributed to B 
(fairness based on marginal productivities with a focus on losses) 
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9
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Table 6:  Average shares distributed to subject B, by treatment condition, and minimum 
claims of the responders in the UGT and UGT1R 
(averages across all nine matrices; standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
  
 
 
Allocations 
to subject B 
 
Minimum claims 
of responders 
 
 B was wrong B was right B was wrong B was right 
TPT 
A was wrong 0.5016 (0.1139) 
0.7107 
(0.2293) - - 
A was right 0.2696 (0.2172) 
0.5017 
(0.1015) - - 
TPTSQM 
A was wrong 0.4955 (0.0768) 
0.6643 
(0.1423) - - 
A was right 0.3369 (0.1399) 
0.5058 
(0.1109) - - 
TPTSQNM 
A was wrong 0.5056  (0.1122) 
0.6052 
(0.1718 ) - - 
A was right 0.3735 (0.1676) 
0.5050 
(0.1070) - - 
  
UGT 
A was wrong 0.4896 (0.0652) 
0.6152 
(0.1054) 
0.3569 
(0.1596) 
0.4088 
(0.2169) 
A was right 0.3926 (0.0901) 
0.4875 
(0.0527) 
0.2330 
(0.1481) 
0.3325 
(0.1761) 
UGT1R 
A was wrong 0.4818 (0.0843) 
0.6099 
(0.1303) 
 0.4020 
(0.1898) 
0.4736 
(0.2363) 
A was right 0.3453 (0.1157) 
0.4819 
(0.0691) 
0.2696 
(0.1750) 
0.3763 
(0.1812) 
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JPm = (20; AwBr; ArBw; 100) 
m = 1 m = 2 m = 3 m = 4 m = 5 m = 6 m = 7 m = 8 m = 9 
30; 30 60; 30 90; 30 30; 60 60; 60 90; 60 30; 90 60; 90 90; 90 
Shapley_Gain          
AwBw 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
AwBr 0.67 0.83 0.89 0.67 0.83 0.89 0.67 0.83 0.89 
ArBw 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.11 
ArBr 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.20 0.35 0.50 
Shapley_Loss          
AwBw 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
AwBr 1.00 0.83 0.56 1.00 0.83 0.56 1.00 0.83 0.56 
ArBw 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.44 0.44 0.44 
ArBr 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
TPT Shares for B         
AwBw 0.48 0.57 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.48 
AwBr 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.78 0.67 0.70 
ArBw 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.23 
ArBr 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.48 
UGT Proposers’ Offers         
AwBw 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.48 
AwBr 0.62 0.64 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.61 
ArBw 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38 
ArBr 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
UGT Responders’ Claims        
AwBw 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.36 
AwBr 0.41 0.44 042 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.38 
ArBw 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22 
ArBr 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 
UGT1R Proposers’ Offers        
AwBw 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.47 
AwBr 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.64 
ArBw 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.34 
ArBr 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.46 
UGT1R Responders’ Claims        
AwBw 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.39 
AwBr 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.46 
ArBw 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 
ArBr 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 
TPTSQM Shares for B        
AwBw 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.51 
AwBr 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.67 0.71 
ArBw 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.31 
ArBr 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.44 0.45 
TPTSQNM Shares for B        
AwBw 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.50 
AwBr 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.62 0.57 
ArBw 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.39 
ArBr 0.51 054 0.51 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.50 
Table 7:  Summary statistics for the TPT, the TPTSQM, and the TPTSQNM conditions 
(shares that third parties allocated to subjects B; averages by payoff matrix) and 
the UGT and UGT1R conditions (shares that proposers offered and acceptance 
thresholds that responders set; averages by payoff matrix) 
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Variables TPT TPTSQM TPTSQNM UGT UGT1R 
Shapley_Gain_-
0.5 
-0.0396 
(0.0383) 
0.201*** 
(0.0609) 
-0.0319 
(0.0586) 
0.000709 
(0.0234) 
-0.0141 
(0.0149) 
Shapley_Loss_-
0.5 
-0.0324* 
(0.0163) 
-0.00475 
(0.00941) 
0.0343 
(0.0211) 
0.0107 
(0.00710) 
-0.00624 
(0.00683) 
A_right -0.242*** (0.0399) 
-0.100*** 
(0.0208) 
-0.136*** 
(0.0231) 
-0.109*** 
(0.0162) 
-0.138*** 
(0.0189) 
B_right 0.242*** (0.0367) 
0.111*** 
(0.0200) 
0.135*** 
(0.0238) 
0.107*** 
(0.0154) 
0.138*** 
(0.0195) 
Constant -0.00428 (0.0073) 
-0.00451** 
(0.00216) 
-0.0024 
(0.00526) 
-0.00273 
(0.00760) 
-0.0203* 
(0.00117) 
# Observations 864 936 1008 864 900 
R2 0.443 0.499 0.25 0.485 0.454 
# Clusters 24 26 28 24 25 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Table 8:  Regressions with the shares offered to subjects B / responders (minus 0.5) as the 
dependent variable (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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 Egalitarianism Libertarianism Accountability 
TPT 13% 8% 79% 
TPTSQM 23% 35% 42% 
TPTSQNM 32% 7% 61% 
UGT 33% 8% 58% 
UGT1R 32% 0% 68% 
Table 9:  Percentage of different fairness types in our treatment conditions 
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Variables UGT UGT1R 
Shapley_Gain_-0.5 0.00431 (0.0159) 
-0.000189 
(0.00954) 
Shapley_Loss_-0.5 -0.00708 (0.00918) 
-0.00553 
(0.00756) 
A_right -0.101*** (0.0181) 
-0.117*** 
(0.0170) 
B_right 0.0765*** (0.0199) 
0.0909*** 
(0.0180) 
Constant -0.155*** (0.0309) 
-0.107*** 
(0.0367) 
# Observations 864 900 
R2 0.112 0.120 
# Clusters 24 25 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 10:  Regressions with the minimum shares subjects B / responders claimed for them-
selves as the dependent variable (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
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Figure 1:  Frequencies (in percent) of shares that third parties and proposers distributed to 
subjects B / responders when both subjects gave the wrong answer 
(average frequencies for all nine matrices) 
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Figure 2: Frequencies (in percent) of shares that third parties and proposers distributed to 
subjects B / responders when only subject A / the proposer was right 
(average frequencies for all nine matrices) 
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Figure 3:  Frequencies (in percent) of shares that third parties and proposers distributed to 
subjects B / responders when only subject B / the responder was right 
(average frequencies for all nine matrices) 
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Figure 4:  Frequencies (in percent) of shares that third parties and proposers distributed to 
subjects B / responders when both subjects gave the right answer 
(average frequencies for all nine matrices) 
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Figure 5:  Frequencies (in percent) of responders’ minimum claims for the cases w wA B , 
w rA B , r wA B , and r rA B  of the UGT (average frequencies for all nine matrices) 
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Figure 6:  Frequencies (in percent) of responders’ minimum claims for the cases w wA B , 
w rA B , r wA B , and r rA B  of the UGT1R (average frequencies for all nine matrices) 
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1. Introduction
Traditionally,capitation(CAP)andfeeforservice(FFS)schemeswerepredominantlyusedto
payphysiciansinhealthcare.WithCAPphysiciansreceiveafixedmonetaryamountforeach
patient assigned to them – irrespective of the quantity of medical care provided. FFS
schemes pay a fixed amount of money for each medical service offered. Both payment
schemes might incentivize physicians to deviate from the optimal treatment of their
patients, however.While, with CAP, physicians are incentivized to provide less care than
beingoptimalfortheirpatients,FFSschemesembedanincentivetodelivermorethanthe
optimallevelofmedicalservice(see,e.g.,EllisandMcGuire,1986,orMcGuire,2000).This
mightresultindetrimentaleffectsforpatients’health(see,e.g.,McGuire,2000).Inorderto
counteract possible negative incentive effects for patients’ health, recent reforms in the
EuropeanandNorthAmericanhealthcaresystemshavereplacedpurepaymentschemesby
socalledmixedpaymentschemesorremuneration,i.e.schemesthatcombineCAPandFFS.
As theoretically argued by Ellis andMcGuire (1986), suchmixed schemes can reduce the
deficienciesofpureschemes.
Although, mixed payment schemes are often assumed as a ‘cure’ to the negative effect
caused by pure incentives, comparisons of the consequences of both payment schemes,
respectively, have received little attention in the empirical literature yet. Some studies
suggest,atleast,thatpatientsarebetteroffafterthisreplacementusingindirectmeasures
to analyze the impact on patients’ health benefit. For example, Krasnik et al. (1990)
conducted a panel study in Denmark and found that general practitioners respond to a
replacement of pure lumpsum payments by CAP supplemented by a FFS component by
raising diagnostic and curative services and decreasing referrals to secondary care.
Concerningreferralrates,IversenandLurås(2000)obtainasimilarresultforNorway.They
observe that referrals from primary to secondary care revealed by Norwegian general
practitionersare largerunderaCAPschemewitha reducedFFScomponent thanundera
scheme with a fixed payment (practice allowance component) complemented by a FFS
payment.Theincreaseinreferraldecisionsmay,however,notonlybeattributabletoCAP,
butrathertothelowerFFScomponent.Dumontetal.(2008)analyzedataonprimarycare
services from the Canadian province Quebec before and after a variation from FFS to a
mixed scheme with a base wage and a reduced FFS payment. Their results suggest that
physicians respond to the mixed incentives by reducing the volume of services, but
increasingthetimespentperserviceandpernonclinicalservice.Alsoemployingdatafrom
theQuebecpaymentreform,ÉchevinandFortin(2011)analyzehospitalpatients’lengthof
stayandriskofreadmission.Theyfindthatthehospitallengthofstayofpatientstreatedin
departmentsunderamixedpaymentschemeincreasedsubstantially.Nevertheless,therisk
of readmission with the same diagnosis does not appear to be overall affected by the
reform.
Some field studies focusing on pure payment schemes find a rather weak or even no
relationshipbetweenphysicians’paymentandtheirsupplyofmedicalservices(seeGosden
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etal.,2001,orSørensenandGrytten,2003,foranoverview).Forexample,Hutchinsonetal.
(1996)comparehospitalutilizationratesinOntario(Canada)underFFSandCAPincentives
and do not find any difference. Similarly, Hurley and Labelle (1995) conclude that the
responses topurepayment incentivesamongCanadianphysiciansare rathermixed.After
controllingforcharacteristicsofpatientsandphysicians,GryttenandSørensen(2001)report
thattheimpactofpaymentschemesonNorwegianphysicians’behaviorisrathersmall.
Sincemany of the field studies vary more than one component of the payment scheme
simultaneouslyormightsufferfromselectionbiasesregardingpatientcharacteristics,causal
inferences on the direction and the strength of an effect are rather difficult. In addition,
these studies are often based on selfreportswhich are not unlikely to differ from actual
behavior (e.g., Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). In order to overcome some of the
methodologicaldeficiencies,Fuchs(2000)proposedtoincorporateeconomicexperimentsas
acomplementarymethodtofieldstudiesinhealtheconomicresearch.HennigSchmidtetal.
(2011) are among the first ones to follow this research agenda. They experimentally
investigate the behavioral effects of FFS and CAP under controlled laboratory conditions.
Their results demonstrate that these payment incentives significantly influence physician
provisionbehavior.Thatis,theyfindsupportforthetheoreticallypredictedunderprovision
withcapitationandoverprovisionwithfeeforservice,thoughpatientbenefitsprovetobe
importantaswell.
Our study investigates theeffectsonphysicians’provisionbehaviorand consequences for
patients’healththatareassociatedwithareplacementofpurepaymentincentivesbymixed
incentives. We base our study on controlled laboratory experiments, similar to Hennig
Schmidtetal.Ourexperimentaldesignofpurepaymentincentivesdiffersinthreeimportant
aspects from the one of HennigSchmidt et al. (2011), however. First, our design allows
directlycomparingthetwopurepaymentschemesanddifferentmixturesofthemwitheach
other.Second, itallows identifyingphysician’sresponsestospecificpatientcharacteristics.
Third,itallowsassessingtheeffectsofbudgetvariationswhichoftenaccompanyachangeof
payment schemes. In contrast to field data, the experimental data allowsmeasuring the
impactofpureandmixedpaymentschemesdirectlyonpatients’health.
Our experiment particularly addresses the following questions: Do patients benefit from
mixedincentives?Thatis,domixedpaymentschemesmitigateoverandunderprovisionas
predictedbytheory(EllisandMcGuire,1986)?Dotheobservedeffectsdependonspecific
patientcharacteristics?That is,howdo thepatient’s illnessand theseverityof this illness
affectthephysician’sbehavior?Doesitpayoffforpolicymakersinhealthcaretoimplement
mixed incentives?That is,does the ‘patientbenefitphysician remuneration’ ratio improve
withamixedpaymentscheme?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design and
procedure. The results are provided in section 3. Section 4 summarizes our findings and
concludes.
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2. Experimentaldesignandprocedure
Theaimofthisstudyistoanalyzetheimpactofdifferentpaymentschemesonphysicians'
supplyofmedicalservicesandonthepatients'healthbenefits.Exceptfortheseschemes,no
otherexperimentalparameterisvaried.Theexperiment,thus,allowsforacontrolledceteris
paribusanalysisofthepaymentmethod.
In all experimental conditions subjects face the following decision situation: Each subject
decides in the role of a physician and chooses a quantity ofmedical services for a given
patient whose health benefit is influenced by that choice. More specifically, physician 
decidesonthequantityofmedicalservices    	  
forninepatients   	 .
Patients differ in their illnesses      and in the severities     of these
illnesses. The physician receives a certain payment which depends on the experimental
condition(seebelow)andhastobearcoststhatdependonthequantityofmedicalservices
heorshechooses.Costsareassumedtobe      inallconditions.
1Witheach
decision, thephysician simultaneouslydeterminesherprofit!
" (paymentR – costc) and
thepatient'shealthbenefit,bothmeasuredinmonetaryterms.Thepatientisassumed
to be passive and fully insured, accepting each level of medical service provided by the
physician.
Acommoncharacteristicofthepatientbenefitfunctionsisaglobaloptimumonthequantity
interval[0,10](seeFigure1).2Illnesses  eachimplyadifferentlevelofhealthbenefit.
Inparticular,illnessesaremodeledinawaythateachillnessischaracterizedbyadifferent
levelofmaximumhealthbenefit#$  %,&$  and'$  (andacertain
slopeof thebenefit function (i.e.,a certainchangeofbenefit resulting fromanadditional
unitofmedicalservice).Whiletheslopeofthebenefit function isthesamefor illnessesA
andB, it is different for illness C. Theoptimal quantity$ yieldingpatients themaximum
health benefit$ frommedical services depends only on the severity of an illness –
moderate (), intermediate () and severe (). In our experiment, the patient's optimal
quantitiesare$  )forseverityx,$  *forseverityy,and$  %forseverityz.Taking$
as the benchmark for the optimal medical treatment for the patient, we can identify
overprovisionandunderprovision,respectively.3Theoptimalamountofmedicalservicesis
specifiedforeachpatientandisknowntothephysician.Thus,thereisnouncertaintyabout
the impactof thechosenquantityofmedical serviceson thepatients'healthbenefit,and
behavioralpatterns likedefensivemedicine (see,e.g.,KesslerandMcCellan,1996) canbe
neglected.

1Inlinewiththetheoreticalliterature,weassumeconvexcostfunctions(e.g.,Ma,1994,andChonéandMa,
2010).
2 A concave patient benefit function has been widely assumed in theoretical papers (see, e.g., Ellis and
McGuire,1986,Ma,1994,ChonéandMa,2010).
3 From a medical point of view there might be several acceptable treatment variations among different
physicians. This is not addressed in our simplified experimental setup. We, rather, assume that a specific
amountofmedicalservicesrenderstheoptimalhealthbenefittoapatient.
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Figure1:Benefitfunctionsforillnessesandseverities







Patientsarenotactualsubjectsparticipatingintheexperiment.Realpatients’healthoutside
the lab is affected by decisions in the experiment, however. Subjects are informed
accordingly, i.e., they know that themonetary equivalent to the patient benefit resulting
from their decisions is transferred to a charity caring for real patients (the Christoffel
Blindenmission,seealsosection2.2.).
Inordertostudythechangeofpaymentschemes,weemployawithinsubjectdesign.That
is, each subjectparticipates in a session consistingof twoparts. Inpart I, subjectsdecide
under a purepayment scheme– either CAPor FFS. In part II, theydecideunder amixed
paymentscheme(inthefollowing labeledasMIX)–eitherwithmoreweightonFFSoron
CAP.Besidesthewithinsubjectcomparisonofpureandmixedincentiveschemes(partIvs.
part II), thisdesignalsoallows foranacrosssubjectcomparisonof thetwopure incentive
schemes in part I as well as of the different mixed incentives schemes in part II. In the
following,theexperimentalconditions,i.e.paymentschemes,areexplainedinmoredetail.
2.1. Experimentalconditions
2.1.1. Purepaymentschemes
Under CAP, each physician receives a lumpsum payment per patient of 10 regardless of
illnessand severity , i.e.+  ,-  . Physician .s profit per patient is thus!
"  
 / . Under FFS, physicians are paid a fee of 0  1 per service they provide, i.e.
+  1 independentof illnessesandseverities ofan illness.Accordingly,physician
.sprofitperpatientis!
"   1 / .
Themaximumprofitaphysiciancanachieve isequal forbothpurepaymentschemes, i.e.
!2
'#3  !2
445  .Moreover,themarginalchangesofprofitsarealsothesameinCAPand
FFS. The only difference between the two schemes is the profit maximizing quantity of
medicalservices2,whichis0forCAPand10forFFS.Quantity2doesnotdependonillness
k and severities  of an illness. See Figure 2 for the profit functions in CAP and FFS (and
AppendixBforthecompletesetofparametervalues).
 
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Figure2:ProfitfunctionsinthepurepaymentschemesCAPandFFS

2.1.2. Mixedpaymentschemes
Themixedpaymentschemescomprisebotha lumpsumandafeeforservicecomponent.
Moreformally,+  6,- 7  / 60.IntheMIXmoreCAPschemes,weputmoreweight
on the lumpsumcomponent.Toensure that themaximumprofit inMIXmoreCAP is the
sameasinthepurepaymentschemes(i.e.,thatphysicianscanearnasmuchunderthepure
asunderthemixedschemes)thefeeforservicecomponent0isadjusted.Weimplemented
two schemes: MIXmoreCAP(2) and MIXmoreCAP(4). In MIXmoreCAP(2), the profit
maximizingquantity2is2,theweightofthelumpsumcomponent6is0.96,andthefeeper
service0 is 10. Accordingly, the payment for the physician is RMIXmoreCAP(2) = 8 +
(. InMIXmoreCAP(4), thevaluesare 2  (,6  9( and0  *, i.e.,RMIXmore
CAP(4)=9(+8*.
In theMIXmoreFFS schemes, theFFS componenthasahigherweight.Toguarantee that
themaximumprofit is the sameas in theMIXmoreCAPandpurepayment schemes,we
adjusted the lumpsumcomponent,-.Again,we implemented two schemes: MIXmore
FFS(8)andMIXmoreFFS(6). InMIXmoreFFS(8),2  9, theweightof theFFScomponent
 / 6is0.80,andthelumpsumpaymentis18.Accordingly,thepaymentforthephysician
is RMIXmoreFFS(8) = 19 + 91. In MIXmoreFFS(6), the values are 2  8,
 / 6  8,and,-  8,i.e.RMIXmoreFFS(6)=(+81.
TheprofitfunctionsoftheMIXschemesareillustratedinFigure3.Bychoosing2  1and4
intheMIXmoreCAPschemesandbychoosing2  8and8intheMIXmoreFFSschemes,
weensure that profitmaxima are closer to thepatientoptima than in thepurepayment
schemes,butdonotcoincidewiththem.Thatis,wereducedthetradeoffbetweenprofit
maximizationandbenefitmaximization,thoughthistradeoffdoesnotvanishcompletely.
 
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Figure3:Profitfunctionsinthemixedpaymentschemes
 
Keeping themaximumprofit constant acrosspure andmixedpayment schemes comesat
the cost that the feeforservice component and the lumpsum component have to be
adjusted in theMIX schemes. Implementing the components from the pure schemes and
usingthesameprofitmaximumquantities2as intheMIXschemeswould implya lower
profitmaximum for thephysician in the resulting 'nonadjusted'mixedpayment schemes.
Thatis,undertheseschemesitwouldnotbepossibleforthephysiciantoearnasmuchas
underthepurepaymentschemes.Thismightsignificantlydecreasephysicians'incentivesto
considerthepatienthealthbenefitcomparedtothe'adjusted'mixedschemes.
Fromaperspectiveofapolicymakernotonly thenatureofphysicians'paymentschemes
and the resulting incentivesonphysicians’behavior,butalso the total cost forphysicians'
remunerationarerelevanttojudgeupontheeffectivenessofareformofpaymentschemes.
Accordingly,thetotalexpendituresresultingfromthedifferentpaymentschemeshavetobe
estimated.Aslongaswecanassumethatphysiciansarerationalandpurelyselfishdecision
makers,theywillalwayschoosetheprofitmaximumandthetotalexpenditureforthethird
partypayeristhesameinthepureasinthe'adjusted'mixedschemes,whileit is lowerin
the 'nonadjusted' mixed schemes. But if we assume, e.g., that physicians choose each
possible quantity of medical service with equal probability, then the expected total
expenditure inan 'adjusted'mixed scheme ishigher than that inapure scheme (which is
equaltotheoneinthe'nonadjusted'mixedscheme).
Inordertocontrolfortheincentiveandexpenditureeffectsthatareassociatedwithalower
profitmaximum,weruntwoadditionalconditionswith'nonadjusted'mixedschemes,one
with more weight on CAP and another with more weight on FFS. The two nonadjusted
schemes are labeled MIXmoreCAP(2)NA and MIXmoreFFS(8)NA. Implementing these
schemesshouldgivemoreinsightsintothepolicymakers'tradeoffbetweenintroducingan
effectivemixedincentiveschemeandkeepingthetotalexpenditureforphysicians’payment
constant. The schemeMIXmoreCAP(2)NA is designed in a way that, first, both+'#3 
,-   and+445  1 from the pure payment schemes are included and, second, the
physician'sprofitmaximum isat2  1 as inMIXmoreCAP(2).Theweighton the lump
sum component6 is chosen such that these two criteria aremet, i.e.,6  9. Also in
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schemeMIXmoreFFS(8)NA,both+'#3  ,-  and+445  1are includedwhilethe
physician'sprofitmaximumisat2  9asinMIXmoreFFS(8).Theweightattachedtothe
FFScomponent / 6 is0.80.Theprofitfunctionsusedinthetwocontrolconditionsare
illustrated in Figure 4. As this Figure reveals, the physician'smaximum profit in the non
adjustedpaymentschemes isequalto8.40and,thus, lowerthanthat inthepureandthe
nonadjustedmixedschemes(whichisequalto10).
Figure4:Profitfunctionsinthenonadjustedmixedpaymentschemes
 
2.1.3. Presentationandexperienceeffects
In condition CAPPresentation, we aim to test whether already the presentation of the
paymentscheme–eitherasaCAPorasamixedscheme–influencesphysicians'behavior.
Thatthepresentationofmonetaryrewardsalonecansubstantiallyaffectbehaviorhasbeen
demonstrated in a number of studies (see, e.g., Pruitt 1967, 1970, Selten and Stoecker,
1986, Hannan et al., 2005, Gürerk and Selten, 2012, and Hossain and List, 2012).4 For
example,inafieldexperimentonanagriculturalcompany,Englmaieretal.(2012)observe
thatahighersalienceof incentives forquantity (i.e., thepiecerate) tends to increase the
totalamountoflettuceharvested.Itisanopenquestionwhethersucheffectsalsotranslate
tothepresentationofphysicians'paymentschemes,however.
In order to isolate the effect of presentation,we design incentives, i.e., physicians' profit
functions, in away that they are exactly the same for both, part : and ::.Onlyhow the
paymentispresentedtophysicians(eitherasCAPorasmixedpayment)differsbetweenthe
twoparts. This design allowsus to identify the impact of thepresentationonphysicians'
behavioratawithinsubjectlevel.Toimplementequalprofitsinapureandamixedscheme,
wechoosethecostfunction
3;<=andthelumpsumpaymentperpatient,-3;<=suchthat
profits in the pure payment scheme >?@3;<= are exactly the same as those in the non
adjusted mixed payment scheme MixmoreCAP(2)NA. That is, in part : physician i

4 See also the extensive literature on framing effects, i.e. effects that are caused by "the decisionmaker's
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice" (Tversky and
Kahneman,1981,p.453).WhiletheseminalpaperinthisfieldwasprovidedbyTverskyandKahneman(1981),
morerecentliteratureissurveyedbyKühberger(1998)andLevinetal.(1998).
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receives!
"   * / 
3;<=, with 
3;<=   / ( 7 %. Costs 
3;<= are
convexonthequantityintervalwithaminimumat2medicalservices.
Inadditiontotheeffectofpresentation,wecontrolfortheeffectofexperience.Thatis,we
control whether being confronted with a pure payment scheme in the part : affects
decisionsmade in part ::. Since the aim of our study is to test the replacement of pure
paymentschemesbymixedschemes,choosingawithinsubjectdesign(i.e.,askingfortheir
decisions in both payment schemes consecutively) is an appropriate approach.5
Nevertheless, itmightbeinterestingtoisolatethebehavioraleffectswhichareduetothe
experience of subjectsmade in a pure payment scheme. Accordingly, in conditionsMIX
moreCAP(4) and MIXmoreFFS (6), we implement the two mixed payment schemes
withoutrunningapurepaymentschemebeforehand.Allexperimentalconditionsandthe
numberofparticipantsaresummarizedinTable1.
Table1:Experimentalconditions

Name Condition PartI PartII #Subjects
AC2 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2) CAP MIXmoreCAP(2) 22
AC4 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(4) CAP MIXmoreCAP(4) 24
AF8 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8) FFS MIXmoreFFS(8) 24
AF6 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(6) FFS MIXmoreFFS(6) 24
NAC2 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2)NA CAP MIXmoreCAP(2)NA 22
NAF8 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8)NA CAP MIXmoreFFS(8)NA 22
PC2 CAPPresentation CAPPres MIXmoreCAP(2)NA 24
ExC4 MIXmoreCAP(4) MIXmoreCAP(4) – 23
ExF6 MIXmoreFFS(6) MIXmoreFFS(6) – 20
2.2. Experimentalprotocol
The computerized experiment was programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and
conducted at elfe, the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the University of
DuisburgEssen, Germany. Overall 205 students from the University of DuisburgEssen
participated in our experimental sessions. They were recruited by the online recruiting
systemORSEE (Greiner, 2004).6 Sincewe did not observe significant differences between
decisionsofmedical students (whoare supposed tobecomephysicians in the future)and
nonmedical students in CAP and FFS, respectively (CAP/FFS: p=0.1880/0.1274, Fisher
PitmanPermutationtestfortwoindependentsamples(FPPI),twosided),oursubjectpoolis
notrestrictedtostudentswithabackgroundinmedicine.

5 See, e.g., Kagel and Roth (2000) who use a similar approach to test the performance of centralized
clearinghousemechanisms.
6 Students who registered in ORSEE to participate in laboratory experiments at the Essen Laboratory for
ExperimentalEconomicswereinvitedviaautomaticallygeneratedemailsandregisteredforaspecialsession.
We can thus say that subjectswere randomly allocated to the experimental conditions.Moreover, subjects
werenotinformedaboutthecontentoftheexperimentalconditionsunlesstheyparticipatedinasession.
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The procedure was as follows: Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated to the
cubicles.Then,theyweregivenplentyoftimetoreadtheinstructionsforpartIandtoask
clarifying questions which were answered by the same experimenter in private. Subjects
were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts, but received detailed
instructions for part II only after having finished part I of the experiment. To check for
subjects'understandingofthedecisiontask,theyhadtoanswerasetofcontrolquestions.
The experiment did not start unless all subjects had answered the control questions
correctly.Ineachofthetwopartsoftheexperiment,subjectsthensubsequentlydecidedon
the quantity of medical service for each of the nine patients, i.e. for each possible
combinationofillnessesandseverities.Theorderofpatientswasrandomlydeterminedand
keptconstantforallsubjectsinallconditions(seeTable2).
Table2:Randomizedorderofillnessesandseveritiesofillness

Patientj 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Illnessk B C A B B A C A C
Severityl x x z Y z y z x y
Before making their decision for a specific patient, subjects are informed about their
payment,theircostandprofit,aswellasaboutthepatient’sbenefitforeachquantityfrom
0 to 10. All monetary amounts are given in Taler, our experimental currency unit, the
exchangeratebeing1Taler=€0.08.7Theprocedurewasexactlythesameinpart::ofthe
experiment.
Whenallsubjectshadmadetheirdecisions,werandomlydeterminedonedecisionineach
partoftheexperimenttoberelevantforasubject'sactualpayoffandthepatientbenefit.
After the experiment, subjects were paid in private according to these two randomly
determineddecisionsandweredismissed.
To verify that the money corresponding to the sum of patient benefits in a session was
actuallytransferred,weappliedaproceduresimilartotheoneusedinHennigSchmidtetal.
(2011)andEckelandGrossman (1996).To thisend,oneof theparticipantswas randomly
chosentobethemonitor.Aftertheexperiment,themonitorverifiedthatanorderonthe
aggregatedbenefitintherespectivesessionwaswrittentothefinancialdepartmentofthe
University of DuisburgEssen to transfer themoney to theChristoffel Blindenmission. The
orderwassealedinanenvelopeandthemonitorandexperimenterthenwalkedtogetherto
thenearestmailboxanddepositedtheenvelope.Themonitorwaspaidanadditional€5.
Sessions lasted for about 70 minutes. Subjects earned, on average, €15.74. The average
benefit per patient was €12.94. In total, €2,652.70 were transferred to the Christoffel
Blindenmission.Themoneysupportedsurgicaltreatmentsofcataractpatientsinahospital
in Masvingo (Zimbabwe) staffed by ophthalmologists of the Christoffel Blindenmission.

7Instructions(includingexamplesofthedecisionscreen)andcontrolquestionsareincludedinAppendixA.
13

Average costs for such an operation amounted to about €30. Thus, themoney from our
experimentallowedtreating88patients.8
3. Results
3.1. Provisionbehaviorunderpurepaymentschemes
Before investigating the behavioral effects of introducing mixed incentive schemes, we
comparephysician'schoicesmadeinthetwopurepaymentschemesofparts IoftheMIX
conditions.Aggregatedataondecisionsmade in thepurepaymentschemes is included in
Table3.
Table3:Descriptivestatisticsforbehaviorunderpurepaymentschemes

Name Condition
PartI
Mean s.d.
AC2 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2) 3.04 2.08
AC4 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(4) 3.44 1.90
AF8 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8) 7.57 2.34
AF6 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(6) 7.19 1.94
NAC2 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2)NA 2.78 1.96
NAF8 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8)NA 6.89 2.10
In the experimental conditions AC2, AC4, and NAC2, we used the same CAP payment
schemeinpartIoftheexperiment.Sincephysicians'choicesunderthispaymentschemedo
notdiffersignificantlybetweenthethreeconditionseitherontheaggregatelevel(p>0.1398)
or on the patient level, except for three of the 3x9 comparisons (A2C2/AC4: patient 3
p=0.0900, AC2/NAC2: patient 1 p=0.0480, AC4/NAC2: patient 7 p=0.0520, FPPI, two
sided),wepooldataovertheseCAPconditionswhenanalyzingtheincentiveeffectsofthe
two pure payment schemes. Similarly, in conditions AF8, AF6, and NAF8, we used the
same FFS payment scheme in part I. Since physicians' choices under FFS do not differ
significantly between these conditions either on the aggregate level (p>0.2140) or at the
patientlevelexceptforoneofthe3x9comparisons(AF8/NAF8:patient9p=0.0686,FPPI,
twosided), we also pool data over these FFS conditions in our analysis of pure payment
schemes.
Comparingphysicians’quantitychoicesbetweentheCAPandtheFFSpaymentschemesfor
all three illnesses  and severities reveals that physicians do respond to financial
incentives.WeparticularlyobservethatpatientsareunderprovidedinCAPandthattheyare
overprovided inFFS (seeFigures5and6).That is, thequantitychosenby thephysician is
lower inCAPandhigher inFFSthanthequantityyieldingthemaximumhealthbenefit for
the patient. This effect is significant for all patients (p<0.0002,Wilcoxonsignedranktest,
twosided). 

8Subjectswerenot informedaboutthemoneybeingassignedtoadevelopingcountrytoavoidmotives like
compassion.
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Figure5:Benefitfunctions,profitfunctions,andaveragequantitiesperseverityinCAP

Figure6:Benefitfunctions,profitfunctions,andaveragequantitiesperseverityinFFS

Ourresults,thus,confirmthesignificantunderprovisionwithcapitationandthesignificant
overprovisionwith feeforserviceobserved fordifferentparametersbyHennigSchmidtet
al.(2011).Ourresults,thus,alsorelatetoearlierfieldstudiesbyGaynorandGertler(1995)
orbyGaynorandPauly(1990).However,weextendthefindingsonpurepaymentschemes
insofaraswesystematicallyvarybenefit functionsrepresentingcertaincharacteristicsofa
patient. Accordingly, we are able to associate the degree of underprovision and
overprovision, respectively, with these patient characteristics. In particular, we find that,
under both pure payment schemes and in all conditions, physicians' decisions do
significantly respondtotheseverityofan illness (p<0.0054),buthardly tothe illness itself
(p>0.1049, except for two of the 3x2x3 comparisons where p<0.0135, Fisher Pitman
Permutationtestforpairedreplicates(FPPP),twosided).Thatis,neitherthelevelofpatient
health benefit that could be maximally realized by the physician, nor the increase (and
decrease, respectively) of health benefit that results from an additional unit of medical
service (bothare impliedbyan illness; seeSection2.1.1) systematicallyaffectsphysicians'
behavior.Only thequantity yielding themaximumhealthbenefit (which is impliedby the
severity of an illness) clearly influences the choice of medical services. The more the
optimum quantity for the patient deviates from the profit maximizing quantity for the
physician, the more underprovision in CAP and overprovision in FFS, respectively, is
observed.More specifically, calculating the distance between the quantity chosen by the
physician and the quantity that is optimal for the patient we find that this distance
significantlyincreasesthemoreseveretheillnessisinCAPandthelessseveretheillnessis
inFFS (p<0.0000,FPPP, twosided).Figure7 illustrates these findings. In the following,we
poolphysicians'decisionsoverthethreeillnessesA,B,C.
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Figure7:Distancebetweenpatientoptimumandchosenquantityperseverity

Finally, due to the symmetry of our pure payment schemeswe are able to test whether
incentives to underprovide in CAP are equally strong as incentives to overprovide in FFS.
From a psychological point of view, people might regard choosing a higher quantity of
medicalservicesforthepatient(whichis incentivizedinFFS)lessseverethanomittingthis
quantityfromthepatient(whichisincentivizedinCAP)though,inourexperimenttheloss
of benefit for the patient is the same in both cases. Accordingly, the problem of
overprovision in FFS might be more severe than the problem of underprovision in CAP.
Comparingthedistancebetweenthequantitychosenbythephysicianandthequantitythat
is optimal for thepatient between the twopurepayment schemesdoes not support this
supposition,however(CAP:1.99vs.FFS:2.28;p=0.2754,FPPI,twosided).9
Result1(Provisionbehaviorunderpurepaymentschemes)
WeobservesignificantunderprovisionwithCAPandsignificantoverprovisionwithFFS.The
deviations from the patient optimal quantity of medical services observed with the two
payment schemesareequally severe.Underboth schemes, the severityofan illnesshasa
significantandsystematiceffectwhereastheillnessitselfdoesnot.
3.2. Comparisonofpureandmixedpaymentschemes
Effectsfromchangesofthepaymentmethodfromapuretoamixedschemeonphysician
provision behavior can be identified by our withinsubject design. Aggregate data on
decisionsinthemixedpaymentschemesisincludedinTable4.Notethat,alsointhemixed
schemes,physicians'decisionshardlyeverrespondtothepatient’sillness(p>0.1049,except
forAF6:Avs.Bp=0.0017andBvs.Cp=0.0134),buttheydosignificantlysotoitsseverity
(p<0.0053, FPPP, twosided). Accordingly, we pool physicians' decisions in the mixed
paymentschemesoverthethreeillnessesA,B,Cforallsubsequentanalyses.


9SymmetryforthedistancetothepatientoptimumholdsalsoforcomparisonsofMixmoreCAP(2)withMix
moreFFS(8), and MixmoreCAP(4) with MixmoreFFS(6). Also between the symmetric mixed incentive
schemeswefindnosignificantdifferenceregardingthisdistance(p>0.2283,FPPI,twosided).
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Table4:Descriptivestatisticsforbehaviorundermixed paymentschemes

Name Condition
PartII
Mean s.d.
AC2 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2) 3.66 1.74
AC4 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(4) 4.65 1.32
AF8 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8) 6.92 1.73
AF6 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(6) 5.62 1.21
NAC2 CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2)NA 3.46 1.43
NAF8 FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8)NA 6.50 1.53
Comparing behavior of physicians in the pure CAP payment scheme (in part I) with their
behaviorintherespective(adjusted)MIXmoreCAPscheme(inpartII)yieldsasignificantly
higherprovisionof services in the latter (AC2:over all severitiesp=0.0017;differentiated
perseverityp0.0000;AC4:averageoverallseveritiesp=0.000;differentiatedperseverity:
p0.0416, FPPP, twosided). That is, introducing amixed payment scheme that yields the
sameprofitmaximumas inCAPsignificantly reduces theunderprovisionobserved inCAP.
Thiseffect increaseswithdecreasing lumpsumcomponent in themixedpaymentscheme
(0.96inMIXmoreCAP(2)vs.0.84inMIXmoreCAP(4);p=0.0002,FPPI,twosided).Though,
in bothmixed schemes and for all severities there is still a significant deviation from the
quantityofmedicalservicesthatisoptimalforthepatient(p<0.0040,Wilcoxonsignedrank
test,twosided).TheresultsareillustratedinFigure8.
Figure8:AveragequantitychoicesinCAPandMIXmoreCAPpaymentschemes

ComparingbehaviorofphysiciansunderFFS inpart Iwith theirbehavior in the respective
(adjusted)MIXmoreFFS scheme in part II yields a significantly lower quantity ofmedical
serviceinthelatter(AF6:overallseveritiesp=0.0082;differentiatedperseverityp0.0000;
AF8: average over all severities p=0.000; differentiated per severity: x: p=0.2436, y:
p=0.0299,z:p=0.0003,FPPP,twosided).Thatis,introducingamixedincentiveschemethat
yields the same profit maximum for the physician as in FFS significantly reduces the
overprovision observed in FFS. This effect is stronger the less weight is given to the FFS
componentinthemixedpaymentscheme(0.80inMIXmoreFFS(8)and0.60inMIXmore
FFS(6); p=0.0004, FPPI, twosided). Though, in both mixed schemes and for all severities
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thereisstillasignificantdeviationfromthequantityofmedicalservicesthatisoptimalfor
thepatient(p<0.0038,FPPP,twosided).TheresultsareillustratedinFigure9.
Figure9:AveragequantitychoicesinFFSandMIXmoreFFSpaymentschemes

Result2(Impactoftheintroductionofmixedpaymentschemes)
Introducingmixedincentiveschemessignificantlyreducestheunderprovisionobservedwith
CAPandtheoverprovisionobservedwithFFS,respectively.
3.3. Analysisofnonadjustedmixedschemes:Incentiveandexpenditureeffects
Inorder to ensure that aphysician canearn asmuchunder thepure asunder themixed
payment schemes, we adjusted the feeforservice component and the lumpsum
component in the mixed schemes tested in conditions AC2, AC4, AF6, and AF8,
respectively. Without this adjustment, the physician’s profit maximum (and,
correspondingly,thephysicians’monetaryincentives)wouldbelowerinthemixedschemes
than in thepurepayment schemes. In order to control for the incentive and expenditure
effects that are associated with a lower profit maximum, we compare behavior in the
adjustedandnonadjustedmixedschemes (i.e.,MIXmoreCAP(2)vs.MIXmoreCAP(2)NA
andMIXmoreFFS(8) vs.MIXmoreFFS(8)NA). Interestingly, we find neither a significant
effectfortheMIXmoreCAPschemes(p=0.5804,allFPPI,twosided)norfortheMIXmore
FFSschemes(p=0.2886,allFPPI,twosided).Thatis,reducingthemaximalpayoffphysicians
canachieveinthemixedpaymentschemesdoesnotaffectthequantityofmedicalservices
provided.Accordingly,alsowhenintroducingthetwononadjustedmixedpaymentschemes
physicianstendtoreducetheirdeviation fromthepatient’soptimalquantitycomparedto
the pure payment schemes (CAP vs. MIXmoreCAP(2)NA: p=0.0001; differentiated per
severityp0.0004,FFSvs.FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8)NA:p=0.03206;differentiatedperseverity
x:p=0.3256,y:p=0.1893,z:p=0.0268;FPPP,twosided).Figure10illustratesthesefindings.
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Figure10:Averagequantitychoicesinthenonadjustedandtheadjustedmixedschemes

Looking at the thirdparty's total expenditure for physicians' payment (i.e., their
remuneration)intheadjustedandnonadjustedmixedpaymentschemes,wefindthatthis
is significantlyhigher in the former than in the latter (MIXmoreCAP(2)NAvs.MIXmore
CAP(2):p=0.0000andMIXmoreFFS(8)NAvs.MIXmoreFFS(8)p=0.0007,FPPI, twosided;
see Table 5 below). But how do the expenditures that result in the adjusted and non
adjusted mixed schemes relate to the ones that result in the pure payment schemes?
Comparingtotalexpendituresforphysicianspaymentbetweenthenonadjustedmixedand
thepureschemeswefindsignificantly lowerexpenditures in the formerthan in the latter
(NAC2:p=0.0000,NAF8:p=0.0018,FPPP,twosided).Theadjustedmixedschemeswitha
largerCAPcomponentyieldsignificantlyhigherexpendituresthanCAP(AC2:p=0.0000;A
C8: p=0.0000), while the adjusted mixed schemes with a larger FFS component yield
significantlylowerexpendituresthanFFS,ifatall(AF8:p=0.3344,AF6:p=0.02573).
Result3(Provisionbehaviorundernonadjustedmixedpaymentschemes)
Alowermaximumprofitforphysiciansdoesnotsignificantlyaffectphysicians'behavior,but
yields a lower expenditure for physicians’ payment in the nonadjusted mixed schemes
(whichisalsolowerthantheexpenditureintherespectivepurepaymentschemes).
AlthoughtotalexpendituresintheadjustedMixmoreCAPschemesarehigherthanthosein
the pure schemes, from a perspective of a policymaker both, the remuneration for
physiciansandthebenefitforpatients,areimportanttojudgetheeffectivenessofareform
ofpaymentschemes.Result3impliesthatkeepingthenatureofincentivesconstantsuffices
to achieve a physician behavior similar to a highpowered incentive scheme resulting in
higherexpendituresforthethirdpartypayer.Thenextsectionprovidesanindepthbenefit
remunerationanalysisofthepureandthemixedpaymentschemes.
3.4. Benefitremunerationanalysisofpureandmixedpaymentschemes
Whenreformingphysicianpaymentschemes, thirdpartypayersoftenrelyoncostbenefit
analysesoftheimpactofreformsonpatientwelfareandhealthcarecosts(see,e.g.,Garber,
2000). In fieldstudies,prominentmeasures forpatients’healthbenefithavebeen,among
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others, the time spent with a patient, the number of patient visits, or the referrals to
specialists (see, e.g.,Dumontet al., 2008).Obviously, implications for thepatients’health
benefitare rather indirect, renderinga fullfledgedanalysisofpatients’welfaredifficult in
the field. The behavioral data from our experiment are suitable for the analysis of third
payers’costsasourdesignallowstocontrolandtodirectlymeasurevariationsinphysicians'
remunerationandcorrespondingchangesinpatients’healthbenefit.Although,admittedly,
theexperimentalsettingisstylized,itgivesimportantinsightsintotherelativeperformance
ofpureandmixedpaymentschemesresultingfromphysicians'treatmentbehavior.
Ourresultsinthelastsectionsrevealthatthehealthbenefitofanaveragepatientishigher
inamixedpaymentschemethaninthecorrespondingpurepaymentscheme(seeTable5).
For the cost of physicians’ payment, thepicture resulting froma comparisonof pure and
mixedschemes is lessclearcut(seesection3.3.). Inparticular,physicians'remuneration is
lowerintheadjustedmixedschemeswithalargerFFScomponentandinbothnonadjusted
mixed schemes than in the corresponding pure schemes, while in the adjusted mixed
schemeswithalargerCAPcomponenttheremunerationishigherthaninCAP.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics on patients’ health benefit and physicians’ remuneration by
paymentscheme
Condition
PartI
(purepaymentschemes)
PartII
(mixedpaymentschemes)
Avg.
PatientBenefit
Avg.
Remuneration
Avg.
PatientBenefit
Avg.
Remuneration
CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2) 7.42 10.00 8.27 11.06
CAP–MIXmoreCAP(4) 8.31 10.00 9.64 12.12
FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8) 6.84 15.14 7.68 14.67
FFS–MIXmoreFFS(6) 7.47 14.38 9.26 13.15
CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2)NA 7.34 10.00 8.27 9.38
FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8)NA 7.72 13.78 8.35 12.41
In the following, we analyze the average ratios of patient benefit and physician's
remunerationforboththepureandthemixedpaymentschemes(seeTable6).Replacinga
pure scheme by a mixed scheme usually improves the benefitremuneration ratio. This
effectissignificantforthereplacementofafeeforservicepaymentschemebyanadjusted
mixed schemewith a relatively highweight on the lumpsum component (0.40) and by a
nonadjustedmixed scheme (FFSvs.MIXmoreFFS(6):p=0.0280, FFSvs.MIXmoreFFS(8)
NA: p=0.0891) and for replacing a capitation payment scheme by a nonadjusted mixed
scheme(CAPvs.MIXmoreCAP(2)NA:p=0.0000).
Comparing the benefitremuneration ratio between the two pure incentive schemes, we
findasignificantlyhigherratioinCAPthaninFFS(p=0.0027,FPPI,twosided).Similarly,also
themixedschemeswithahigherweightonthelumpsumcomponent implyasignificantly
higherratiothantheschemeswithahigherweightontheFFScomponent(p=0.0027,FPPI,
20

twosided). That is, comparedover all payment schemes,weobserve thehighestbenefit
remunerationratiointheMIXmoreCAP(2)NAscheme.
Table6:Analysisofpatients’healthbenefitandphysicians’remunerationratio
Condition
PartI
(purepaymentschemes)
PartII
(mixedpaymentschemes)
Avg.(Benefit/
Remuneration)
Avg.(Benefit/
Remuneration)
CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2) 0.74 0.75
CAP–MIXmoreCAP(4) 0.83 0.80
FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8) 0.60 0.57
FFS–MIXmoreFFS(6) 0.61 0.71
CAP–MIXmoreCAP(2)NA 0.73 0.88
FFS–MIXmoreFFS(8)NA 0.68 0.73
Result4(Ratioofhealthbenefitandremuneration)
Almost all mixed payment schemes yield a higher benefitremuneration ratio than the
respective pure payment schemes. Payment schemes comprising a CAPcomponent attain
thehighestvalues.
Takenat its face value,our results render fora thirdpartypayerwho is interested in the
ratioofbenefitsandremunerationthenonadjustedMixmoreCAPschememostattractive.
Naturally, the lowest remuneration for the average physician observed in this scheme
contributes to the favorable benefitremuneration ratio. A thirdparty payer giving more
weighttothepatienthealthbenefitmightoptforanadjustedMixmoreCAPschemewitha
higherweightonthelumpsumcomponentinstead.
3.5. Presentationandexperienceeffects
Finally, we test whether the presentation of physicians’ profit as the result of a pure
payment scheme (part I) or as the result of a mixed scheme (part II) already influences
behavior. Our results reveal, in fact, significant differences regarding this presentation:
physicianschooseasignificantlyhigherquantityofmedicalserviceiftheprofitresultsfroma
mixedpayment scheme than if it results fromapurepayment scheme (p=0.01741, FPPP,
twosided).Differentiatingaccordingtoseverities,wefindthiseffecttobeduetoahighly
significantdifferenceforseverityyonly(x:p=0.3282;y:p=0.0012;z:p=0.2452,allFPPP,two
sided).
In order to find out to what extend the reported benefitimproving effects of themixed
incentiveschemesareduetotheexperienceofsubjectsmadewiththepureschemesinpart
I of theexperiment,we repeated twoof themixedpayment schemeswithouta firstpart
(MIXmoreCAP(4) and MIXmoreFFS (6)). Comparing the two mixed schemes with and
withoutpartIoftheexperiment,wefindnosignificantdifferences(p=0.9638andp=0.1243,
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allFPPI, twosided).That is, subjects’experiencedoesnotalter theirbehavior inpart IIof
theexperiment,atleastnottoasignificantdegree.
Result5(Presentationandexperience)
Whilethepresentationofaprofit functionasbeingtheresultofamixedpaymentscheme
significantly improves patient benefits, the experience of subjects with a pure payment
schemedoesnotsignificantlyaffectbehavior.
4. DiscussionandConcludingRemarks
This studyprovideda laboratory testof theeffects thatareassociatedwithahealth care
provider payment reform – i.e., the replacement of pure payment incentives by mixed
incentives. Regarding the pure incentive schemes, our data support the significant
underprovisionwith capitation payment and significant overprovision with feeforservice
payment as predicted by theory (Ellis andMcGuire, 1986) and suggested by results from
previousstudies(see,e.g.,HennigSchmidtetal.,2011).Inadditiontopreviousresearch,our
systematicvariationofpatientcharacteristics– illnessandseverityof illness–revealsthat
neitherthelevelofpatienthealthbenefitthatcouldbemaximallyrealizedbythephysician,
nor the increase (and decrease, respectively) of health benefit that results from an
additional unit of medical service systematically affects physicians' decisions. Only the
quantity yielding the maximum health benefit clearly influences the choice of medical
services.Themoretheoptimumquantityforthepatientdeviatesfromtheprofitmaximizing
quantity for the physician, the more underprovision in a capitation payment scheme or
overprovisioninafeeforservicepaymentscheme,respectively,isobserved.
Combining capitation with feeforservice incentives, we find that the significant
underprovision and overprovision of medical services observed with CAP and FFS,
respectively,canbemitigatedsignificantly.Evenifthesupplementedpureschemereceives
relatively littleweight,weobserveasignificant increaseof thequantityofmedicalservice
providedbyphysicians.Accordingly,ourexperimentaldataprovidingadirectmeasurefor
thepatients’healthbenefitrevealthatpatientsexperienceahigherhealthbenefitinmixed
paymentschemescomparedtopurepaymentschemes.Interestingly,ourfindingrelatesto
evidencefromfieldstudiesarguingthatpatientarebetteroffafterthechangefromapure
to a mixed scheme (e.g., Krasnik et al., 1990, or Iversen and Luras, 2000). Moreover,
presenting physician’s profit as the result of a mixed incentive scheme instead of a
capitation scheme already significantly increases physicians’ care for the patient. That is,
mixingpurepaymentschemeswitheachotherpositivelyaffectsprovisionbehaviorbeyond
themeremonetaryincentives.
Ouranalysisoftotalexpendituresforphysicians’paymentdemonstratesthatitispossibleto
designmixedschemes thatdecrease the totalpayment forphysicians,but still reduce the
physicians’ deviation from the patient optimal quantity ofmedical care. These results are
appealing from awelfare economics perspective. Calculating the ratio of patient benefits
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andphysicians’remunerationwefindthatournonadjustedmixedschemewitharelatively
highweightonthecapitationcomponentyieldsthehighestbenefitremunerationratio.
Assuch,ourexperimentalstudyprovidesvaluable implicationsforhealthcarereformsthat
includetheintroductionofmixedpaymentschemesforphysicians.Apolicymakerorathird
party payer focusing on a wellbalanced ratio between expenditures for physicians’
remunerationandpatients’healthbenefitwouldfavoramixedcapitationschemethatdoes
not adjust physicians' maximum payment to the level of the previous pure capitation
paymentscheme.Athirdpartypayerinterestedinthepatienthealthbenefitwouldoptfor
anadjustedcapitationschemewithahighweightonthelumpsumcomponentinstead.
 
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AppendixA:Instructions+ComprehensionQuestions

WelcometotheExperiment!
Preface
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision behavior. You and the other
participantswillbeaskedtomakedecisionsforwhichyoucanearnmoney.Yourpayoffdependson
thedecisionsyoumake.Attheendoftheexperiment,yourpayoffwillbeconvertedtoEuroandpaid
toyouincash.Duringtheexperiment,allamountsarepresentedintheexperimentalcurrencyTaler.
10Talerequals8Euro.
The experiment will take about 90 minutes and consists of two parts. You will receive detailed
instructionsbeforeeachpart.Notethatnoneofyourdecisionsineitherparthaveanyinfluenceon
theotherpartoftheexperiment.
PartOne
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to
answeranyquestionsyoumayhave.Ifyouhavequestionsatanytimeduringtheexperiment,please
raiseyourhandandwewillcometoyou.
Partoneoftheexperimentconsistsof9roundsofdecisionsituations.
DecisionSituations
Ineachroundyoutakeontheroleofaphysiciananddecideonmedicaltreatmentforapatient.That
is, you determine the quantity ofmedical services youwish to provide to the patient for a given
illnessandagivenseverityofthisillness.
Everypatient is characterizedbyoneof three illnesses (A,B,C), eachofwhich canoccur in three
differentdegreesof severity (x,y, z). Ineachconsecutivedecision roundyouwill faceonepatient
who ischaracterizedbyoneof the9possiblecombinationsof illnessesanddegreesofseverity (in
randomorder).Yourdecisionistoprovideeachofthese9patientswithaquantityof0,1,2,3,4,5,
6,7,8,9,or10medicalservices.
Profit
Ineachroundyoureceiveafeeforservice(capitation)remunerationfortreatingthepatient.Your
remuneration increases with the amount of medical treatment (is irrespective of the amount of
medicaltreatment)youprovide.Youalsoincurcostsfortreatingthepatient,whichlikewisedepend
on the quantity of services you provide. Your profit for each decision is calculated by subtracting
thesecostsfromthefeeforservice(capitation)remuneration.
Everyquantityofmedicalserviceyieldsaparticularbenefitforthepatient–contingentonhisillness
andseverity.Hence,inchoosingthemedicalservicesyouprovide,youdeterminenotonlyyourown
profitbutalsothepatient’sbenefit.
In each round youwill receivedetailed informationon your screen (seebelow) for the respective
patient the illness, your amount of feeforservice (capitation) remuneration  for each possible
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amount ofmedical treatment   your costs, profit aswell as the benefit for the patientwith the
correspondingillnessandseverity.


Payment
Attheendoftheexperimentoneofthe9roundsofpartonewillbechosenatrandom.Yourprofitin
thisroundwillbepaidtoyouincash.
Forthispartoftheexperiment,nopatientsarephysicallypresentinthelaboratory.Yet,thepatient
benefitdoesaccruetoarealpatient:Theamountresultingfromyourdecisionwillbetransferredto
theChristoffelBlindenmissionDeutschlande.V.,64625Bensheim,anorganizationwhich funds the
treatmentofpatientswitheyecataract.
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ThetransferofmoneytotheChristoffelBlindenmissionDeutschlande.V.willbecarriedoutafterthe
experimentby theexperimenter andoneparticipant. Theparticipant completes amoney transfer
form,fillinginthetotalpatientbenefit(inEuro)resultingfromthedecisionsmadebyallparticipants
intherandomlychosensituation.Thisformpromptsthepaymentofthedesignatedamounttothe
Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. by the University of DuisburgEssen’s finance
department.Theformisthensealedinapostpaidenvelopeandpostedinthenearestmailboxbythe
participantandtheexperimenter.
Aftertheentireexperimentiscompleted,oneparticipantischosenatrandomtooverseethemoney
transfer to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. The participant receives an additional
compensationof5Euroforthistask.Theparticipantcertifiesthattheprocesshasbeencompleted
asdescribedherebysigningastatementwhichcanbeinspectedbyallparticipantsattheofficeof
the Chair of Quantitative Economic Policy. A receipt of the bank transfer to the Christoffel
BlindenmissionDeutschlande.V.mayalsobeviewedhere.
ComprehensionQuestions
Priortothedecisionroundswekindlyaskyoutoanswerafewcomprehensionquestions.Theyare
intended to help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have any questions
aboutthis,pleaseraiseyourhand.Partoneoftheexperimentwillbeginonceallparticipantshave
answeredthecomprehensionquestionscorrectly.
 
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PartII
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to
answeranyquestionsyoumayhave.Ifyouhavequestionsatanytimeduringtheexperiment,please
raiseyourhandandwewillcometoyou.
Parttwooftheexperimentalsoconsistsof9roundsofdecisionsituations.
DecisionSituations
As inpartoneoftheexperiment,youtakeontheroleofaphysician ineachroundanddecideon
medicaltreatmentforapatient.Thatis,youdeterminethequantityofmedicalservicesyouwishto
providetothepatientforagivenillnessandagivenseverityofthisillness.
Everypatient is characterizedbyoneof three illnesses (A,B,C), eachofwhich canoccur in three
differentdegreesof severity (x,y, z). Ineachconsecutivedecision roundyouwill faceonepatient
who ischaracterizedbyoneof the9possiblecombinationsof illnessesanddegreesofseverity (in
randomorder).Yourdecisionistoprovideeachofthese9patientswithaquantityof0,1,2,3,4,5,
6,7,8,9,or10medicalservices.
Profit
In each round you are remunerated for treating the patient. In each round you receive a feefor
service (capitation) remuneration for treating the patient. Your remuneration increases with the
amountofmedical treatment (is irrespectiveof theamountofmedical treatment)youprovide. In
addition to this, in each round you receive a capitation remunerationwhich is irrespective of the
amountofmedical treatment (a feeforservice remunerationwhich increaseswith theamountof
medical treatment). You also incur costs for treating the patient, which likewise depend on the
quantityofservicesyouprovide.Yourprofitforeachdecisioniscalculatedbysubtractingthesecosts
fromthesumofyourfeeforservice(capitation)andcapitation(feeforservice)remuneration.
As in part one, every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient –
contingent on his illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you
determinenotonlyyourownprofitbutalsothepatient’sbenefit.
In each round youwill receivedetailed informationon your screen (seebelow) for the respective
patient the illness, your amount of feeforservice (capitation) remuneration  for each possible
amountofmedical treatment  theamountofyourcapitation (feeforservice) remuneration,your
costs,profitaswellasthebenefitforthepatientwiththecorrespondingillnessandseverity.
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Payment
Attheendoftheexperimentoneofthe9roundsofparttwowillbechosenatrandom.Yourprofitin
thisroundwillbepaidtoyouincash, inadditiontoyourpaymentfromtheroundchosenforpart
oneoftheexperiment.
Aftertheexperimentisover,pleaseremainseateduntiltheexperimenterasksyoutostepforward.
Youwillreceiveyourpaymentatthefrontofthelaboratorybeforeexitingtheroom.
As inpartone,nopatientsarephysicallypresent inthelaboratoryforparttwooftheexperiment.
Yet,thepatientbenefitdoesaccruetoarealpatient:Theamountresultingfromyourdecisionwill
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betransferredtotheChristoffelBlindenmissionDeutschlande.V.,64625Bensheim,anorganization
whichfundsthetreatmentofpatientswitheyecataract.
The process for the transfer of money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. as
describedforpartoneoftheexperimentwillbecarriedoutbytheexperimenterandoneparticipant.
ComprehensionQuestions
Priortothedecisionroundswekindlyaskyoutoanswerafewcomprehensionquestions.Theyare
intended to help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have any questions
aboutthis,pleaseraiseyourhand.Parttwooftheexperimentwillbeginonceallparticipantshave
answeredthecomprehensionquestionscorrectly.
Finally,wekindlyaskyoutonottalktoanyoneaboutthecontentofthissessioninordertoprevent
influencingotherparticipantsafteryou.Thankyouforyourcollaboration!



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ComprehensionQuestionsPartI:CAP(FFS)
QuestionsTables14:
14a)Whatisthecapitation(feeforservice)?
14b)Whatarethecosts?
14c)Whatistheprofit?
14d)Whatisthepatientbenefit?
Quantityofmedical
treatment
Capitation
(Feeforservice)
(inTaler)
Costs
(inTaler)
Profit
(inTaler)
Benefitof the
patientwithillness
Fandseverityy
(inTaler)
0 20.00(0.00) 0.00 20.00(0.00) 15.00
1 20.00(4.00) 0.20 19.80(3.80) 16.00
2 20.00(8.00) 0.80 19.20(7.20) 17.00
3 20.00(12.00) 1.80 18.20(10.20) 18.00
4 20.00(16.00) 3.20 16.80(12.80) 19.00
5 20.00(20.00) 5.00 15.00(15.00) 20.00
6 20.00(24.00) 7.20 12.80(16.80) 19.00
7 20.00(28.00) 9.80 10.20(18.20) 18.00
8 20.00(32.00) 12.80 7.20(19.20) 17.00
9 20.00(36.00) 16.20 3.80(19.80) 16.00
10 20.00(40.00) 20.00 0.00(20.00) 15.00
1. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide2quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
2. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide9quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
Quantityofmedical
treatment
Capitation
(Feeforservice)
(inTaler)
Costs
(inTaler)
Profit
(inTaler)
Benefitof the
patientwithillness
Gandseverityz
(inTaler)
0 20.00(0.00) 0.00 20.00(0.00) 10.00
1 20.00(4.00) 0.20 19.80(3.80) 12.00
2 20.00(8.00) 0.80 19.20(7.20) 14.00
3 20.00(12.00) 1.80 18.20(10.20) 16.00
4 20.00(16.00) 3.20 16.80(12.80) 18.00
5 20.00(20.00) 5.00 15.00(15.00) 20.00
6 20.00(24.00) 7.20 12.80(16.80) 22.00
7 20.00(28.00) 9.80 10.20(18.20) 24.00
8 20.00(32.00) 12.80 7.20(19.20) 22.00
9 20.00(36.00) 16.20 3.80(19.80) 20.00
10 20.00(40.00) 20.00 0.00(20.00) 18.00
3. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide2quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
4. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide9quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
32

ComprehensionQuestionsPartII:MixmoreCAP(FFS)
14a)Whatisthecapitation(feeforservice)?
14a)Whatisthefeeforservice(capitation)?
14b)Whatarethecosts?
14c)Whatistheprofit?
14d)Whatisthepatientbenefit?
Quantityof
medical
treatment
Capitation
(Feeforservice
(inTaler)
FeeforService
(Capitation)
(inTaler)
Costs
(inTaler)
Profit
(inTaler)

Benefitof the
patientwith
illnessFand
severityy(in
Taler)
0 19.20(0.00) 0.00(7.20) 0.00 19.20(7.20) 15.00
1 19.20(3.20) 0.80(7.20) 0.20 19.80(10.20) 16.00
2 19.20(6.40) 1.60(7.20) 0.80 20.00(12.80) 17.00
3 19.20(9.60) 2.40(7.20) 1.80 19.80(15.00) 18.00
4 19.20(12.80) 3.20(7.20) 3.20 19.20(16.80) 19.00
5 19.20(16.00) 4.00(7.20) 5.00 18.20(18.20) 20.00
6 19.20(19.20) 4.80(7.20) 7.20 16.80(19.20) 19.00
7 19.20(22.40) 5.60(7.20) 9.80 15.00(19.80) 18.00
8 19.20(25.60) 6.40(7.20) 12.80 12.80(20.00) 17.00
9 19.20(28.80) 7.20(7.20) 16.20 10.20(19.80) 16.00
10 19.20(32.00) 8.00(7.20) 20.00 7.20(19.20) 15.00
1. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide1quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
2. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide8quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
Quantityof
medical
treatment
Capitation
(Feeforservice
(inTaler)
FeeforService
(Capitation)
(inTaler)
Costs
(inTaler)
Profit
(inTaler)
Benefitof the
patientwith
illnessGand
severityz(in
Taler)
0 19.20(0.00) 0.00(7.20) 0.00 19.20(7.20) 10.00
1 19.20(3.20) 0.80(7.20) 0.20 19.80(10.20) 12.00
2 19.20(6.40) 1.60(7.20) 0.80 20.00(12.80) 14.00
3 19.20(9.60) 2.40(7.20) 1.80 19.80(15.00) 16.00
4 19.20(12.80) 3.20(7.20) 3.20 19.20(16.80) 18.00
5 19.20(16.00) 4.00(7.20) 5.00 18.20(18.20) 20.00
6 19.20(19.20) 4.80(7.20) 7.20 16.80(19.20) 22.00
7 19.20(22.40) 5.60(7.20) 9.80 15.00(19.80) 24.00
8 19.20(25.60) 6.40(7.20) 12.80 12.80(20.00) 22.00
9 19.20(28.80) 7.20(7.20) 16.20 10.20(19.80) 20.00
10 19.20(32.00) 8.00(7.20) 20.00 7.20(19.20) 18.00
3. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide1quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
4. Assumethataphysicianwantstoprovide8quantitiesofmedicaltreatmentforthepatient
depictedabove.
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
AppendixB:ParameterTables

TableB.1
Quantity(q)
Treatment Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AC2
+
A  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
+
AA'#3 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6
+
AA445 0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4
AC4
+
A  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
+
AA'#3 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
+
AA445 0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4 4.8 5.6 6.4 7.2 8
AF8
+
A  0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
+
AA'#3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
+
AA445 0 1.6 3.2 4.8 6.4 8 9.6 11.2 12.8 14.4 16
AF6
+
A  0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
+
AA'#3 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
+
AA445 0 1.2 2.4 3.6 4.8 6 7.2 8.4 9.6 10.8 12
NAC2
+
A  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
+
AA'#3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
+
AA445 0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4
NACF8
+
A  0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
+
AA'#3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
+
AA445 0 1.6 3.2 4.8 6.4 8 9.6 11.2 12.8 14.4 16
all  0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10
AC2
!
A  10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0
!
AA  9.6 9.9 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6
AC4
!
A  10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0
!
AA  8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4
AF8
!
A  0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10
!
AA  3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10 9.9 9.6
AF6
!
A  0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10
!
AA  6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4
NAC2
!
A  10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0
!
AA  8 8.3 8.4 8.3 8 7.5 6.8 5.9 4.8 3.5 2
NACF8
!
A  0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10
!
AA  2 3.5 4.8 5.9 6.8 7.5 8 8.3 8.4 8.3 8
all #B 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
#C 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2
#D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4
&B 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
&C 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5
&D 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7
'B 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
'C 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4
 'D 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8

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
TableB.2ExperimentalParametersinConditionPC2

Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
+
A  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
+
AA'#3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
+
AA445 0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4

A3;<= 7 6.7 6.6 6.7 7 7.5 8.2 9.1 10.2 11.5 13

AA  0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10
!
A3;<= 8 8.3 8.4 8.3 8 7.5 6.8 5.9 4.8 3.5 2
!
AA  8 8.3 8.4 8.3 8 7.5 6.8 5.9 4.8 3.5 2



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1. Introduction 
For policy makers, improving quality in the health care market has been a major issue in 
recent years (McCellan, 2011). Thus, the reform of reimbursement for health care providers, 
i.e. physicians, has become seminal. As established capitation or fee-for-service schemes 
rather "pay" physicians for the quantity than for the quality of medical treatment, policy 
makers have started to implement monetary pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes to 
incentivize quality improvement. By now, payment schemes including P4P incentives have 
been introduced in many countries, e.g. the UK (Doran et al., 2006, Campbell et al., 2009), 
the USA (Rosenthal et al., 2004, and Rosenthal, 2008), Australia (Duckett et al. 2008, Scott 
2008, Scott et al. 2009), France (Mousquès et al., 2012), Korea (Kim, 2010), New Zealand 
(Perkins and Seddon, 2006, and Buetow, 2008), or Spain (Gené-Badia et al. , 2007).  
Existing P4P incentives vary to some extent, the key determinants are alike, however. First, 
P4P incentives are usually designed as a monetary bonus paid in addition to the basic 
payment, which usually is capitation (CAP), fee-for-service (FFS), or a combination of both.1 
P4P programs with a basic payment of CAP have been introduced, among others, in the UK 
within the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), in the US within the California P4P 
Program, and in Spain. Countries that have implemented P4P programs with a basic FFS 
payment scheme include, e.g., the US (Medicare), Australia, New Zealand and France. 
Second, performance measures usually include a combination of structure, process and 
outcome measures (Donabedian, 2005). Third, the basis for the financial bonus is either an 
absolute measure such as targets or intervals (see, e.g., the QOF in the UK), based on 
improvements in the measure (see, e.g., the Medicare Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration in the US), or a relative ranking (see, e.g., the Value Incentive Program in 
Korea). Fourth, the size of the bonus is rather small, i.e., less than 5 percent of the entire 
remuneration (Borowitz et al., 2010). An exception is the QOF in the UK where the bonus 
amounts to about 20 percent (Doran et al., 2006). 
Despite the increasing popularity of monetary P4P, it is yet unclear whether they actually 
enhance quality and efficiency of care (Borowitz et al., 2010). Reasons for this uncertainty 
include limited access to valid data and design problems leading to negative effects (see 
Maynard, 2012, for a survey). The latter comprise, among others, substituting away from the 
non-rewarded towards the rewarded aspects of quality (Mullen et al., 2010), improving 
quality to the performance target (Campbell et al., 2009), or gaming with quality indicators 
in terms of exception reporting (Gravelle et al., 2010). For the California P4P Program, 
Mullen et al. (2010), e.g., find that P4P did have a positive impact on some of the rewarded 
clinical measures. However, in the cases in which physicians substituted away from 
unrewarded aspects of medical treatment, the gain in quality of the P4P indicator could 
sometimes not be offset by the reduction in the other indicators. In the UK, incentives within 
                                                                
1 Most P4P programs include incentives for primary care physicians, specialists, or hospitals. Since we will focus 
on the direct implications of introducing P4P incentives on physicians’ behavior, hospitals are not considered as 
for their case P4P payments imply additional agency problems. Accordingly, specific payment forms used in 
hospitals such as budgets or DRGs are also not discussed in this study. 
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the QOF seemed to have resulted only in a short-term increase in quality due to quality 
thresholds (Campbell et al., 2009) and even triggered unintended gaming with the quality 
indicators, e.g., in terms of exception reporting (Gravelle et al., 2010).  
While these examples underline problems of existing P4P schemes resulting from the 
specific designs of performance measures (in particular the difficulty of identifying quality), 
they do not tell much about the effectiveness of P4P incentives per se. Moreover, field 
research on P4P programs often faces the problem that relevant parameters are difficult to 
control like the implementation of additional incentives (e.g., public reporting), regional or 
institutional characteristics of study groups, or the health status of patients treated.2 Hence, 
it is difficult to assess whether the quality metrics used are not reliable or whether the 
financial P4P incentives themselves fail to work. That introducing monetary rewards can 
have negative behavioral effects has been demonstrated in previous field and laboratory 
research. For example, running an IQ task and a donation collection task Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000) observe that implementing a monetary bonus can significantly decrease 
work effort. Similar results have been obtained by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) on the 
willingness to host a nuclear waste repository and by Mellström and Johannesson (2008) on 
the supply of blood donors (see also Frey and Jegen, 2001, for a survey). Accordingly, it is an 
open question whether introducing P4P incentives aimed at achieving an optimal provision 
of medical care actually crowds out physicians' intrinsic motivation. 
In order to prevent costly failures and to guarantee the success of P4P programs, a 
controlled analysis of the effects of financial P4P incentives on physician provision behavior 
is of great importance. The purpose of our paper is to provide such a controlled analysis of 
P4P incentives. In particular, our study contributes to previous research by investigating the 
effects of P4P incentives on the provision of medical care in a controlled laboratory 
experiment. Laboratory experiments are a new and emerging method in health economics 
(see, e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). It allows analyzing individual behavior in a controlled 
environment where only one parameter is changed at a time. External factors like patients' 
health status can be isolated and, if a change in behavior occurs, it can be attributed to the 
change of that one parameter, here the change of the payment scheme. Moreover, in the 
laboratory we can employ a reliable measure for patients’ health status and, accordingly, the 
quality of care making it possible to isolate the effect of monetary P4P incentives from 
effects of deficient quality indicators. Laboratory experiments are a relatively inexpensive 
method to study behavioral responses to reforms. They are, thus, an effective additional tool 
to guide policy makers in designing appropriate incentive schemes. 
In our experiment, participants act in the role of physicians and make decisions about the 
medical treatment of nine different patients. The treatment choice affects the patient 
benefit. The patients differ systematically in their illness and the degree of severity of these 
illnesses. We induce a sequential within-subject design to account for a payment reform 
given the same patient population before and after implementation. In part one of the 
                                                                
2 Many of the P4P reimbursement schemes like the Quality and Outcomes Framework in the UK or Pacificare in 
California have been implemented along with public evaluation programs. 
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experiment, physicians decide about the quantity of medical treatment either under a 
capitation or a fee-for-service payment scheme. In part two, they are confronted with a P4P 
scheme based on capitation and fee-for-service payment, respectively. P4P is designed as a 
performance-based bonus paid in case physicians treat patients close to their optimum. The 
bonus applies to all patients; hence substitution away from unrewarded patients or 
exception reporting is impossible. The experimental design not only allows a controlled 
investigation of physicians' responses to P4P incentives, but also enables us to compare cost-
benefit ratios between the different payment schemes. Moreover, due to our within-subject 
design we are able to identify whether and how patterns of behavior revealed in the basic 
payment schemes change with P4P incentives.  
Our results demonstrate that introducing P4P incentives leads to treatment levels which are 
significantly closer to patient optimal levels than those observed with the baseline incentives 
of CAP and FFS. The degree to which patients benefit from P4P depends on their individual 
characteristics (i.e., the severity of their illness). These results hold for both, medical and 
non-medical student participants. Moreover, comparing patient benefits and physician 
remuneration between the different payment schemes reveals that the increase in benefits 
is outweighed by the additional cost of P4P incentives. Analyzing individual treatment 
behavior shows that there are different behavioral types and that P4P incentives differently 
affect these types. In particular, there is some indication that the financial incentives 
included in P4P might crowd out the intrinsic motivation to care. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present design and procedure of our 
experiment with a special focus on how we designed the P4P incentives. In Section 3 we 
present our results and in Section 4 we conclude. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
In the experiment, we analyze the impact of financial P4P incentives on the quantity of 
medical treatment and, thus, the patient health benefit. Capturing the character of a reform 
we use a sequential design consisting of two parts. In part 1 of the experiment, subjects are 
confronted with either one of the baseline payment schemes, CAP or FFS. In part 2, the only 
parameter we change is introducing a P4P incentive. This procedure allows a controlled 
ceteris paribus analysis. 
The basic design of the decision situation follows Brosig-Koch et al. (2013). Subjects are in 
the role of a physician ݅ and decide on the quantity of medical services ݍ ൌ ሼͲǡ ͳǡ ǥ ǡ ͳͲሽ for 
nine different patients ݆ ג ሾͲǡͳǡ ǥ ǡͻሿ who vary in their illnesses ݇ ג ሾܣǡ ܤǡ ܥሿ, and the 
severities ݈ ג ሾݔǡ ݕǡ ݖሿof these illnesses. For each patient a physician receives a remuneration 
ܴ depending on the experimental condition and bears costs ܿ௞௟ሺݍሻ ൌ ͲǤͳ ȉ ݍଶ which are the 
same in all conditions.3 With each decision, the physician determines her profit ߨ௞௟௜ , i.e. 
ܴ െ ܿ௞௟ሺݍሻ, as well as the patient's health benefit ܤ௞௟. Both, profits and patient benefits, are 
                                                                
3 Convex cost functions are used in several theoretical models describing physician behavior (e.g., Ma, 1994 
and Choné and Ma, 2011). 
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measured in monetary terms. Patients in the experiment are assumed to be passive and fully 
insured, accepting the quantity of medical treatment provided by the physician. 
Patient benefit functions (see Figure 1) take on a global optimum on the quantity interval 
[0,10].4 The optimal level of patient benefit depends on the illnesses, i.e. ܤ஺௟ሺݍכሻ ൌ ͹, 
ܤ஻௟ሺݍכሻ ൌ ͳͲǡ and ܤ஼௟ሺݍכሻ ൌ ͳͶǡ and is achieved when the patient optimal quantity ݍכ is 
provided. Moreover, each illness implies a certain slope of the benefit function, i.e., a certain 
change of benefit resulting from an additional unit of medical service. While the slope of the 
benefit function is the same for illnesses A and B, it is different for illness C. The patient 
optimal quantity ݍכ depends on the severity of an illness, i.e. ݍכ ൌ ͵ for severity x, ݍכ ൌ ͷ 
for severity y, and ݍכ ൌ ͹ for severity z. Taking ݍכ as a benchmark, we can identify the 
magnitude of overprovision and underprovision. The optimal amount of medical services is 
specified for each patient and is known to the physician.5  
Figure 1: Patient Benefit Functions for Illnesses ݇ and Severities ݈ 
 
Patients in the experiment are not present in the lab. The experimental participants are 
informed, however, that the monetary equivalent to the realized patient benefit is 
transferred to a charity (the Christoffel Blindenmission) caring for real patients with eye 
cataract (see also section 2.2). In the following, we explain the payment schemes used in the 
experimental conditions in more detail. 
2.1 Experimental Conditions 
2.1.1. Baseline Incentive Schemes (Part 1) 
The design of the baseline incentives CAP and FFS follows Brosig-Koch et al. (2013). Under 
CAP, a physician receives a lump-sum payment per patient, i.e. ܴ ൌ ܮܵ ൌ ͳͲ. Thus, 
physician ݅ᇱs profit per patient is ߨ௞௟௜ ሺݍሻ ൌ ͳͲ െ ܿ௞௟ሺݍሻ. Under FFS, physicians are paid a fee 
of ݌ ൌ ʹ per service they provide, i.e. ܴሺݍሻ ൌ ʹݍ. Accordingly, physician ݅ᇱs profit per 
patient is ߨ௞௟௜ ሺݍሻ ൌ ʹݍ െ ܿ௞௟ሺݍሻ (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                                
4 A concave patient benefit function has been widely assumed in theoretical papers; see e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 
1986, Ma, 1994, Choné and Ma, 2011. 
5 Thus, there is no uncertainty about the impact of the chosen quantity of medical services on the patient’s 
health benefit. 
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Figure 2: Profits of CAP and FFS Schemes in Part1 of the Experiment 
  
The maximum profit a physician can achieve is identical for CAP and FFS (ߨො௞௟஼஺௉ ൌ ߨො௞௟ிிௌ ൌ
ͳͲሻ, as is the (absolute value of) marginal changes of profits. The profit maximizing quantity 
of medical servicesݍො, however, differs and is 0 for CAP and 10 for FFS (see also Appendix A.3 
for the complete set of parameter values). Given this parameterization, the profit functions 
for the two payment schemes are perfectly symmetric. Since patient benefit functions are 
also symmetric, we are able to fully compare behavior revealed under the two payment 
schemes. 
2.1.2. P4P Incentive Scheme (Part 2) 
P4P programs for primary care physicians and specialists use financial incentives to stimulate 
improvements in the quality of care and, in some cases, reductions in costs. Motivated by 
the composition of actual P4P schemes we chose our experimental parameters. We use the 
CAP and FFS payment schemes as a basis and provide an additional performance-based 
bonus in case the physician provides treatment within a predetermined performance 
interval. We link the performance measure to the individual patient’s health benefit that can 
be interpreted as the health outcome of a certain medical procedure.  
In particular, we design the P4P scheme as follows. P4P incentives apply to all patients; 
hence we exclude problems of multitasking or exception reporting. Physicians are rewarded 
for being “close” to the patient optimal quantity of medical care ݍכǡ which is perfectly 
identifiable in our design. A physician is rewarded with a bonus for those quantity choices 
that do not differ by more than one unit from the patient optimal quantity ݍכ. Whenever the 
physician’s quantity choice differs by more than one unit, she does not receive a bonus. The 
bonus is specified such that we provide higher incentives to treat those patients optimally 
that are in need of a high (low) quantity of medical services in CAP (FFS). More specifically, 
we designed the bonus in a way that maximum incentives are fully comparable across 
different patient types. This means, physicians receive the same maximum profit when 
treating the patients within the predetermined performance interval, irrespective of the 
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severity of the illness.6 We increased the physicians' profit maximum by 20 percent to ߨො=12 
for all patient types to achieve a sufficient difference in incentives to the baseline schemes. 
This increase is in line with the Quality and Outcomes Framework in the UK which was 
intended to increase family physicians’ income up to 25 percent depending on their 
performance (Doran et al., 2006). The remuneration from P4P is 
Ͷ ൌ  ቄ ௟ܲ ݂݅ȁݍ െ ݍ
כȁ ൑ ͳ
Ͳ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
where Pl is the P4P bonus which depends on the patient’s severity of illness l. Given that the 
physician's profit function in CAP is symmetric to the profit function in FFS, and given that 
the maximum profit with P4P incentives is equal to 12 for all patient types, we have 
symmetric profit functions also with P4P incentives. Table 1 shows the bonus for each 
severity in CAP and in FFS. 
Table 1: Parameters for the P4P bonus in CAP and FFS 
Severity ௟ܲ
஼஺௉ ௟ܲ
ிிௌ 
x (q*=3) 2.4 5.6 
y (q*=5) 3.6 3.6 
z (q*=7) 5.6 2.4 
Physicians’ total profits under the P4P payment schemes are calculated by ߨ௞௟௜ ൌ
ܴ௞௟
஼஺௉Ȁிிௌ
௞ܲ
஼஺௉Ȁிிௌ െ ͲǤͳݍଶ and are depicted in Figure 3 (see also Appendix A.3 for the 
complete set of parameter values). By paying the bonus if the chosen quantity is within an 
interval of quantities instead of if it exactly matches the patient optimal quantity, the 
physician’s and the patient’s interests are not perfectly aligned. The physician profit 
maximizing quantities are ݍො௫஼஺௉௉ସ௉=2, ݍො௬஼஺௉௉ସ௉=4, ݍො௭஼஺௉௉ସ௉=6 under CAP P4P and 
ݍො௫ிிௌ௉ସ௉=4, ݍො௬ிிௌ௉ସ௉=6, ݍො௭ிிௌ௉ସ௉=8 under FFS P4P, whereas the patient optimal quantities 
are ݍ௫כ=3, ݍ௬כ= 5 and ݍ௭כ=7. Hence, the incentive from the baseline schemes are still inherent 
in the P4P schemes, but to a substantially lower extent. 
                                                                
6 Recall that the severity of an illness determines the patient optimal quantity q*, which is related to a certain 
payment from the baseline schemes. 
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Figure 3: Profits of CAP P4P and FFS P4P Schemes in Part 2 of the Experiment 
  
2.1.3. Constant Profit Maximum 
Policy-makers who aim at reforming physician payment towards a P4P scheme are often 
constrained to a constant budget. Assuming selfish physicians, it appears reasonable to keep 
the profit maximum constant before and after reforming a payment scheme. To test the 
effect of a constant profit maximum, we model a CAP payment scheme with a profit 
maximum equal to the one in CAP P4P ߨො=12, i.e. CAP12. The lump-sum payment is assumed 
to be 12 resulting in physician i’s profit ߨ௞௟௜ ሺݍሻ ൌ ͳʹ െ ܿ௞௟ሺݍሻ (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Profits of CAP, FFS and CAP12 Schemes 
 
2.2. Experimental Protocol 
The computerized experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and 
conducted at elfe, the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics of the University of 
Duisburg-Essen, Germany. Overall 44 medical students (who are supposed to become 
physicians in the future) and 56 non-medical students from the University of Duisburg-Essen 
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participated in our experimental sessions. See Table 2 for an overview of experimental 
conditions. Subjects were recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).7  
Table 2: Number of Subjects per Condition and Type of Students 
Condition 
Payment Scheme 
Part 1 - Part 2 
Type of Students Total 
Non-Medical Medical 
 
C1 CAP - CAP P4P 23 22 45 
C2 FFS - FFS P4P 20 22 44 
CAP12 CAP12 - CAP P4P 13 - 13 
Total 56 44 100 
The procedure follows Brosig-Koch et al. (2013). Prior to the actual experiment subjects 
were randomly assigned to their cubicles. They had enough time for reading the instructions 
for part 1 of the experiment (when deciding under one of the baseline payment schemes) 
and for privately asking the experimenter clarifying questions. After reading the instructions, 
subjects had to answer several control questions to make sure they had understood the 
decision task. Once everyone had answered these questions correctly, part 1 of the 
experiment started. The order of the nine patients to be treated was randomly determined 
and kept constant for all subjects in part 1 and part 2 of all conditions to make the data 
straightforwardly comparable across payment schemes (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Randomized Order of Illnesses and Severities of Illness 
Patient j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Illness k B C A B B A C A C 
Severity l x x z y z y z x y 
For each of the nine patients, subjects are informed on their decision screen about their 
remuneration, their cost and profit, as well as about the patient’s benefit for each quantity 
of medical treatment. All monetary amounts are given in the experimental currency Taler 
the exchange rate being 1 Taler = €0.08.8 In part 2 of the experiment, we applied exactly the 
same procedure except for subjects now being confronted with a P4P payment scheme. At 
the end of part 2, one decision for each part of the experiment was randomly chosen to be 
relevant for the subject's actual payoff and the patient benefit. We used this procedure to 
                                                                
7 Students who registered in ORSEE to participate in laboratory experiments at the Essen Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics were invited via automatically generated e-mails and registered for a special session. 
We can thus say that subjects were randomly allocated to the experimental conditions. Moreover, subjects 
were not informed about the content of the experimental conditions unless they participated in a session. 
8 Instructions, control questions, and an example of the decision screen are included in Appendix A.2. 
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avoid wealth and averaging effects.9 After the experiment, subjects privately received their 
payment and were dismissed. 
The monetary value of patient benefits for the two payoff-relevant decisions aggregated 
over all subjects was transferred to the Christoffel Blindenmission. To verify this transfer, we 
applied a procedure similar to the one used in Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and Eckel and 
Grossman (1996). After the experiment, a previously randomly determined subject acted as 
our monitor and verified that a correct transfer order on the aggregated benefit in the 
respective session was written to the university’s financial department. The monitor and 
experimenter then walked together to the nearest mailbox and deposited the order in a 
sealed envelope. The monitor was paid an additional 5€. 
Sessions lasted for about 70 minutes. Subjects earned, on average, 16.58€. The average 
benefit per patient was 13.38€. In total, 1,351.78€ were transferred to the Christoffel 
Blindenmission. The money supported surgical treatments of cataract patients in a hospital 
in Masvingo (Zimbabwe) staffed by ophthalmologists of the Christoffel Blindenmission. 
Average costs for such an operation amounted to about 30€. Thus, the money from our 
experiment allowed treating 45 patients.10 
3. Results 
In this section, we first present the average quantity of treatment physicians provide for 
each decision under the baseline payment schemes CAP and FFS. Second, we analyze 
whether patients actually benefit from P4P payment incentives and present a within-subject 
comparison of treatment behavior before and after a reform towards P4P payment. For this, 
we restrict the analysis to non-medical students. Third, we compare provision behavior 
between non-medical students and prospective physicians. Fourth, we check whether our 
results hold when keeping the profit maximum constant. Finally, we classify subjects 
according to their behavior in part 1 and describe type-specific changes of behavior in part 2.  
3.1. Provision Behavior under Baseline Payment Schemes  
Analyzing physician provision behavior under the baseline payment schemes, we find that 
subjects are not purely selfish in the sense that many of them do not provide their profit-
maximizing quantity of treatment ݍො௞௟஼஺௉=0 or ݍො௞௟ிிௌ=10. However, in CAP patients are 
significantly underserved, i.e. the average quantities provided per subject per severity are 
significantly lower than the patient optimal quantities (p=0.0000 Fisher Pitman Permutation 
test for paired replicates, two-sided; FPPP in the following). In FFS, patients are significantly 
overserved, i.e. the average quantities provided per subject and severity are significantly 
higher than the patient optimum (p=0.0000, FPPP two-sided).  
                                                                
9 Various studies confirm that the random payment technique does not affect the power of the monetary 
incentive for non-complex choice tasks (Starmer and Sugden, 1991, Cubitt et al., 1998, Laury, 2006, Baltussen 
et al., 2012). 
10 Subjects were not informed that the money would be transferred to a developing country in order to avoid 
motives like compassion. 
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The symmetry of physicians’ profit functions and patients’ benefit functions allows 
comparing the extent of deviations from the patient optimum between CAP and FFS. From a 
psychological point of view, people might regard choosing a higher quantity of medical 
treatment for the patient (which is incentivized in FFS) less severe than not providing this 
quantity to the patient (which is incentivized in CAP). We do not find such an effect, 
however. In both payment schemes, we observe a similar degree of over- or underprovision, 
respectively (p=0.5911, Fisher Pitman Permutation test for independent replicates, two-
sided; FPPI in the following).  
Figure 5 shows the average quantities chosen per patient for each severity (depicted by the 
vertical lines) as well as physician’s profit and patient’s benefit for each quantity of medical 
treatment in CAP and FFS. 
Figure 5: Average Treatment Quantity per Severity in CAP and FFS 
 
 
Testing the influence of patient characteristics on provision behavior yields a significant and 
systematic effect of the severity of illness (p<0.0746, FPPP, two-sided), but almost no 
significant effect of the illness itself (p>0.2722, except for 1 out of the 6 comparisons where 
p=0.0501, FPPP, two-sided). Thus, neither the maximum level of patient health benefit nor 
the change of benefit that is associated with an additional unit of medical treatment (both 
are implied by an illness) systematically affect provision behavior. Only the quantity yielding 
the maximum health benefit (which is implied by the severity of an illness) influences the 
choice of medical treatment. The more the patient optimal quantity deviates from the 
physician’s profit maximizing quantity (i.e., the more severe the illness is in CAP and the less 
severe the illness is in FFS), the more does the quantity choice deviate from the patient 
optimum (p<0.0004, FPPP, two-sided), see Figure 6. These results are fully in line with the 
observations made by Brosig-Koch et al. (2013).  
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Figure 6: Distance between Patient Optimum and Chosen Quantity per Severity 
  
Result 1: Under CAP (FFS) physicians significantly underserve (overserve) patients. 
Deviations from the patient optimal medical treatment are significantly influenced by the 
severity of a patient’s illness. 
3.2. (Change of) Provision Behavior under P4P Incentives 
Next, we compare subjects’ provision behavior before and after introducing P4P incentives. 
As a patient’s illness has almost no significant (and no systematic) effect on the quantity of 
treatment provided under P4P incentives (p>0.6234, except for 2 out of the 6 comparisons 
where p<0.0232, FPPP, two-sided), we pool decisions over illnesses in all subsequent 
analyses. 
Figure 7 depicts the average treatment quantities for each severity without and with P4P 
incentives. The black horizontal lines indicate the patient optimal quantities. We find that 
implementing a bonus payment significantly reduces the underprovision observed under 
CAP (p<0.0314, FPPP, two-sided) and the overprovision observed under FFS (p=0.0000, FPPP, 
two-sided). Moreover, patients significantly benefit from introducing P4P incentives in CAP 
and in FFS as subjects in the role of physicians reduce their deviation from the patient 
optimal quantity to a similar extent (p>0.5926, FPPI, two-sided). The reduction of deviation 
is significantly affected by the severity of illness, though (p<0.0002, FPPP, two-sided). In 
particular, we observe the highest reduction for the most severe illness in CAP and the least 
severe illness in FFS, respectively.  
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Figure 7: Average Treatment Quantity per Severity without and with P4P 
  
With P4P incentives, we still observe a significant underprovision under a CAP baseline 
payment (p=0.0000, FPPP, two-sided) and a significant overprovision under a FFS baseline 
payment (p=0.0000, FPPP, two-sided).11 But, in contrast to the baseline incentives, the 
distances to the patient optimal level now only significantly differ across some severities in 
FFS P4P, i.e. between severities x and z (p=0.0019) and between severities y and z (p=0.0074 
FPPP, two-sided; see Figure 8). The results are summarized in observation 2.  
Figure 8: Distance between Patient Optimum and Chosen Quantity with P4P Incentives 
 
Result 2: Patients benefit from introducing P4P incentives as these incentives significantly 
mitigate the underprovision (overprovision) observed with the baseline scheme CAP (FFS). 
Though, the deviations from the patient optimal treatment do not completely vanish with 
P4P. 
3.3. Medical versus non-medical students 
Our third research question analyzes whether differences in provision behavior exist 
between non-medical students – who are the typical subjects in laboratory experiments – 
and prospective physicians. In particular, we test the supposition that making a decision in a 
                                                                
11 This result is supported by an OLS regression of the P4P incentive on the quantity of medical treatment, see 
Appendix A.1.  
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medical context might be induced by the different professional background and, accordingly 
leads to different decisions made by the two subject groups (see Ahlert et al., 2012).  
Figure 9: Average Treatment Quantity per Severity for Medical and Non-medical Students 
  
   
Figure 9 shows the average of treatment levels per severity for non-medical and medical 
students. There are no significant differences between the two subject groups in all payment 
schemes (p>0.1599, FPPI, two sided), except a weak one for severity x in FFS (p=0.0505, 
FPPT, two-sided). Only in the latter case we find that medical students are somewhat more 
patient-oriented than non-medical students. Moreover, all previous observations on the 
baseline payment schemes and the effect of P4P incentives also hold for prospective 
physicians.  
Result 3: There are almost no significant differences in provision behavior between medical 
and non-medical students.  
3.4. Robustness Check: Constant Profit Maximum 
Introducing P4P incentives in our experiment is associated with an increase in physicians' 
maximum profit. We, therefore, test whether similar behavioral effects can be observed 
when keeping the profit maximum constant between the baseline and the P4P schemes.12 In 
condition CAP12, we designed a CAP payment scheme in such a way that the physician profit 
                                                                
12 As we find no differences between medical and other students, we pool the data from here on. 
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maximum is identical with and without P4P incentives, i.e. ߨො=12. We find no significant 
difference in average treatment quantities per severity provided between a CAP scheme 
with ߨො=12 (part 1 in condition CAP12) and a CAP scheme with ߨො=10 (part 1 in condition C1; 
p≥0.2397 FPPI, two-sided). Similarly, we find no significant difference between the CAP P4P 
schemes in part 2 of conditions CAP12 and C1, which have the same profit maximum of 
ߨො=12 (p>0.4405 FPPI, two-sided). Accordingly, patients benefit from introducing P4P 
incentives also when this payment reform is not associated with an increase of physicians' 
profit maximum.  
Result 4: It appears that no increase in the maximum profit level is necessary to achieve the 
same patient health benefits.  
This result raises the question on how patient benefits and the expenditure for physicians' 
payment are related to each other in the different conditions. 
3.5. Ratio of Patient Benefit/Physician Remuneration 
In this section, we analyze how patient benefits and the expenditure for physicians' 
remuneration are related in the different conditions. For this, we calculate the individual 
ratios r of the sum of benefits over the nine patients and the sum of respective 
remunerations and compare them between the different payment schemes.13 As already 
noted, patient benefits significantly increase after introducing P4P incentives. But, expenses 
for physicians' remuneration also significantly increase with P4P incentives, particularly in 
conditions C1 and C2 (p<0.0140, FPPP, two-sided). Even in CAP12, where the profit 
maximum is the same in the baseline and in the P4P payment schemes, we find a significant 
increase in expenses (p=0.0002, FPPP, two-sided). We, thus, observe both, an increase in 
patient benefits and in physicians' remuneration. These results support recent field studies 
reporting that P4P schemes increase the quality of care, but come at increased costs (Mullen 
et al., 2010). Compared to these field studies, our controlled experimental environment 
allows clearly identifying the overall effect of P4P on the benefits per monetary unit spent 
(see Table 4).  
Table 4: Patient Benefit and Expenditure on Physician Remuneration per Condition 
Condition 
Part 1 Part 2 
Patient 
Benefit 
Expenditure on 
remuneration 
Avg. r 
Patient 
Benefit 
Expenditure on 
remuneration 
Avg. r 
C1 7.7605 10.0000 0.7761 9.4074 13.7807 0.6876 
C2 7.4656 14.2751 0.6056 9.3624 15.3016 0.6241 
CAP12 8.3504 12.0000 0.6959 9.5983 13.8667 0.6991 
 
                                                                
13 The minimum and maximum possible ratios for the four payment schemes given the nine patient types are: 
CAP (CAP P4P) rmin=0 (0), rmax=1.4 (1.13) and FFS (FFS P4P)  rmin= 0 (0), rmax=5 (3.45). Note that the maximum 
levels for FFS (FFS P4P) are given for a quantity of one as for a quantity of zero the expenditure would be zero 
and thus the ratio undefined. However, we can exclude these cases as none of the subjects chose zero given 
FFS (FFS P4P). 
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Comparing the individual ratios r between the baseline and P4P schemes, we find that they 
do not differ significantly for C2 and CAP12 (p>0.6136, FPPT, two-sided), whereas they 
significantly decrease for C1 (p=0.0040, FPPP, two-sided). Thus, the patient benefits per 
monetary unit spent might even decrease with P4P incentives. Figure 10 illustrates the 
average benefit-expenditure ratios per condition before and after the P4P reform.  
 
Figure 10: Average Benefit/Remuneration per Condition before and after the Reform 
 
Result 5: The increase in patient benefits cannot overcompensate the additional 
expenditures associated with pay-for-performance incentives. 
3.6. Individual Behavior 
In this section, we focus on individual behavior and its changes between the two parts of the 
experiment. In particular, we identify four behavioral types: profit maximizing subjects (PMs) 
choosing their profit maximum quantity, benefit maximizing subjects (BMs) choosing the 
patient optimal quantity, trade-off types (TOs) choosing a quantity between the profit 
maximum and the patient optimal quantity, and others (Os) whose quantity choices cannot 
be explained by these types.14 We define a subject to match one of these four behavioral 
types if the majority of his/her decisions in each part of the experiment is consistent with 
the classification criterion. If this is not the case we classify the subject as non-consistent 
(NCs).15 The number of subjects per type in each condition and part of the experiment is 
given in Table 5. We pool our data over medical and non-medical students as the 
distribution of behavioral types across these subject groups is not significantly different 
(baseline: p=0.834, P4P incentives: p=0.970, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; 
supporting our results in section 3.3). Similarly, we pool our data over (the symmetric) CAP 
and FFS schemes as we find also no significant effect across these schemes (baseline: 
                                                                
14 Our design does not allow identifying social welfare optimizers, i.e. subjects who choose the quantity yielding 
the maximum sum of patient benefit and physician profit. The reason is that we cannot differentiate clearly 
between subjects who maximize social welfare and those who maximize patient benefits except for two of the 
nine patients for whom social welfare-maximizing quantities differ from patient optimal ones. 
15 This class comprises subjects that choose Pareto-inefficient quantities. 
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p=0.900, P4P incentives: p=0.970, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; supporting our 
results in sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
Table 5: Distribution of Patient Types per Part  
  Baseline Payment With P4P Incentives 
PM 10 63 
BM 26 33 
TO 56 0 
O 1 1 
NC 7 3 
Total 100 100 
Our classification reveals that, without P4P incentives, 56 percent of subjects can be 
classified as TOs, 26 percent as BMs, and only 10 percent as PMs. After introducing P4P 
incentives, 63 percent of subjects can be classified as PMs. Also, the fraction of BMs is 
increased to 33 percent. Obviously, as the loss of profits associated with an optimal medical 
treatment decreases with P4P incentives, more subjects are willing to bear this lower loss to 
consistently treat their patients in an optimal way. Since the distance between the profit 
maximum quantity and the benefit maximum quantity is only one unit in part 2, it is not 
possible to identify TOs in this part. While, in part 1, there are 7 percent of subjects whose 
behavior is not consistent with one of the four types, in part 2 the percentage of NCs is 
decreased to 3 percent. Only 1 subject (1 percent of overall decisions) does not follow the 
behavioral pattern of PM, BM, or TO.  
The analysis of individual changes of behavior between the two parts reveals a more 
detailed picture of how P4P incentives work (see Table 6). We find that only 29 percent of 
subjects do not change their type. These are particularly PMs (90 percent of them do not 
change their type) and BMs (77 percent of them do not change their type). For all other 
subjects (71 percent) the type classification changes with P4P incentives. The majority of 
them are TOs (56 out of 71) who mainly switch to either PM (45) or, to a minor degree, BM 
(8). The six BMs who change their behavior, switch to PM. The latter finding indicates that 
the monetary P4P incentives might crowd out the subjects’ intrinsic motivation to maximize 
patient benefits, at least to some degree. 
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Table 6: Individual Type Changes from Part 1 to Part 2 per Patient 
Type Changes Number of Subjects 
PM-PM 9 
PM-O 1 
BM-BM 20 
BM-PM 6 
TO-PM 45 
TO-BM 8 
TO-NC 3 
O-BM 1 
NC-PM 4 
NC-BM 3 
Total 100 
Another way to classify subjects is to use a measure averaging the treatment behavior over 
all patients. We base our classifications on the individual absolute distance between the 
chosen quantity and the patient optimal quantity averaged over all nine patients per part 
(݀௜).
16 The classifications are derived as follows.  
First, we consider the classification of BMs. The patient optimal quantity averaged over all 
nine patients is ݍ௞௟כ ൌ ͷ irrespective of the payment scheme. Accordingly, patient optimal 
treatment implies that the chosen quantities averaged over all nine patients do not deviate 
from ݍ௞௟כ ൌ ͷ, i.e. the patient optimal distance over all nine patients is ݀௞௟כ ൌ Ͳ. To be 
classified as a BM we allow for an individual deviation of less than 0.5 from the patient 
optimal distance, i.e, ݀௜ ൏ ͲǤͷǤ  
Second, we derive the classification of PMs. With baseline incentives in part 1, the profit 
maximizing quantity for all nine patients is ݍො௞௟ ൌ Ͳ for CAP and ݍො௞௟ ൌ ͳͲ for FFS. Thus, the 
profit maximizing distance to the patient optimal quantity (ݍ௞௟כ ൌ ͷ) is መ݀௞௟ ൌ ͷ under both 
baseline schemes. With P4P incentives in part 2, the profit maximizing quantity for all nine 
patients is ݍො௞௟ ൌ Ͷ for CAP P4P and ݍො௞௟ ൌ ͸ for FFS P4P. Hence, the profit maximizing 
distance to the patient optimal quantity ሺݍ௞௟כ ൌ ͷሻ is መ݀௞௟ ൌ ͳ for both P4P schemes, We keep 
the classification of PMs comparable between the two schemes insofar as the thresholds, i.e. 
the allowed deviations from the optimal distances, are the same in both schemes. With 
baseline incentives in part 1, subjects are classified as PMs, if ݀௜ ൐ ͶǤͷ. With P4P incentives 
in part 2, subjects are classified as PMs, if ݀௜ ൐ ͲǤͷ.  
Third, we consider TOs who trade-off patient benefits with own profits. Their individual 
distances are in between the ones of BMs and PMs. Hence, with baseline incentives in part 1 
a subject is classified as TO, if ͲǤͷ ൑ ݀௜ ൑ ͶǤͷǡ and with P4P incentives in part 2 a subject is 
classified as TO, if ݀௜ ൌ ͲǤͷ.
17 
 
                                                                
16 Due to the symmetric design of the benefit and payment functions in part 1 and part 2, respectively, this 
measure does not need to be adjusted between CAP (CAP P4P) and FFS (FFS P4P). 
17 Note that given these classifications social welfare optimizers are identical to TOs. 
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Table 7: Distribution of Patient Types per Part 
  Baseline Payment With P4P Incentives 
PM 10 67 
BM 16 33 
TO 74 - 
Total 100 100 
Given this classification, we find that, in part 1, 74 percent of subjects are TOs, 16 percent 
are BMs, and only 10 percent are PMs (see Table 7). This distribution of types is very similar 
to the one based on individual decisions. The percentages change when a P4P bonus is 
introduced in part 2 of the experiment. With P4P incentives, 67 percent of subjects can be 
classified as PMs and 33 percent as BMs. The shift toward profit maximizing behavior, again, 
underlines the effectiveness of financial incentives. At the same time we see that the lower 
loss of profits associated with an optimal medical treatment of patients induces more 
subjects to behave in this way.  
Again, the comparison of the individual classification between the two parts reveals a more 
detailed picture of the functioning of P4P incentives (see Table 8). We find that, with this 
second classification, a similar percentage of subjects (25 percent) who do not change their 
type. Again, these are particularly PMs (100 percent of them do not change their type) and 
BMs (94 percent of them do not change their type). All other subjects (75 percent) do 
change their type classification with P4P incentives. The majority of them are TOs (74 out of 
75) who mainly switch to either PM (56) or, to a minor degree, BM (18). The one BM who 
changes her behavior, switches to PM. That is, the insights generated with our first 
classification also hold for the second one. Note that with this second classification we find 
almost no hint for a crowding out of the intrinsic motivation to treat the patients in an 
optimal way. 
Table 8: Switching behavior of Types between Part 1 and Part 2 over all Patients 
Type Changes Number of Subjects 
BM-BM 15 
BM-PM 1 
PM-PM 10 
TO-BM 18 
TO-PM 56 
Total 100 
Result 6: Profit maximizing subjects and benefit maximizing subjects reveal a rather stable 
behavior between the two parts of the experiment. Particularly those, who trade off the 
own profit with the patient benefit, change their behavior with P4P incentives. The majority 
of them switches to profit maximization (which comes along with an increase in patient 
benefits). 
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4. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to analyze P4P incentives within a laboratory experiment. In contrast 
to a large part of the existing research, the laboratory environment allows isolating the 
effects of financial P4P incentives from other influencing factors and, thus, drawing 
conclusions on how P4P schemes work. In particular, the experimental setting allows 
introducing a clear-cut performance measure directly linked to the patient's benefit which is 
different from many field studies. Our data reveal that physician provision behavior under 
P4P schemes differs significantly from behavior under more traditional fee-for-service and 
capitation schemes. In particular, being paid a bonus for good performance, physicians 
provide patients with medical services much closer to their optimal treatment levels, hence 
improving the quality of care. The observed effects hold for both non-medical students (the 
pre-dominant population analyzed in laboratory experiments) and prospective physicians.  
Our results lead us to conclude that in case quality metrics are well designed in order to 
prevent other problems observed in the field such as substitution from non-incentivized to 
incentivized aspects of medical care (Eggleston, 2005, Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011), patient 
exclusion (Gravelle et al., 2010), or reliability of evidence-based outcome measures 
(Maynard, 2012), P4P incentives may actually lead to better patient outcomes.  
However, comparing the benefit/expenditure ratio of payment schemes without and with 
P4P incentives, we observe in almost all treatments that this ratio is not significantly 
improved when P4P is introduced. In one case it even slightly decreases. From a welfare 
economic perspective, the increase in patient health benefits, thus, cannot overcompensate 
the additional expenditure due to P4P incentives in our parameter setting. This result is in 
line with findings of previous field studies (see e.g. Mullen et al. 2010). Hence, in case policy 
makers aim at improving the quality of care in terms of better treatment of patients, P4P 
incentives can be a successful policy means. However, if policy makers also want to improve 
the patient benefit per monetary unit spent, P4P incentives alone may not be sufficient. This 
insight holds even if the P4P scheme is designed in a way that the profit maximum is held 
constant compared to the baseline payment scheme. This may be an important indicator for 
policy makers in terms of money needed to provide P4P incentives.  
Finally, our analysis of individual switching behavior supports the effectiveness of financial 
P4P incentives. While the majority of physicians trades off patient benefits against their own 
payoff under the basic payment schemes in part 1 of our experiment, most of them become 
profit maximizers in part 2 which goes along with the targeted increase in patient benefits. 
That is, aligning financial incentives for physicians with patient health benefits is a successful 
means to bring medical treatment closer to the patient optimum. Though, in some individual 
cases financial incentives might also crowd out the intrinsic motivation to treat patients well.  
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APPENDICES 
 
A.1. OLS Regression: P4P incentive on the quantity of medical treatment clustered 
by subject 
VARIABLES C1  C2   
P4P incentive 1.546*** -1.789*** 
  (0.366)  (0.283) 
Constant 1.285  9.294*** 
  (0.798)  (0.620)             
Observations 414  360 
R-squared 0.124  0.216 
N_clust  23  20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
  
27 
 
A.2 Instructions and Control Questions 
 
Welcome to the Experiment! 
Preface 
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision behavior. You and the other participants will be 
asked to make decisions for which you can earn money. Your payoff depends on the decisions you make. At the 
end of the experiment, your payoff will be converted to Euro and paid to you in cash. During the experiment, 
all amounts are presented in the experimental currency Taler. 10 Taler equals 8 Euro. 
The experiment will take about 90 minutes and consists of two parts. You will receive detailed instructions 
before each part. Note that none of your decisions in either part have any influence on the other part of the 
experiment. 
Part One 
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to answer any 
questions you may have. If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand and 
we will come to you. 
Part one of the experiment consists of 9 rounds of decision situations. 
Decision Situations 
In each round you take on the role of a physician and decide on medical treatment for a patient. That is, you 
determine the quantity of medical services you wish to provide to the patient for a given illness and a given 
severity of this illness. 
Every patient is characterized by one of three illnesses (A, B, C), each of which can occur in three different 
degrees of severity (x, y, z). In each consecutive decision round you will face one patient who is characterized 
by one of the 9 possible combinations of illnesses and degrees of severity (in random order). Your decision is to 
provide each of these 9 patients with a quantity of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 medical services. 
Profit 
In each round you receive a fee-for-service (capitation) remuneration for treating the patient. Your 
remuneration increases with the amount of medical treatment (is irrespective of the amount of medical 
treatment) you provide. You also incur costs for treating the patient, which likewise depend on the quantity of 
services you provide. Your profit for each decision is calculated by subtracting these costs from the fee-for-
service (capitation) remuneration. 
Every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient – contingent on his illness and 
severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you determine not only your own profit but also 
the patient’s benefit. 
In each round you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the respective patient the 
illness, your amount of fee-for-service (capitation) remuneration - for each possible amount of medical 
treatment -  your costs, profit as well as the benefit for the patient with the corresponding illness and severity. 
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Payment 
At the end of the experiment one of the 9 rounds of part one will be chosen at random. Your profit in this 
round will be paid to you in cash. 
For this part of the experiment, no patients are physically present in the laboratory. Yet, the patient benefit 
does accrue to a real patient: The amount resulting from your decision will be transferred to the Christoffel 
Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim, an organization which funds the treatment of patients with 
eye cataract. 
The transfer of money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. will be carried out after the 
experiment by the experimenter and one participant. The participant completes a money transfer form, filling 
in the total patient benefit (in Euro) resulting from the decisions made by all participants in the randomly 
chosen situation. This form prompts the payment of the designated amount to the Christoffel Blindenmission 
Deutschland e.V. by the University of Duisburg-Essen’s finance department. The form is then sealed in a 
postpaid envelope and posted in the nearest mailbox by the participant and the experimenter. 
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After the entire experiment is completed, one participant is chosen at random to oversee the money transfer 
to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. The participant receives an additional compensation of 5 
Euro for this task. The participant certifies that the process has been completed as described here by signing a 
statement which can be inspected by all participants at the office of the Chair of Quantitative Economic Policy. 
A receipt of the bank transfer to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. may also be viewed here. 
Comprehension Questions 
Prior to the decision rounds we kindly ask you to answer a few comprehension questions. They are intended to 
help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have any questions about this, please raise your 
hand. Part one of the experiment will begin once all participants have answered the comprehension questions 
correctly.  
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Part II 
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to answer any 
questions you may have. If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand and 
we will come to you. 
Part two of the experiment also consists of 9 rounds of decision situations. 
Decision Situations 
As in part one of the experiment, you take on the role of a physician in each round and decide on medical 
treatment for a patient. That is, you determine the quantity of medical services you wish to provide to the 
patient for a given illness and a given severity of this illness. 
Every patient is characterized by one of three illnesses (A, B, C), each of which can occur in three different 
degrees of severity (x, y, z). In each consecutive decision round you will face one patient who is characterized 
by one of the 9 possible combinations of illnesses and degrees of severity (in random order). Your decision is to 
provide each of these 9 patients with a quantity of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 medical services. 
Profit 
In each round you are remunerated for treating the patient. In each round you receive a fee-for-service 
(capitation) remuneration for treating the patient. Your remuneration increases with the amount of medical 
treatment (is irrespective of the amount of medical treatment) you provide. In addition to this, in each round 
you receive a bonus payment, in case the quantity of medical services you provide is equal to the one that 
results in the highest benefit for the patient, or deviates by one quantity from the latter. You also incur costs 
for treating the patient, which likewise depend on the quantity of services you provide. Your profit for each 
decision is calculated by subtracting these costs from the sum of your fee-for-service (capitation) remuneration 
and bonus payment. 
As in part one, every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient – contingent on his 
illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you determine not only your own 
profit but also the patient’s benefit. 
In each round you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the respective patient the 
illness, your amount of fee-for-service (capitation) remuneration - for each possible amount of medical 
treatment -  the amount of your bonus payment, your costs, profit as well as the benefit for the patient with 
the corresponding illness and severity. 
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Payment 
At the end of the experiment one of the 9 rounds of part two will be chosen at random. Your profit in this 
round will be paid to you in cash, in addition to your payment from the round chosen for part one of the 
experiment. 
After the experiment is over, please remain seated until the experimenter asks you to step forward. You will 
receive your payment at the front of the laboratory before exiting the room. 
As in part one, no patients are physically present in the laboratory for part two of the experiment. Yet, the 
patient benefit does accrue to a real patient: The amount resulting from your decision will be transferred to the 
Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim, an organization which funds the treatment of 
patients with eye cataract. 
The process for the transfer of money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. as described for part 
one of the experiment will be carried out by the experimenter and one participant. 
Comprehension Questions 
Prior to the decision rounds we kindly ask you to answer a few comprehension questions. They are intended to 
help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have any questions about this, please raise your 
hand. Part two of the experiment will begin once all participants have answered the comprehension questions 
correctly.  
Finally, we kindly ask you to not talk to anyone about the content of this session in order to prevent influencing 
other participants after you. Thank you for your collaboration! 
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Comprehension Questions Part I: CAP (FFS)  
Questions Tables 1-4:  
1-4 a) What is the capitation (fee-for-service)? 
1-4 b) What are the costs? 
1-4 c) What is the profit? 
1-4 d) What is the patient benefit? 
Quantity of medical 
treatment 
Capitation  
(Fee-for-service) 
(in Taler) 
Costs  
(in Taler) 
Profit  
(in Taler) 
Benefit of the 
patient with illness 
F and severity y  
(in Taler) 
0 20.00 (0.00) 0.00 20.00 (0.00) 15.00 
1 20.00 (4.00) 0.20 19.80 (3.80) 16.00 
2 20.00 (8.00) 0.80 19.20 (7.20) 17.00 
3 20.00 (12.00) 1.80 18.20 (10.20) 18.00 
4 20.00 (16.00) 3.20 16.80 (12.80) 19.00 
5 20.00 (20.00) 5.00 15.00 (15.00) 20.00 
6 20.00 (24.00) 7.20 12.80 (16.80) 19.00 
7 20.00 (28.00) 9.80 10.20 (18.20) 18.00 
8 20.00 (32.00) 12.80 7.20 (19.20) 17.00 
9 20.00 (36.00) 16.20 3.80 (19.80) 16.00 
10 20.00 (40.00) 20.00 0.00 (20.00) 15.00 
1. Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
2. Assume that a physician wants to provide 9 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
Quantity of medical 
treatment 
Capitation  
(Fee-for-service) 
(in Taler) 
Costs  
(in Taler) 
Profit 
 (in Taler) 
Benefit of the 
patient with illness 
G and severity z  
(in Taler) 
0 20.00 (0.00) 0.00 20.00 (0.00) 10.00 
1 20.00 (4.00) 0.20 19.80 (3.80) 12.00 
2 20.00 (8.00) 0.80 19.20 (7.20) 14.00 
3 20.00 (12.00) 1.80 18.20 (10.20) 16.00 
4 20.00 (16.00) 3.20 16.80 (12.80) 18.00 
5 20.00 (20.00) 5.00 15.00 (15.00) 20.00 
6 20.00 (24.00) 7.20 12.80 (16.80) 22.00 
7 20.00 (28.00) 9.80 10.20 (18.20) 24.00 
8 20.00 (32.00) 12.80 7.20 (19.20) 22.00 
9 20.00 (36.00) 16.20 3.80 (19.80) 20.00 
10 20.00 (40.00) 20.00 0.00 (20.00) 18.00 
3. Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
4. Assume that a physician wants to provide 9 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
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Comprehension Questions Part II: CAP(FFS) P4P 
1-4 a) What is the capitation (fee-for-service)? 
1-4 a) What is the bonus payment? 
1-4 b) What are the costs? 
1-4 c) What is the profit? 
1-4 d) What is the patient benefit? 
Quantity of 
medical 
treatment 
Capitation 
(Fee-for-service 
 (in Taler) 
Bonus 
payment 
 (in Taler) 
Costs 
 (in Taler) 
Profit 
 (in Taler) 
 
Benefit of the patient 
with illness F and 
severity y  
(in Taler) 
0 20.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 20.00 (0.00) 15.00 
1 20.00 (4.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.20 19.80 (3.80) 16.00 
2 20.00 (8.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.80 19.20 (7.20) 17.00 
3 20.00 (12.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.80 18.20 (10.20) 18.00 
4 20.00 (16.00) 7.20 (7.20) 3.20 24.00 (20.00) 19.00 
5 20.00 (20.00) 7.20 (7.20) 5.00 22.20 (22.20) 20.00 
6 20.00 (24.00) 7.20 (7.20) 7.20 20.00 (24.00) 19.00 
7 20.00 (28.00) 0.00 (0.00) 9.80 10.20 (18.20) 18.00 
8 20.00 (32.00) 0.00 (0.00) 12.80 7.20 (19.20) 17.00 
9 20.00 (36.00) 0.00 (0.00) 16.20 3.80 (19.80) 16.00 
10 20.00 (40.00) 0.00 (0.00) 20.00 0.00 (20.00) 15.00 
1. Assume that a physician wants to provide 1 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
2. Assume that a physician wants to provide 8 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
Quantity of 
medical 
treatment 
Capitation 
(Fee-for-service 
 (in Taler) 
Bonus 
payment 
 (in Taler) 
Costs 
 (in Taler) 
Profit 
 (in Taler) 
Benefit of the patient 
with illness G and 
severity z  
(in Taler) 
0 20.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 20.00 (0.00) 10.00 
1 20.00 (4.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.20 19.80 (3.80) 12.00 
2 20.00 (8.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.80 19.20 (7.20) 14.00 
3 20.00 (12.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.80 18.20 (10.20) 16.00 
4 20.00 (16.00) 0.00 (0.00) 3.20 16.80 (12.80) 18.00 
5 20.00 (20.00) 0.00 (0.00) 5.00 15.00 (15.00) 20.00 
6 20.00 (24.00) 11.20 (4.80) 7.20 24.00 (21.60) 22.00 
7 20.00 (28.00) 11.20 (4.80) 9.80 21.40 (23.00) 24.00 
8 20.00 (32.00) 11.20 (4.80) 12.80 18.40 (24.00) 22.00 
9 20.00 (36.00) 0.00 (0.00) 16.20 3.80 (19.80) 20.00 
10 20.00 (40.00) 0.00 (0.00) 20.00 0.00 (20.00) 18.00 
3. Assume that a physician wants to provide 1 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
4. Assume that a physician wants to provide 8 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above.  
34 
 
A.3 Parameter Tables 
 
Quantity (q) 
Treatment Variable  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
C1 
ܴ௞௟ூ  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
ܴ௞௟ூூ 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
௫ܲ
ூூ஼஺௉ 0 0 2.4 2.4 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
௬ܲ
ூூ஼஺௉ 0 0 0 0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 
௭ܲ
ூூ஼஺௉ 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 5.6 0 0 
C2 
ܴ௞௟ூ  0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
ܴ௞௟ூூிிௌ 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
௫ܲ
ூூிிௌ 0 0 5.6 5.6 5.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
௬ܲ
ூூிிௌ 0 0 0 0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 
௭ܲ
ூூிிௌ 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.4 2.4 2.4 0 0 
CAP12 
ܴ௞௟ூ  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
ܴ௞௟ூூ 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
௫ܲ
ூூ஼஺௉ 0 0 2.4 2.4 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
௬ܲ
ூூ஼஺௉ 0 0 0 0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 
௭ܲ
ூூ஼஺௉ 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.6 5.6 5.6 0 0 
all  ܿ௞௟  0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10 
C1 
ߨ௞௟ூ  10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
ߨ௫ூூ 10 9.9 12 11.5 10.8 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
ߨ௫ூூ 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 12 11.1 10 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
ߨ௫ூூ 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 12 10.7 9.2 1.9 0 
C2 
ߨ௞௟ூ  0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10 
ߨ௫ூூ 0 1.9 9.2 10.7 12 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10 
ߨ௫ூூ 0 1.9 3.6 5.1 10 11.1 12 9.1 9.6 9.9 10 
ߨ௫ூூ 0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 10.8 11.5 12 9.9 10 
CAP12 
ߨ௞௟ூ  12 11.9 11.6 11.1 10.4 9.5 8.4 7.1 5.6 3.9 2 
ߨ௫ூூ 10 9.9 12 11.5 10.8 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
ߨ௫ூூ 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 12 11.1 10 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
ߨ௫ூூ 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 12 10.7 9.2 1.9 0 
all ܤ஺௫ 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
ܤ஺௬ 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2 
ܤ஺௭ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 
ܤ஻௫ 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 
ܤ஻௬ 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 
ܤ஻௭ 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 
ܤ஼௫ 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 
ܤ஼௬ 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4 
  ܤ஼௭ 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 
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quality reporting, on the quality of medical care is, however, ambiguous. This is often 
because empirical research to date has not succeeded in distinguishing between the 
eﬀ ects of monetary and non-monetary incentives, which are usually implemented 
simultaneously. We use a controlled laboratory experiment to isolate the impact of non-
monetary performance incentives: subjects take on the role of physicians and make 
treatment decisions for patients, receiving feedback on the quality of their treatment. 
The subjects’ decisions result in payments to real patients. By giving either private or 
public feedback we are able to disentangle the motivational eﬀ ects of self-esteem and 
social reputation. Our results reveal that public feedback incentives have a signiﬁ cant 
and positive eﬀ ect on the quality of care that is provided. Private feedback, on the other 
hand, has no impact on treatment quality. These results hold for medical students and 
for other students.
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1. Introduction 
Recent healthcare reforms in various countries have specifically aimed at improving the quality of 
medical care while simultaneously controlling costs (McCellan, 2011). In this context non-monetary 
performance incentives, predominantly in the form of public quality reporting, have gained 
increasing popularity among policy makers as a means to achieving these two seemingly contrary 
goals (Dranove and Jin, 2010).  
Evidence on public quality reporting in medical care shows that while it leads physicians to change 
their provision behavior (Kolstad, 2013), it is not clear that this actually improves the quality of care 
(Marshall, 2000). On the one hand, there is some indication that public quality reporting can 
contribute to decreased mortality rates; see Hannan et al. (1994) or Rosenthal et al. (1997). On the 
other hand, public reporting can also lead to unintended problems, such as a shift in effort towards 
those aspects of medical care that are reported on and away from unreported aspects (Werner et al., 
2009), or the selection of patients towards those whose treatment improves the reported outcomes 
(Dranove et al., 2003, Cutler et al., 2004, Werner and Asch, 2005). Another issue is that regional 
characteristics influence the effects of public quality reporting on the quality of medical care: public 
quality reports have a larger impact, for instance, the more competitive the health care market is 
(Grabowski and Town, 2011). A further issue with previous empirical studies on the effects of non-
monetary performance incentives in health care is that they are often difficult to disentangle from 
those of monetary incentives, especially as these two mechanisms are typically implemented 
together, e.g. in the US Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration within Medicare and in the 
UK Quality and Outcomes Framework. Simultaneous implementation of multiple new incentives 
makes it very difficult to establish what the individual impact of each of these changes to the system 
is, and whether they are in fact substitutes or complements (Maynard, 2012). Hence, Cutler et al. 
(2004) point out that more research on such incentives is essential to understanding the underlying 
mechanisms that drive changes in physician provision behavior.  
From a theoretical point of view, it is important to differentiate between the modes of performance 
incentives, i.e. whether feedback is given privately or in public. Private feedback is a competitive 
incentive which addresses an individual’s self-esteem. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) state that the mere 
possibility of receiving positive feedback can motivate an individual to increase his performance. 
Making someone’s relative performance known to others, however, adds a reputational or image 
aspect to the incentive and speaks to the individual’s desire to gain social status and avoid social 
disapproval (see Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). On the other hand, monitoring performance and giving 
feedback also implies control, which can potentially crowd out pro-social behavior (see Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2008).  
So far there is barely any empirical research specific to the health care sector which distinguishes the 
effect of (private) performance feedback based on self-esteem from that (public) based on social 
reputation. Hibbard et al. (2003) and Hibbard et al. (2005) report on an experimental field study in 
which they examine the effects of private as well as public feedback on the quality of care in 
hospitals. Their design includes two intervention groups, one of which receives both private and 
public feedback and one only private feedback, and a control group which is given no feedback at all. 
They find that hospitals which receive public feedback are significantly more involved in quality 
improvement efforts than hospitals with only private or with no feedback (Hibbard et al., 2003). 
Hospitals in both treatment groups increase their quality compared to the control group hospitals 
with no feedback, although the differences in average performance changes between the two 
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treatment groups were not statistically significant (Hibbard et al., 2005). However, the results of 
these studies are subject to some methodological limitations, such as non-random assignment of 
hospitals to the groups and reliance on self-reported performance measures. 
In non-medical settings, evidence for the positive impact of private feedback on performance is 
provided by several laboratory experiments, for instance Charness et al. (2011) and Kuhnen and 
Tymula (2012) for output in real-effort tasks. The positive impact of rank information on 
performance has also been documented in various field studies, including Mas and Moretti (2009) 
among factory shift workers, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) for high school students, and Blanes i Vidal 
and Nossol (2011) for white-collar workers. However, studies by Hannan et al. (2008), Eriksson et al. 
(2009), and Barankay (2011a and 2011b) all report results from laboratory or field experiments which 
suggest that feedback affects performance either negatively (at least for some individuals or under 
some conditions) or not at all. There is also evidence from laboratory experiments for a positive 
impact of public feedback on performance in non-medical settings, such as contributions to a public 
good (Rege and Telle, 2004) or donations to charity (Ariely et al., 2009). This effect has also been 
found in the field: In a study of Vietnamese language students, Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) report 
that both private and public feedback significantly raise test performance as compared to giving no 
feedback at all. In fact, students who were given public feedback outperformed those who received 
private feedback, though the difference is only marginally significant.  
The lack of evidence for the health care market and the ambiguous results of performance feedback 
in other domains obscure the picture of how feedback incentives might work in a medical setting. 
The relevant studies that do exist in the health domain suffer methodological shortcomings, such as 
reliance on self-reported measures and non-random assignment to intervention groups (Hibbard et 
al., 2003, and Hibbard et al., 2005). The contribution of this paper is to disentangle the underlying 
mechanisms of private and public feedback incentives in the medical context in a controlled 
laboratory experiment. This method allows us to isolate the impact of feedback on the quality of 
medical care from other factors in the physician’s decision environment, such as the simultaneous 
variation of financial incentives, regional system characteristics, and the health status of patients. 
Moreover, laboratory experiments are an inexpensive method to analyze the effects of a planned 
reform before it is implemented, and can thus help policy makers avoid costly failures. Specifically, 
our research adds to the literature discussed above in two main ways: Firstly, we investigate how 
non-monetary performance incentives for physicians affect the quality of the medical services they 
provide. Secondly, we control for the different motivation mechanisms behind public and private 
feedback by implementing the two separately and comparing their respective impact on the quality 
of medical care provided. 
In our experiment subjects take on the role of physicians and make decisions over the medical 
treatment of patients, receiving feedback on the quality of care they provide. To account for the 
character of a political reform, we employ a within-subject design: In part 1 of the experiment 
subjects decide on the quantity of medical treatment they provide for a number of patients and are 
remunerated based on a fee-for-service schedule. In part 2 subjects are asked to make the same 
treatment decisions for an equal number of patients with the same characteristics as in part 1, but 
this time they will receive feedback on their performance at the end of the experiment in addition to 
the remuneration. Physician performance is measured in terms of outcome quality of care for the 
patient and is fully observable, i.e. not self-reported. Feedback is given in form of competitive 
rankings and is either private or public. Subjects who receive private feedback are informed about 
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(only) their position in the ranking of participants on their computer screen. For public feedback 
subjects are asked to stand up while the ranking is read out loud by the experimenter, a procedure 
similar to that used in experimental studies by Rege and Telle (2004) and Ariely et al. (2009). In order 
to account for potential professional effects, we compare the decisions made by medical students – 
physicians in training – to those of other (student) subjects. Patient benefits realized in the 
experiment accrue to real patients as they are transferred to an organization which provides eye 
cataract operations. 
In section 2 of this paper we describe our experimental design. In section 3 we present results, while 
section 4 discusses some policy implications and concludes. 
 
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiment consists of two parts, each containing a choice task with 9 decision situations. All 
subjects hence made a total of 18 individual decisions. 
 
Decision Situations 
The basic decision situation follows that of Brosig-Koch et al. (2013a, b).1 The subject takes on the 
role of a physician and decides on the treatment of a patient. Treatment is performed by allotting the 
patient a quantity of qג[0,1,2, … 10] medical services. With each treatment decision, the physician 
simultaneously determines his own profit π(q) and the patient's health benefit Bkl(q), both measured 
in monetary terms. For each treatment quantity, the physician also incurs costs ckl=0.1q
2 which are 
deducted from his fee-for-service (FFS) remuneration R=2q.2 This basic decision is repeated 
sequentially for nine patients, who differ in the benefit they stand to gain from medical treatment.3 
Each patient suffers from one of three illnesses, kג[A,B,C], which determines the maximum benefit 
he can receive from optimal treatment (BAl(q*),= 7, BBl(q*),= 10, BCl(q*),= 14; see Figure 1). The 
illnesses each take on one of three degrees of severity, lג[x,y,z], which in turn determines the 
quantity of medical services at which a patient gains the optimal benefit from treatment (ݍ௫כ  = 3, ݍ௬כ  = 
5, ݍ௭כ = 7). See Appendix B.1 for a complete set of the parameters adapted from Brosig-Koch et al. 
(2013a). 
                                                          
1 Brosig-Koch et al. (2013b) study the effects of pay-for-performance incentives on physicians’ provision 
behavior. Basing our experimental design on theirs allows us to compare financial and non-monetary incentive 
mechanisms in future research.  
2 We use FFS as it is the principal remuneration structure for primary physicians in most countries, e.g. in the 
US (Medicare), Australia, France, and Germany. Using a different payment structure such as capitation would 
presumably not change the qualitative results of our experiment, as we are concerned with a reform which is 
independent of monetary remuneration. 
3 The order of the 9 patients was determined randomly at the outset of the experiment and then kept constant 
for all subjects and in all variants of the choice task. 
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Figure 1: Patient benefit functions for illnesses k and severities l  
 
 
The physician’s profit-maximizing choice in every treatment decision is to provide the largest possible 
quantity of 10 medical services. As this quantity is always higher than the quantity that maximizes 
the patient’s benefit (due to the fee-for-service remuneration scheme), subjects face a trade-off 
between the two welfare functions in each treatment decision. See Figure 2 for an example of the 
decision situation. 
 
Figure 2: Example of a decision screen in treatments  
 
 
Patients 
The patients in our experiment were not physically present in the laboratory. Nevertheless, the 
monetary value of the patient benefit went to real patients outside the laboratory. We follow 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and Brosig et al. (2013a, b) in this approach to making patient outcomes 
in the decision situations directly relevant to health, rather than mere monetary payments. Subjects 
were instructed that the sum of all patient benefits achieved in the situations selected for payment 
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would be transferred to the charity organization Christoffel Blindenmission, which provides care for 
patients with eye diseases.  
 
Payment 
All monetary amounts in the experiment were designated in the experimental currency of Taler. 1 
Taler equals € 0.80. In keeping with experimental best practice, one decision situation for each part 
of the experiment was drawn at random at the end of the experiment (random payment technique) 
in order to avoid wealth and averaging effects.4 The situations chosen in each session are valid for all 
its participants. Each subject received the combined physician profits achieved in these two 
situations as payoff for the experiment. The benefit received by the patient in these two situations 
was donated to the Christoffel Blindenmission. The donation was carried out immediately after the 
experimental session was completed and was witnessed by a randomly chosen subject (who received 
an additional payment of €5 for this task). 
 
Treatment Conditions 
In order to address our research questions, we conduct two separate treatment conditions: (1) 
PRIVATE and (2) PUBLIC.  
In condition (1) PRIVATE, the first part of the experiment consists of the choice task as described 
above: subjects decide on medical treatment for 9 patients. In the second part of the experiment, 
subjects again make the same treatment decisions for these 9 patients. However, before beginning 
part two of the experiment, they are informed that at the end of this task, all participants in the 
session (typically 12 subjects) will be ranked according to the quality of treatment they provide. 
Treatment quality is defined as the (negative) difference between the realized patient benefit and 
the optimal patient benefit. The highest treatment quality is thus achieved by choosing the patient-
optimal quantity of medical services; in this case treatment quality is zero. This performance 
feedback is given in private, so that subjects learn only their own position in the ranking (on their 
computer screen), but not anyone else’s. Ranks are shared if participants provide equal treatment 
quality. Feedback is provided only for the one decision situation in this part of the experiment which 
has been randomly selected for payment.  
Condition (2) PUBLIC is analogous to condition (1), consisting of the basic choice task in part one of 
the experiment and a feedback incentive for the choice task in part two. Again, subjects are told in 
the instructions for part two that they will be ranked according to the quality of treatment provided 
in the situation chosen for payment. In this condition, however, the ranking is made public among 
the participants of this session: First, the rank table with all participants (identified by their seat 
numbers) is displayed on their computer screens (see Figure 3). Next, in a procedure similar to that 
of Ariely et al. (2009) and Rege and Telle (2004), subjects are requested to stand up (allowing 
everyone to see everyone else over the walls of their cubicles). The ranking is then read aloud by the 
                                                          
4 Various studies confirm that the random payment technique does not dilute the power of the monetary 
incentive for non-complex choice tasks (Starmer and Sugden, 1991, Cubitt et al. 1998, Laury, 2006, Baltussen et 
al., 2010). 
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experimenter. As they are called up, subjects are required to raise a sign displaying their seat 
number. 
We use a within-subject design to account for the character of a reform that introduces performance 
feedback. This allows us to analyze behavior before and after the reform in a controlled way: 
Comparing the decisions made in part one in these two treatments to those made in the incentivized 
tasks in part two (within-subject comparison) permits us to address our research question Q1 
whether feedback incentives have an impact on the quality of medical treatment provided. The 
comparison of choices made in part two between treatments (1) and (2) helps us answer our 
research question Q2 whether the mode of delivering feedback – privately or publicly – affects the 
impact of the feedback incentive on treatment quality.  
 
Figure 3: Example public feedback screen 
 
 
Medical Students  
In all sessions of our experiment, we recruited medical students as well as students of other degree 
programs as subjects. Comparing decision behavior between these groups allows us to clarify 
whether prospective physicians – who have perhaps selected themselves into medical education 
based on specific social preferences, or are influenced by medical professional norms in the course of 
their training, or both – react differently to reputation-based performance incentives. Ahlert et al. 
(2012), for example, find that behavior in situations framed as medical treatment decisions (rather 
than neutral decisions) is impacted by the professional norms of medicine or economics adopted by 
their subjects. However, other experiments carried out at the Essen Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics involving different types of health-related decisions have not confirmed this type of 
professional effect (e.g. Brosig-Koch et al. 2013a, b). 
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Robustness Check  
We test the robustness of our results against the order in which subjects face the incentivized and 
non-incentivized tasks. Aside from experimental design considerations, private feedback could have 
motivating or demotivating effects on provision behavior in the second part of the experiment. We 
reversed the task order in two sessions for treatment condition (1) PRIVATE FEEDBACK: Subjects here 
completed part 1 with a private feedback incentive and part 2 without a feedback incentive. Note 
that we could not test for a reverse task order with public feedback as this would imply the loss of 
subjects’ anonymity in part 1 of the experiment, which compromises subsequent decisions in the 
non-incentivized task in part two of the experiment.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was carried out at the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics (Duisburg-Essen 
University) in June 2012 using the specialized software z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). 144 subjects were 
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and participated in a total of 12 sessions of about an hour each.  
Subjects were allocated to seats in the laboratory by a random draw. They received separate written 
instructions at the outset of each part of the experiment and were given several minutes to read the 
instructions carefully and to ask clarifying questions. At the beginning of part 1, subjects also 
completed several control questions (see Appendix A) which served to ensure that all subjects 
understood the task at hand. The control questions were announced in the instructions and were not 
relevant to any payments earned in later decisions. 
At the end of the experiment all subjects were paid out individually and in private. They received an 
average payoff of €13.51 (min: €7.6, max: €16.00) and generated an average patient benefit of 
€12.18 (min: € 2.4, max: € 22.4). In total, €1754.4 were transferred to the Christoffel-Blindenmission. 
Assuming a cost of €30 per eye cataract operation, this amounts to the treatment of about 58 real 
patients. 
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3. Results 
 
Data 
We consider decisions made by 144 subjects. See Table 1 for the distribution of participants across 
treatment conditions and degree programs. 
 
Table 1: Overview subjects 
 
Impact of Feedback Incentives on Treatment Quality 
In order to analyze whether feedback incentives serve to improve the quality of medical treatment 
provided, we first consider the decisions made by all subjects in treatment conditions (1) and (2) and 
compare their choices in the first task without a feedback incentive to those in the second task with 
feedback. Treatment quality is defined as the (negative) difference between the optimal benefit a 
patient can potentially achieve from being treated and the actual benefit he receives from the 
amount of services he is provided. Average treatment quality thus ranges from 0 (no deviation from 
optimal quality) to -10.3 (the largest possible average deviation from the optimum across all 9 
decisions).  
We consider the aggregated decisions made by our subjects for all patients and across all illnesses 
and degrees of severity, as this best reflects the typical decision situation of a physician who is faced 
with a heterogeneous group of patients within a time interval such as a month or a quarter.5  
 
  
                                                          
5 We control for the impact of the individual illnesses and degrees of severity on the physician’s treatment 
quality in an OLS regression and find significant coefficients for both (see Appendix B.2). This does not detract 
from our results, as our main concern in this paper is with the general situation of a physician facing a 
heterogeneous group of patients. However, the impact of feedback incentives on the performance of 
physicians who deal with more specific sub-populations of patients (e.g. with particularly severe or chronic 
illnesses) is an interesting subject of further research. 
Treatment Number of subjects 
Total Medical students Others 
(1) PRIVATE  60 12 48 
(2) PUBLIC  60 14 46 
(3) REVERSE ORDER (PRIVATE) 24 5 19 
Total 144 31 113 
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Figure 4: Average treatment quality by task 
 
 
In the aggregate, the subjects in our experiment provided treatment with a quality of -2.87 on 
average (so their decisions result in an average loss of patient benefit of 2.87 Taler relative to the 
optimum; SD = 2.86) in decisions without a feedback incentive, and of -2.57 (SD = 2.74) in decisions 
with feedback (see Figure 4). This difference is highly statistically significant in a two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-test (p < 0.01).6 Our first result is thus: 
In general, setting a non-monetary feedback incentive for subjects significantly improves the 
quality of medical treatment they provide to patients.  
 
Effect of Feedback Mode 
Turning to the relative effects of giving performance feedback privately or publicly, we compare the 
effect of the feedback incentive across the treatment conditions PUBLIC and PRIVATE. The public 
feedback incentive in treatment condition (2) led to an improvement in the medical treatment 
quality from -2.97 (SD = 2.83) to -2.48 (SD = 2.68; see Figure 5).7 This difference is statistically highly 
significant (p < 0.01). In treatment condition (1), the private feedback incentive improved the average 
treatment quality slightly from -2.77 (SD = 2.88) to -2.67 (SD = 2.79). This shift is, however, not 
statistically significant (p = 0.64). (The results of these statistical tests are also confirmed in simple 
OLS regressions; see Appendix B.3.) 
 
  
                                                          
6 Unless noted otherwise, all statistical tests presented here are two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests and two-
tailed Student’s t-tests provide very similar results. 
7 Note that while subject behavior in task 1 differs slightly across treatments (1) and (2), this difference is not 
statistically significant (p > 0.10). 
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Figure 5: Average treatment quality by feedback mode  
 
 
This leads to our second result: 
The mode in which feedback incentives are provided matters: While public feedback yields a 
significant improvement in the treatment quality subjects provide, the effect of private 
feedback is not statistically significant.  
 
Medical Students 
The above two results are generally robust to a relevant subject pool characteristic, whether subjects 
medical students or not. Considering sub-samples of medical students and other subjects separately, 
feedback incentives improve average treatment quality from -2.67 (SD = 2.48) to 2.17 (SD = 2.34) for 
the prior and from -2.93 (SD = 2.95) to -2.68 (SD = 2.83) for the latter (see Figure 6). Both shifts are 
statistically significant: p = 0.01 and p = 0.07, respectively.  
 
Figure 6: Average treatment quality by degree  
 
 
The impact of the feedback mode also holds for the two separate sub-samples (see Figure 7): Private 
feedback tends to improve treatment quality, though the effect is not statistically significant: Medical 
students in this group achieve a quality of -3.21 (SD = 2.81) without and -3.05 (SD = 2.66) with the 
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incentive, while other subjects improve very slightly from -2.66 (SD = 2.89) to -2.57 (SD = 2.82). For 
both subsamples, the differences are not statistically significant (p > 0.70). The significant effect of 
the public feedback incentive, on the other hand, is upheld in both groups: Medical students improve 
their treatment quality from -2.20 (SD = 2.06) to -1.41 (SD = 1.71), while others improve from -3.20 
(SD = 2.99) to -2.80 (SD = 2.83); both changes are statistically significant, with p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, 
respectively.8 Moreover, simple OLS regressions show that given public feedback, medical students 
provide significantly better treatment quality than non-medical students (see Appendix B.4). 
 
Figure 7: Average treatment quality by feedback mode and degree
 
 
Hence we find that public feedback significantly improves the treatment quality provided by medical 
and other students, while the effect of private feedback is not statistically significant for both groups. 
The effect for public feedback is significantly larger for medical students. 
 
Robustness to Task Order and Subject Characteristics 
Using data from the two reverse-order sessions, we find that the results of the private feedback 
incentive are robust to providing the quality incentive in part 1 of the experiment and not providing it 
in part 2. Subjects achieve an average treatment quality of -2.38 (SD = 2.52) and -2.13 (SD = 2.45) 
respectively, which does not represent a statistically significant difference (p = 0.31; see Figure 8).  
As mentioned above, corresponding controls for a reversed task order are difficult to implement in 
the public feedback treatment. Making subjects’ decisions or their consequences known to other 
participants in the experiment in part 1 would presumably have an additional influence on the 
decisions made in part 2, obfuscating the effect of purely reversing the tasks.  
                                                          
8While the within-subject effect of public and private feedback is consistent across groups, the treatment 
quality provided in part one (the non-incentivized task) differs significantly across all pairs of subject groups 
discussed in this section (p<0.05).  
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We also estimated OLS regressions to control for the influence of subject characteristics (age, 
gender, family members in the medical profession) and specifics of the decision situation (severity, 
illness, session, whether subjects knew other participants in the session) on the quality of medical 
treatment provided in our experiment. None of these factors adds any explanatory power to our 
analysis (see Appendix B.4). 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We find feedback as a performance incentive to have an effect on the quality of medical care 
provided in our experiment. The effect is, however, dependent on the feedback mode: Private 
feedback has no impact on the quality of care, whereas public feedback has a significant positive 
impact. Our results are robust to a subject’s enrollment in medical education and socio-demographic 
characteristics as well as to changes in the task order. 
So far, there is evidence that physicians react to non-monetary  performance incentives (Kolstad, 
2013), However, there seems to be little evidence that quality reporting incentives actually lead to 
better medical treatment quality and lower health care costs (Dranove and Jin, 2010). This may be 
due to the fact that while treatment quality is typically multidimensional, only some of its aspects 
can be reported, as e.g. in the US Nursing Home Quality Initiative. In this case, physicians may react 
to public reporting by improving quality only for the reported measures whilst decreasing quality 
along non-reported dimensions, for instance by patient selection (Dranove et al., 2003, Werner and 
Asch, 2005). In our controlled laboratory experiment quality is fully reported. Under these 
circumstances, we find public feedback incentives to have a positive and significant effect on the 
quality of medical care provided. Hence, if future policy reforms succeed at establishing more 
comprehensive ways of reporting quality in health care, this should serve as a tool to increase quality 
of care.  
Our results also suggest that the mode of providing quality feedback is important and should be 
taken into account by policy makers. The mere motive of boosting self-esteem which underlies 
private performance feedback does not seem sufficient to align physician interests more closely with 
patient interests. The additional motive of reputation (image motivation) introduced by public 
performance feedback, on the other hand, can perhaps foster quality improvement in medical care. 
Public performance feedback may be a cost-efficient means towards this end – in contrast to 
monetary pay-for-performance incentives, which also serve to raise patient benefit but are not 
necessarily cost-efficient (Brosig-Koch et al., 2013b). Future research in this area should be directed 
towards investigating how monetary mechanisms interact with non-monetary mechanisms, and the 
conditions under which they enhance or detract from each other.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Instructions and Control Questions 
 
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision behavior. You and the other 
participants will be asked to make decisions for which you can earn money. Your payoff depends on 
the decisions you make. At the end of the experiment, your payoff will be converted to Euro and paid 
to you in cash. During the experiment, all amounts are presented in the experimental currency Taler. 
10 Taler equals 8 Euro. 
The experiment will take about 90 minutes and consists of two parts. You will receive detailed 
instructions before each part. Note that none of your decisions in either part have any influence on 
the other part of the experiment. 
 
Part One 
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to 
answer any questions you may have. If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please 
raise your hand and we will come to you. 
Part one of the experiment consists of 9 rounds of decision situations. 
 
Decision Situations 
In each round you take on the role of a physician and decide on medical treatment for a patient. That 
is, you determine the quantity of medical services you wish to provide to the patient for a given 
illness and a given severity of this illness. 
Every patient is characterized by one of three illnesses (A, B, C), each of which can occur in three 
different degrees of severity (x, y, z). In each consecutive decision round you will face one patient 
who is characterized by one of the 9 possible combinations of illnesses and degrees of severity (in 
random order). Your decision is to provide each of these 9 patients with a quantity of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 medical services. 
 
Profit 
In each round you are remunerated for treating the patient. Your remuneration increases with the 
amount of medical treatment you provide. You also incur costs for treating the patient, which 
likewise depend on the quantity of services you provide. Your profit for each decision is calculated by 
subtracting these costs from the remuneration. 
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Every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient – contingent on his illness 
and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you determine not only your own 
profit but also the patient’s benefit. 
In each round you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) on the patient’s 
illness and its severity as well as the remuneration, cost, and patient benefit for each quantity of 
medical services (see screen shot in Figure 1 above). 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment one of the 9 rounds of part one will be chosen at random. Your profit in 
this round will be paid to you in cash. 
For this part of the experiment, no patients are physically present in the laboratory. Yet, the patient 
benefit does accrue to a real patient: The amount resulting from your decision will be transferred to 
the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim, an organization which funds the 
treatment of patients with eye cataract. 
The transfer of money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. will be carried out after the 
experiment by the experimenter and one participant. The participant completes a money transfer 
form, filling in the total patient benefit (in Euro) resulting from the decisions made by all participants 
in the randomly chosen situation. This form prompts the payment of the designated amount to the 
Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. by the University of Duisburg-Essen’s finance 
department. The form is then sealed in a postpaid envelope and posted in the nearest mailbox by the 
participant and the experimenter. 
After the entire experiment is completed, one participant is chosen at random to oversee the money 
transfer to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. The participant receives an additional 
compensation of 5 Euro for this task. The participant certifies that the process has been completed as 
described here by signing a statement which can be inspected by all participants at the office of the 
Chair of Quantitative Economic Policy. A receipt of the bank transfer to the Christoffel 
Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. may also be viewed here. 
 
Comprehension Questions 
Prior to the decision rounds we kindly ask you to answer a few comprehension questions. They are 
intended to help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have any questions 
about this, please raise your hand. Part one one if the experiment will begin once all participants 
have answered the comprehension questions correctly.  
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Part Two 
Please read the following instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to 
answer any questions you may have. If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please 
raise your hand and we will come to you. 
Part two of the experiment also consists of 9 rounds of decision situations. 
 
Decision Situations 
As in part one of the experiment, you take on the role of a physician in each round and decide on 
medical treatment for a patient. That is, you determine the quantity of medical services you wish to 
provide to the patient for a given illness and a given severity of this illness. 
Every patient is characterized by one of three illnesses (A, B, C), each of which can occur in three 
different degrees of severity (x, y, z). In each consecutive decision round you will face one patient 
who is characterized by one of the 9 possible combinations of illnesses and degrees of severity (in 
random order). Your decision is to provide each of these 9 patients with a quantity of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 medical services. 
 
Profit 
In each round you are remunerated for treating the patient. Your remuneration increases with the 
amount of medical treatment you provide. You also incur costs for treating the patient, which 
likewise depend on the quantity of services you provide. Your profit for each decision is calculated by 
subtracting these costs from the remuneration. 
As in part one, every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient – 
contingent on his illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you 
determine not only your own profit but also the patient’s benefit. 
In each round you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) on the patient’s 
illness and its severity as well as the remuneration, cost, and patient benefit for each quantity of 
medical services (see screen shot below). 
 
Payment 
At the end of the experiment one of the 9 rounds of part two will be chosen at random. Your profit in 
this round will be paid to you in cash, in addition to your payment from the round chosen for part 
one of the experiment. 
After the experiment is over, please remain seated until the experimenter asks you to step forward. 
You will receive your payment at the front of the laboratory before exiting the room. 
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As in part one, no patients are physically present in the laboratory for part two of the experiment. 
Yet, the patient benefit does accrue to a real patient: The amount resulting from your decision will be 
transferred to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim, an organization 
which funds the treatment of patients with eye cataract. 
The process for the transfer of money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. as 
described for part one of the experiment will be carried out by the experimenter and one participant. 
 
Feedback 
In addition to your payment you will receive feedback in this part of the experiment on the quality of 
treatment you provide as a physician. The best treatment quality is achieved when the patient 
receives the highest possible benefit. The lower the patient’s benefit from the provided amount of 
services, the worse the treatment quality. 
A ranking of all participants in the experiment will be generated. The ranking is based on the 
treatment quality provided in the decision situation chosen for payment in this part of the 
experiment. The participant with the highest treatment quality ranks first, the participant with the 
worst treatment quality ranks last. Participants with equal treatment quality share ranks. 
 
[Private feedback treatment:] 
You will see your placement in this ranking on 
your screen at the end of the experiment. Every 
participant only learns their own rank, not those 
of other participants. 
 
[Public feedback treatment:] 
This ranking will be shown on your screen once 
the experiment has been completed. A member 
of the laboratory staff will then ask all 
participants to stand up. The ranking will be read 
out aloud. (The participants’ ranks and seat 
number will be stated, not their names or 
specific decisions.) When your seat number is 
called, please hold up the sign with the number 
so that it is visible to all participants. 
We kindly ask you to not talk to anyone about the content of this session in order to prevent 
influencing other participants after you. Thank you for your Collaboration! 
  
23 
Exemplary Comprehension Question Part 1: 
 
Quantity of medical 
treatment 
 Fee-for-service 
(in Taler) 
Costs  
(in Taler) 
Profit  
(in Taler) 
Benefit of the 
patient with illness 
F and severity y  
(in Taler) 
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 
1 4.00 0.20 3.80 16.00 
2 8.00 0.80 7.20 17.00 
3 12.00 1.80 10.20 18.00 
4 16.00 3.20 12.80 19.00 
5 20.00 5.00 15.00 20.00 
6 24.00 7.20 16.80 19.00 
7 28.00 9.80 18.20 18.00 
8 32.00 12.80 19.20 17.00 
9 36.00 16.20 19.80 16.00 
10 40.00 20.00 20.00 15.00 
Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the patient depicted 
above. 
a) What is the fee-for-service? 
b) What are the costs? 
c) What is the profit? 
d) What is the patient benefit? 
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Appendix B: Further Tables 
B.1 Decision Parameters 
Quantity (q) 
Treatment Variable  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
all 
ܴ௞௟௉௔௥௧ଵ 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
ܴ௞௟௉௔௥௧ଶ 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
all ܿ௞௟ 0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10 
all 
ߨ௞௟௉௔௥௧ଵ 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
ߨ௞௟௉௔௥௧ଶ 10 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0 
all ܤ஺௫  4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
ܤ஺௬ 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2 
ܤ஺௭ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 
ܤ஻௫ 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 
ܤ஻௬ 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 
ܤ஻௭ 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 
ܤ஼௫ 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 
ܤ஼௬ 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4 
  ܤ஼௭ 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 
 
 
B.2 Control for Illnesses and Severities (OLS regression, aggregated 
data) 
VARIABLES Aggregated 
Severity 0.647*** 
(0.039) 
Illness -1.013*** 
(-0.0737) 
Constant -3.928*** 
  (0.241) 
Observations 2,160 
R-squared 0.229 
N_clust 120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B.3 Effect of Feedback Mode (OLS regression) 
VARIABLES Private Public 
Feedback Incentive 0.106 0.491*** 
(0.0808) (-0.0989) 
Constant -2.774*** -2.967*** 
  (0.23) (0.253) 
Observations 1,080 1,080 
R-squared 0.000 0.008 
N_clust 60 60 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
B.4 Control for Subject Characteristics 
B.4.1 Descriptive Subject Characteristics (excluding reverse-order subjects):  
Variable Average (120 subjects) Min Max 
Female 0.6 0 1 
Age 23.5 18 49 
Medical student 0.142 0 1 
Econ student 0.325 0 1 
Parents in health care job 0.2 0 1 
Knew other subjects in session 0.31 0 3 
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B.4.2 Regressions (OLS, clustered by subjects, excluding reverse-order subjects):  
 Aggregate Data 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 
Feedback Incentive 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.298*** 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Age 0.00729 
(0.0467) 
Female 0.41 
(0.357) 
Parents in health care job -0.291 
(0.463) 
Medical student 0.389 
(0.371) 
Knew other subjects in session -0.434 
(0.342) 
Constant -3.042*** -3.117*** -2.812*** -2.955*** -2.736*** 
  (1.091) (0.285) (0.186) (0.201) (0.18) 
Observations 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 2,160 
R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.011 
N_clust 120 120 120 120 120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Private Feedback 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 
Feedback Incentive 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106 
(0.0808) (0.0808) (0.0808) -0.0808 (0.0808) 
Age 0.134* 
(0.0703) 
Female 0.0243 
(0.474) 
Parents in health care job (0.849) 
(0.537) 
Medical student 0.51 
(0.586) 
Knew other subjects in session -0.940* 
(0.514) 
Constant -5.819*** -2.788*** -2.533*** -2.672*** -2.524*** 
  (1.635) (0.346) (0.258) (0.257) (0.227) 
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 
R-squared 0.023 0 0.019 0.006 0.025 
N_clust 60 60 60 60 60 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Public Feedback 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 
Feedback Incentive 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Age -0.0322 
(0.0488) 
Female 0.823 
(0.548) 
Parents in health care job 0.772 
(0.859) 
Medical student 1.194*** 
(0.415) 
Knew other subjects in session -0.168 
(0.465) 
Constant -2.185* -3.488*** -3.057*** -3.245*** -2.908*** 
  (1.174) (0.465) (0.264) (0.308) (0.278) 
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 
R-squared 0.012 0.028 0.016 0.041 0.009 
N_clust 60 60 60 60 60 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
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  θ 
"     θ ∈ [θ , θ ]  /  	    #	
f (θ)    	   F (θ)   	    q
   C (q)  Cq > 0  Cqq > 0 /   C 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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B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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Conclusion 
It is well documented in the literature that incentives in the workplace affect agents’ 
behavior, though the way they do varies greatly across production environments 
(Pendergast, 1999). Designing the “right lever”, as Levitt and Dubner (2009) put it, is 
thus of particular importance. Studying incentives empirically is difficult, however, and 
evidence from more complex production situations often lacks controlled analysis so 
that changes in behavior cannot necessarily be attributed to the incentives. The five 
studies discussed here consider two types of complex situations: complex team 
production processes in which marginal productivities of the individuals are not always 
clear, and the complex decision environment faced by physicians, where performance 
in terms of outcome quality is usually difficult to observe. These studies use laboratory 
experiments and corresponding theoretical models to shed light on the underlying 
mechanisms of incentives in these complex situations, while allowing for a controlled 
analysis. The findings of these studies can be summarized in three main results. 
RESULT 1 
The degree of obviousness of performance measures in complex team production 
situations plays an important role for team members’ perceptions of distributive 
fairness.  
In Chapter 1 we analyze perceptions of distributive fairness in complex joint 
production tasks. Joint production is complex in the sense that individual contributions 
to the joint output are not always apparent, as a result of potential negative 
externalities or synergies of the production. We find that if marginal productivities are 
noticeable, but not obvious, team members do not take them into account. The most 
prevalent distribution norm in this case is the accountability principle. Only when 
individual marginal productivities are made highly apparent do people take them into 
account. Our results thus imply that in complex team production designers of payment 
incentives should be sensitive to the degree of salience of the performance measures. 
In cases where individual productivities are not obvious, performance incentives 
should account for observable inputs only. 
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RESULT 2 
Subjects in the role of physicians react significantly to financial and non-financial 
incentives and improve patient outcomes.  
In Chapters 2-4 we analyze monetary and non-monetary incentives for physicians. To 
this end, subjects in the experiments take on the role of physicians and decide on the 
quantity of medical treatment, knowing that the monetary patient benefit will be 
transferred to real patients outside the laboratory. First we analyze physician provision 
behavior under monetary incentives, given a payment reform from basic capitation or 
fee-for-service remuneration to either mixtures of both or additional P4P incentives. 
We find that both types of new payment incentives affect provision behavior, leading 
to treatment levels significantly closer to the patient optimum. Hence, if policy makers 
wish to improve the quality of health care in terms of better treatment of patients, 
mixed and P4P incentives can be a successful means. However, we also find that 
efficiency – in terms of patient benefit per unit of money spent – does not improve 
under mixed remuneration with a constant profit maximum and under P4P incentives 
with an additional bonus. Only lowering the profit maximum of the mixed 
remuneration scheme also leads to an increase in the benefit-cost ratio. Thus, if policy 
makers seek not only to improve patient benefits but also to increase efficiency, they 
must lower the maximum profit level given mixed remuneration. Second, we analyze 
physician provision behavior in a reform from basic fee-for-service remuneration to 
additional non-monetary incentives. The latter include private feedback, which speaks 
to a person’s self-esteem, and public feedback, addressing reputational motivation. 
We find that while public feedback significantly improves the quality of care provided, 
private feedback has no effect on the latter. Concerning the design of future non-
monetary performance incentives, this suggests that only public feedback incentives 
may lead to an increase in treatment quality.   
RESULT 3 
In a theoretical framework in which financial and non-financial incentives are in place 
simultaneously, only an increase in the latter unambiguously affects physician provision 
behavior such that health care costs are reduced and patient benefit is increased. 
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In a theoretical model I consider the case in which financial and non-financial 
incentives are jointly implemented, as is the case in most P4P programs. In the 
theoretical model physicians differ in their degree of altruism and in the extent to 
which they care about their reputation. In particular, I focus on the case of 
overprovision of medical treatment, as improving patient benefit and lowering costs 
should not be mutually exclusive aims here. The theoretical results indicate that, in 
contrast to monetary incentives, improving non-monetary reputation mechanisms 
unambiguously reduces the costly overprovision of medical treatment and improves 
patient benefits. Moreover, when introduction costs are neglected, increasing 
reputation incentives decreases the welfare maximizing price in a fee-for-service 
scheme. For policy makers reputation-based incentive mechanisms may thus be an 
efficient means to simultaneously improving patient care and reducing healthcare 
costs. 
Results 1-3 underline the importance of controlled laboratory experiments in complex 
production situations in the workplace. The five studies of this dissertation contribute 
substantially to the empirical evidence in this area by yielding controlled analyses of 
performance and payment incentives in complex production situations where field 
data is difficult to collect. They also indicate interesting perspectives for future 
research. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Chapter 1 provides pertinent results for remuneration in multiple business practices, 
from joint ventures to co-authored research projects. Future research could target the 
limitations of the study’s design.  In particular, since we use multiple choice questions 
as real effort task, individual productivities are not observable and we cannot 
differentiate between effort, talent, and luck. Consequently, we are unable to 
distinguish the accountability principle from liberal egalitarianism. Future experiments 
could therefore use a design which controls for talent and / or intention, for example 
by letting subjects determine the level of difficulty of the questions they have to 
answer. Moreover, the perceptions of distributive fairness might be different in the 
domain of losses and in the domain of gains.  
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The results presented in chapters 2-4 on the underlying mechanisms of physician 
payment and performance incentives are useful for health care policy makers. The 
experimental design developed and used in Chapters 2-4 is highly innovative and may 
serve as a basis for future research on payment mechanisms and performance 
incentives for physicians. One suggestion for future experiments is to gradually 
increase the complexity of the production process in this context. A key characteristic 
of a physician’s decision environment is the uncertainty about the outcome of the 
treatment (Arrow, 1963). This may affect not only the patient’s benefit, but also the 
physicians’ profits if they are based on patient outcomes (as is the case in P4P 
schemes). In Chapters 2-4, we assumed both patient benefit and physician profit to be 
fully observable. In order to analyze whether P4P incentives also lead to better patient 
outcomes in situations under risk, one could extend the basic design to include 
uncertainty over the patient outcome and over the physician’s profit. In such a 
scenario with uncertainty over the outcome, physicians might treat patients differently 
and P4P incentives may be less effective.1 A second angle for future experiments is to 
allow for multitasking, i.e. by letting physicians make both incentivized and non-
incentivized treatment decisions for different patients under a capacity constraint. 
Multitasking is a critical problem of performance incentives, and physicians might react 
by increasing treatment quality for patients for whom they receive an incentive, while 
lowering treatment quality for patients where they do not face performance rewards 
(Kaarbøe and Siciliani, 2010). In Chapter 3, we assumed that quality is measureable for 
all patients. When integrating capacity constraints into our design, one could analyze 
whether physicians substitute incentivized patients for non-incentivized ones, and 
whether P4P incentives then still lead to an overall increase in quality. 
Chapter 5 provides novel testable predictions for future laboratory experiments. In 
particular, one could analyze the effect of jointly introducing the P4P incentives of 
Chapter 2 and the non-monetary public feedback of Chapter 4. This is especially 
interesting as these two policy means are usually implemented together, e.g. in the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework in the UK. As the effects of these two types of 
incentives are often difficult to disentangle, it is unclear whether they are substitutes 
or complements (Maynard, 2012), or whether monetary incentives even crowd out 
                                                                
1
 For first results see Brosig-Koch et al. (2013, mimeo dggö). 
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reputational motivation mechanisms – as suggested by the theoretical results of 
Chapter 5 and by the experimental results of Ariely et al. (2009) in a non-medical 
setting.  
Once the complexity of a physician’s profession is analyzed more comprehensively, 
future experimental designs may provide a useful and efficient future test bed for 
policy makers. By testing payment reforms in the laboratory rather than in the field, 
policy makers can avoid costly failures and possible disadvantages for certain patient 
types. 
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